Directory:Jon Awbrey/Papers/Inquiry Driven Systems : Part 4

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• Contents • Part 1 • Part 2 • Part 3 • Part 4 • Part 5 • Appendices • References • Document History •

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Part 4. Discussion of Inquiry

The subject matter under review is assigned the name “inquiry”, a name that is presently both general and vague. The generality is essential, marking the actual extension and the eventual coverage that the name is intended to have. The vagueness is incidental, hinging on the personal concept of the subject matter and the prevailing level of comprehension that relates an interpreter of the name to the object of its indication. As the investigation proceeds, it is hoped that the name can become as general as it is meant to be, but not forever remain so vague.

In regarding and presenting this subject, I need the freedom to adopt any one of several views. These are the perspectives that I call the “classical” or syllogistic, the “pragmatic” or sign theoretic, and the “dynamical” or system theoretic points of view. Each perspective or point of view is supported by a corresponding framework or a supply of resources, the intellectual tools that allow a person taking up such a view to develop and to share a picture of what can be seen from it.

The situation with respect to these different views can be described as follows. The part of the subject that can be seen in each view appears to make sense, if taken by itself, but it does not appear to be entirely consistent with all that is obvious from the other perspectives, and all of these pictures put together are almost certainly incomplete in regard to the subject they are meant to depict. Although the various pictures can be presented in the roughly historical order of their development, it is a mistaken view of their progression to think that the later views can simply replace the former pictures. In particular, if the classical view is taken as an initial approximation to its subject, then it can be regarded as relatively complete with respect to this intention, but both of the later frameworks, that build on and try to reform this basis, are very much works in progress and far from being completed projects. Taken in order of historical development, each succeeding view always promises to keep all that is good from the preceding points of view, but the current state of development is such that these claims have to be taken as promissory notes, not yet matured and not yet due.

In accord with this situation, I would like to be able to take up any one of these views at any point in the discussion and to move with relative ease among the different pictures of inquiry that they frequently show. Along with this ability, I need to have ways to put their divergent and varying views in comparison with each other, to reflect on the reasons for their distinctions and variations, and overall to have some room to imagine how these views might be corrected, extended, reconciled, and integrated into a coherent and a competent picture of the subject.

This part of the discussion cannot be formal or systematic. It is not intended to argue for any particular point of view, but only to introduce some of the language, ideas, and issues that surround the topic of inquiry. No amount of forethought or premeditation that I can muster would be sufficient to impose an alien organization on this array. The most that I can hope to bring to this forum is to seek clarification of some the terms and to pursue the consequences of some of the axioms that are in the air. Nor do I expect the reader to be disarmed by this apology, at least, not yet, and never unilaterally, since it is obvious that my own point of view, however unformed and inarticulate it may be, cannot help but to affect the selection of problems, subtopics, and suggested angles of approach.

Taking all of these factors into account, the best plan that I can arrange for presenting the subject matter of inquiry is as follows:

First, I describe the individual perspectives and their corresponding frameworks in very general terms, but only insofar as they bear on the subject of inquiry, so that each way of looking at the subject is made available as a resource for the discussion that follows.

Next, I discuss the context of inquiry, treating it as a general field of observation in which the task is to describe an interesting phenomenon or a problematic process. There are a number of dilemmas that arise in this context, especially when it comes to observing and describing the process of inquiry itself. Since these difficulties threaten to paralyze the basic abilities to observe, to describe, and to reflect, a reasonable way around their real obstacles or through their apparent obstructions has to be found before proceeding.

Afterwards, I consider concrete examples of inquiry activities, using any combination of views that appears to be of service at a given moment of discussion, and pointing out problems that call for further investigation.

4.1. Approaches to Inquiry

Try as I might, I do not see a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing: To begin from a point where there is nothing to question, to strike out in a given direction without putting anything of consequence at stake, and to trace an unbroken, forward course by following steps that are never unsure. Acquiring a theory of inquiry is not, in short, a purely deductive exercise.

