Directory:Logic Museum/Augustine City of God Book XIV

ON THE CITY OF GOD, BOOK XIV

Introduction
Chapter 1 That the Disobedience of the First Man Would Have Plunged All Men into the Endless Misery of the Second Death, Had Not the Grace of God Rescued Many
Chapter 2 Of Carnal Life, Which is to Be Understood Not Only of Living in Bodily Indulgence, But Also of Living in the Vices of the Inner Man
Chapter 3 That the Sin is Caused Not by the Flesh, But by the Soul, and that the Corruption Contracted from Sin is Not Sin But Sin's Punishment
Chapter 4 What It is to Live According to Man, and What to Live According to God
Chapter 5 That the Opinion of the Platonists Regarding the Nature of Body and Soul is Not So Censurable as that of the Manichжans, But that Even It is Objectionable, Because It Ascribes the Origin of Vices to the Nature of The Flesh
Chapter 6 Of the Character of the Human Will Which Makes the Affections of the Soul Right or Wrong
Chapter 7 That the Words Love and Regard (Amor and Dilectio) are in Scripture Used Indifferently of Good and Evil Affection
Chapter 8 Of the Three Perturbations, Which the Stoics Admitted in the Soul of the Wise Man to the Exclusion of Grief or Sadness, Which the Manly Mind Ought Not to Experience
Chapter 9 Of the Perturbations of the Soul Which Appear as Right Affections in the Life of the Righteous
Chapter 10 Whether It is to Be Believed that Our First Parents in Paradise, Before They Sinned, Were Free from All Perturbation
Chapter 11 Of the Fall of the First Man, in Whom Nature Was Created Good, and Can Be Restored Only by Its Author
Chapter 12 Of the Nature of Man's First Sin
Chapter 13 That in Adam's Sin an Evil Will Preceded the Evil Act
Chapter 14 Of the Pride in the Sin, Which Was Worse Than the Sin Itself
Chapter 15 Of the Justice of the Punishment with Which Our First Parents Were Visited for Their Disobedience
Chapter 16 Of the Evil of Lust,-A Word Which, Though Applicable to Many Vices, is Specially Appropriated to Sexual Uncleanness
Chapter 17 Of the Nakedness of Our First Parents, Which They Saw After Their Base and Shameful Sin
Chapter 18 Of the Shame Which Attends All Sexual Intercourse
Chapter 19 That It is Now Necessary, as It Was Not Before Man Sinned, to Bridle Anger and Lust by the Restraining Influence of Wisdom
Chapter 20 Of the Foolish Beastliness of the Cynics
Chapter 21 That Man's Transgression Did Not Annul the Blessing of Fecundity Pronounced Upon Man Before He Sinned But Infected It with the Disease of Lust
Chapter 22 Of the Conjugal Union as It Was Originally Instituted and Blessed by God
Chapter 23 Whether Generation Should Have Taken Place Even in Paradise Had Man Not Sinned, or Whether There Should Have Been Any Contention There Between Chastity and Lust
Chapter 24 That If Men Had Remained Innocent and Obedient in Paradise, the Generative Organs Should Have Been in Subjection to the Will as the Other Members are
Chapter 25 Of True Blessedness, Which This Present Life Cannot Enjoy
Chapter 26 That We are to Believe that in Paradise Our First Parents Begat Offspring Without Blushing
Chapter 27 Of the Angels and Men Who Sinned, and that Their Wickedness Did Not Disturb the Order of God's Providence
Chapter 28 Of the Nature of the Two Cities, the Earthly and the Heavenly

