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===4.1. Approaches to Inquiry===
 
===4.1. Approaches to Inquiry===
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Try as I might, I do not see a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing:  To begin from a point where there is nothing to question, to strike out in a given direction without putting anything of consequence at stake, and to trace an unbroken, forward course by following steps that are never unsure.  Acquiring a theory of inquiry is not, in short, a purely deductive exercise.
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At the risk of being wrong, I am ready to venture that a theory of inquiry is not to be gained for nothing.  If I try to base this claim on the evidence of all previous attempts, in both my own and others' trials, having already failed, then it is certain only that no positive proof can arise from so negative a recommendation.  Acquiring a theory of inquiry is not, in sum, a purely inductive exercise.
  
 
====4.1.1. The Classical Framework : Syllogistic Approaches====
 
====4.1.1. The Classical Framework : Syllogistic Approaches====

Revision as of 03:54, 4 August 2011


ContentsPart 1Part 2Part 3Part 4Part 5AppendicesReferencesDocument History


Part 4. Discussion of Inquiry

The subject matter under review is assigned the name “inquiry”, a name that is presently both general and vague. The generality is essential, marking the actual extension and the eventual coverage that the name is intended to have. The vagueness is incidental, hinging on the personal concept of the subject matter and the prevailing level of comprehension that relates an interpreter of the name to the object of its indication. As the investigation proceeds, it is hoped that the name can become as general as it is meant to be, but not forever remain so vague.

In regarding and presenting this subject, I need the freedom to adopt any one of several views. These are the perspectives that I call the “classical” or syllogistic, the “pragmatic” or sign theoretic, and the “dynamical” or system theoretic points of view. Each perspective or point of view is supported by a corresponding framework or a supply of resources, the intellectual tools that allow a person taking up such a view to develop and to share a picture of what can be seen from it.

The situation with respect to these different views can be described as follows. The part of the subject that can be seen in each view appears to make sense, if taken by itself, but it does not appear to be entirely consistent with all that is obvious from the other perspectives, and all of these pictures put together are almost certainly incomplete in regard to the subject they are meant to depict. Although the various pictures can be presented in the roughly historical order of their development, it is a mistaken view of their progression to think that the later views can simply replace the former pictures. In particular, if the classical view is taken as an initial approximation to its subject, then it can be regarded as relatively complete with respect to this intention, but both of the later frameworks, that build on and try to reform this basis, are very much works in progress and far from being completed projects. Taken in order of historical development, each succeeding view always promises to keep all that is good from the preceding points of view, but the current state of development is such that these claims have to be taken as promissory notes, not yet matured and not yet due.

In accord with this situation, I would like to be able to take up any one of these views at any point in the discussion and to move with relative ease among the different pictures of inquiry that they frequently show. Along with this ability, I need to have ways to put their divergent and varying views in comparison with each other, to reflect on the reasons for their distinctions and variations, and overall to have some room to imagine how these views might be corrected, extended, reconciled, and integrated into a coherent and a competent picture of the subject.

This part of the discussion cannot be formal or systematic. It is not intended to argue for any particular point of view, but only to introduce some of the language, ideas, and issues that surround the topic of inquiry. No amount of forethought or premeditation that I can muster would be sufficient to impose an alien organization on this array. The most that I can hope to bring to this forum is to seek clarification of some the terms and to pursue the consequences of some of the axioms that are in the air. Nor do I expect the reader to be disarmed by this apology, at least, not yet, and never unilaterally, since it is obvious that my own point of view, however unformed and inarticulate it may be, cannot help but to affect the selection of problems, subtopics, and suggested angles of approach.

Taking all of these factors into account, the best plan that I can arrange for presenting the subject matter of inquiry is as follows:

First, I describe the individual perspectives and their corresponding frameworks in very general terms, but only insofar as they bear on the subject of inquiry, so that each way of looking at the subject is made available as a resource for the discussion that follows.

Next, I discuss the context of inquiry, treating it as a general field of observation in which the task is to describe an interesting phenomenon or a problematic process. There are a number of dilemmas that arise in this context, especially when it comes to observing and describing the process of inquiry itself. Since these difficulties threaten to paralyze the basic abilities to observe, to describe, and to reflect, a reasonable way around their real obstacles or through their apparent obstructions has to be found before proceeding.

Afterwards, I consider concrete examples of inquiry activities, using any combination of views that appears to be of service at a given moment of discussion, and pointing out problems that call for further investigation.

4.1. Approaches to Inquiry

Try as I might, I do not see a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing: To begin from a point where there is nothing to question, to strike out in a given direction without putting anything of consequence at stake, and to trace an unbroken, forward course by following steps that are never unsure. Acquiring a theory of inquiry is not, in short, a purely deductive exercise.

At the risk of being wrong, I am ready to venture that a theory of inquiry is not to be gained for nothing. If I try to base this claim on the evidence of all previous attempts, in both my own and others' trials, having already failed, then it is certain only that no positive proof can arise from so negative a recommendation. Acquiring a theory of inquiry is not, in sum, a purely inductive exercise.

4.1.1. The Classical Framework : Syllogistic Approaches

4.1.2. The Pragmatic Framework : Sign-Theoretic Approaches

4.1.3. The Dynamical Framework : System-Theoretic Approaches

4.1.3.1. Inquiry and Computation
4.1.3.2. Inquiry Driven Systems

4.2. The Context of Inquiry

4.2.1. The Field of Observation

4.2.2. The Problem of Reflection

4.2.3. The Problem of Reconstruction

4.2.4. The Trivializing of Integration

4.2.5. Tensions in the Field of Observation

4.2.6. Problems of Representation and Communication

4.3. The Conduct of Inquiry

4.3.1. Introduction

4.3.2. The Types of Reasoning

4.3.2.1. Deduction
4.3.2.2. Induction
4.3.2.3. Abduction

4.3.3. Hybrid Types of Inference

4.3.3.1. Analogy
4.3.3.2. Inquiry

4.3.4. Details of Induction

4.3.4.1. Learning
4.3.4.2. Transfer
4.3.4.3. Testing

4.3.5. The Stages of Inquiry


ContentsPart 1Part 2Part 3Part 4Part 5AppendicesReferencesDocument History



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