At the risk of being wrong, I am ready to venture that a theory of inquiry is not to be gained for nothing. If I try to base this claim on the evidence of all previous attempts, in both my own and others' trials, having already failed, then it is certain only that no positive proof can arise from so negative a recommendation. Acquiring a theory of inquiry is not, in sum, a purely inductive exercise.

4.1.2. The Pragmatic Framework : Sign-Theoretic Approaches

I would like to introduce a pair of ideas from pragmatism that can help to address the issues of knowledge and inquiry in an integrated way.

The first idea is that knowledge is a product of inquiry. The impact of this idea is that one's interest in knowledge shifts to an interest in the process of inquiry that is capable of yielding knowledge as a result. In the pragmatic perspective, the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is incorporated within a generative theory of inquiry. The result is a theory of inquiry that treats it as a general form of conduct, that is, as a dynamic process with a deliberate purpose.

The second idea is that all thought takes place in signs. This means that all thinking occurs within a general representational setting that is called a "sign relation". As a first approximation, a sign relation can be thought of as a triadic relation or a three place transaction that exists among the various domains of objects, signs, and ideas that are involved in a given situation. For example, suppose that there is a duck on the lake (this is an object); one refers to it by means of the word "duck" (this is a sign) and one has has an image of the duck in one's mind (this is an idea).

Since an inquiry is a special case of a thought process, an activity that operates on sign and ideas in respect of certain objects, this means that the theory of inquiry and the theory of sign relations are very tightly integrated within this point of view, and are almost indistinguishable. Putting the idea that knowledge is a product of inquiry together with the idea that inquiry takes place within a sign relation, one can even say that the inquiry itself, or the production of knowledge, is just the transformation of a sign relation.

Generally speaking, a transformation of a sign relation allows any numbers of objects, signs, and ideas that are involved in a given situation to be engaged in process of change. For example, adding a new word to one's vocabulary, such as the word "mallard" for that which one formerly called a "duck", is just one of many ways that a sign relation can be transformed.

Constant references to "transformations of sign relations", or else to "sign relational transformations", can eventually become a bit unwieldy, and so I assign them the briefer name of "pragmatic transformations". Considered in their full generality, the potential array of pragmatic transformations that one might find it necessary to consider can be very general indeed, exibiting an overwhelming degree of complexity. To deal with this level of complexity, one needs to find strategies for approaching it in stages. Two common tactics are: (1) to classify special types of pragmatic transformations in terms of which kinds of entities are changing the most, and (2) to focus on special cases of pragmatic transformations in which one class of entities is fixed.

If one intends to study processes of development that are every bit as general as "cultural transformations", in which all of the artifacts, symbols, and values are capable of being thrown into a state of flux, then I suggest that pragmatic transformations are a relatively generic but a reasonably well defined form of intermediate case, in other words, a suitable type of transitional object.

What I just gave was the popular version of the theory of signs. This much was already evident in Aristotle's work On Interpretation and was probably derived from Stoic sources. It is still the most natural and intuitive way to approach the idea of a sign relation. But within the frame of pragmatism proper, a number of changes need to be worked on the idea of a sign relation, in order to make it a more exact and more flexible instrument of thought.

From a pragmatic perspective, ideas are taken to be signs in the mind. In this role they come to serve as special cases of "interpretant signs", those that follow other signs in the ongoing process of interpretation. As far as their essential qualities go, signs and ideas can be classed together, though a sign and its interpretant can still be distinguished by their roles in relation to each other. At this point, the reader is probably itching to ask: Where is the interpreter in all of this? Ultimately, signs and ideas can be recognized as features that affect or indirectly characterize the state of the interpretive agent, and their specifications can even be sharpened up to point that one can say it is the states of the interpreter that are the real signs and interpretants in the process. This observation, that Peirce summed up by saying that the person is a sign, has consequences for bringing about a synthesis between the theory of sign relations and the theory of dynamic systems.

4.1.3. The Dynamical Framework : System-Theoretic Approaches

“Inquiry” is a word in common use for a process that resolves doubt and creates knowledge. Computers are involved in inquiry today, and are likely to become more so as time goes on. The aim of my research is to improve the service that computers bring to inquiry. I plan to approach this task by analyzing the nature of inquiry processes, with an eye to those elements that can be given a computational basis.

I am interested in the kinds of inquiries which human beings carry on in all the varieties of learning and reasoning from everyday life to scientific practice. I would like to design software that people could use to carry their inquiries further, higher, faster. Needless to say, this could be an important component of all intelligent software systems in the future. In any application where a knowledge base is maintained, it will become more and more important to examine the processes that deliver the putative knowledge.

4.1.3.1. Inquiry and Computation

Three questions immediately arise in the connection between inquiry and computation. As they reflect on the concept of inquiry, these questions have to do with its integrity, its effectiveness, and its complexity.

1. Integrity. Do all the activities and all the processes that are commonly dubbed "inquiry" have anything essential in common?
2. Effectiveness. Can any useful parts of these so called inquiries be automated in practice?
3. Complexity. Just how deep is the analysis, the disassembly, or the "takedown" of inquiry that is required to reach the level of routine steps?

The issues of effectiveness and complexity are discussed throughout the remainder of this text, but the problem of integrity must be dealt with immediately, since doubts about it can interfere with the very ability to use the word "inquiry" in this discussion.

Thus, I must examine the integrity, or well-definedness, of the very idea of inquiry, in other words, "inquiry" as a general concept rather than a catch all term. Is the faculty of inquiry a principled capacity, leading to a disciplined form of conduct, or is it only a disjointed collection of unrelated skills? As it is currently carried out on computers, inquiry includes everything from database searches, through dynamic simulation and statistical reasoning, to mathematical theorem proving. Insofar as these tasks constitute specialized efforts, each one needs software that is tailored to the individual purpose. To the extent that these different modes of investigation contribute to larger inquiries, present methods for coordinating their separate findings are mostly ad hoc and still a matter of human skill. Thus, one can question whether the very name "inquiry" succeeds in referring to a coherent and independent process.

Do all the varieties of inquiry have something in common, a structure or a function that defines the essence of inquiry itself? I will say "yes". One advantage of this answer is that it brings the topic of inquiry within human scope, and also within my capacity to research. Without this, the field of inquiry would be impossible for any one human being to survey, because a person would have to cover the union of all the areas that employ inquiry. By grasping what is shared by all inquiries, I can focus on the intersection of their generating principles. Another benefit of this alternative is that it promises a common medium for inquiry, one in which the many disparate pieces of our puzzling nature may be bound together in a unified whole.

When I look at other examples of instruments that people have used to extend their capacities, I see that two questions must be faced. First, what are the principles that enable human performance? Second, what are the principles that can be augmented by available technology? I will refer to these two issues as the question of original principles and the question of technical extensions, respectively. Following this model leads me to examine the human capacity for inquiry, asking which of its principles can be reflected in the computational medium, and which of its faculties can be sharpened in the process. It is not likely that everybody with the same interests and applications would answer these questions the same way, but I will describe how I approach them, what has resulted so far, and what directions I plan to explore next.

The focus of my work will narrow in three steps. First, I will concentrate on the design of intelligent software systems that support inquiry. Then, I will select mathematical systems theory as an indispensable tool, both for the analysis of inquiry itself and for the design of programs to support it. Finally, I will develop a theory of qualitative differential equations, implement methods for their computation and solution, and apply the resulting body of techniques to two kinds of recalcitrant problems, (1) those where an inquiry must begin with too little information to justify quantitative methods, and (2) those where a complete logical analysis is necessary to identify critical assumptions.

4.3. The Conduct of Inquiry

4.3.5. The Stages of Inquiry

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• Contents • Part 1 • Part 2 • Part 3 • Part 4 • Part 5 • Appendices • References • Document History •

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