Latin	Latin
BOOK XIV []	The City of God (Book XIV) Argument-Augustin again treats of the sin of the first man, and teaches that it is the cause of the carnal life and vicious affections of man. Especially he proves that the shame which accompanies lust is the just punishment of that disobedience, and inquires how man, if he had not sinned, would have been able without lust to propagate his kind.
BOOK XIV [I] Diximus iam superioribus libris ad humanum genus non solum naturae similitudine sociandum, verum etiam quadam cognationis necessitudine in unitatem concordem pacis vinculo conligandum ex homine uno Deum voluisse homines instituere, neque hoc genus fuisse in singulis quibusque moriturum, nisi duo primi, quorum creatus est unus ex nullo, altera ex illo, id inoboedientia meruissent, a quibus aQmissum est tam grande peccatum, ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteros obligatione peccati et mortis necessitate transmissa. Mortis autem regnum in homines usque adeo dominatum est, ut omnes in secundam quoque mortem, cuius nullus est finis, poena debita praecipites ageret, nisi inde quosdam indebita Dei gratia liberaret. Ac per hoc factum est, ut, cum tot tantaeque gentes per tenarum orbem diversis ritibus moribusque viventes multiplici linguarum armorum uestium sint varietate distinctae, non tamen amplius quam duo quaedam genera humanae societatis existerent, quas civitates duas secundum scripturas nostras merito appellare possemus. Vna quippe est hominum secundum carnem, altera secundum spiritum vivere in sui cuiusqm generis pace volentium et, cum id quod expetunt adsequuntur, in sui cuiusque generis pace viventium.	We have already stated in the preceding books that God, desiring not only that the human race might be able by their similarity of nature to associate with one another, but also that they might be bound together in harmony and peace by the ties of relationship, was pleased to derive all men from one individual, and created man with such a nature that the members of the race should not have died, had not the two first (of whom the one was created out of nothing, and the other out of him) merited this by their disobedience; for by them so great a sin was committed, that by it the human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death. And the kingdom of death so reigned over men, that the deserved penalty of sin would have hurled all headlong even into the second death, of which there is no end, had not the undeserved grace of God saved some therefrom. And thus it has come to pass, that though there are very many and great nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms, and dress, are distinguished by marked differences, yet there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit; and when they severally achieve what they wish, they live in peace, each after their kind.
BOOK XIV [II] Prius ergo videndum est, quid sit secundum carnem, quid secundum spiritum vivere. Quisquis enim hoc quod diximus prima fronte inspicit, vel non recolens vel minus advertens quem ad modum scripturae sanctae loquantur, potest putare philosophos quidem Epicureos secundum carnem vivere, qma summum bonum hominis in corporis voluptate posuerunt, et si qui alii sunt, qui quoque modo corporis honum summum bonum esse hominis opinati sunt, et eorum omne uulgus, qui non aliquo dogmate vel eo modo philosophantur, sed proclives ad libidinem nisi ex voluptatibus, quas corporeis sensibus capiunt, gaudere nesciunt; Stoicos autem, qui summum bonum hominis in animo ponunt, secundum spiritum vivere, quia et hominis animus quid est nisi spiritus? Sed sicut loquitur scriptura divina, secundum carnem vivere utrique monstrantur. Carnem quippe appellat non solum corpus terreni atque mortalis animantis (ueluti cum dicit: Non omnis caro eadem caro. alia quidem hominis, alia autem caro pecoris, alia volucrum, alia piscium), sed et aliis multis modis significatione huius nominis utitur, inter quos varios locutionis modos saepe etiam ipsum hominem, id est naturam hominis, carnem nuncupat, modo locutionis a parte totum, quale est: Ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis caro. Quid enim voluit intellegi nisi omnis homo? Quod apertius paulo post ait: In lege nemo iustificatur, et ad Galatas: Scientes autem quia non iustificatur homo ex operibus legis. Secundum hoc intellegitur: Et Vcrbum caro factum est, id est homo; quod non recte accipientes quidam putaverunt Christo humanam animam defuisse. Sicut enim a toto pars accipitur, ubi Mariae Magdalenae verba in euangelio leguntur dicentis: Tulerunt Dominum meum et nescio ubi posuerunt eum, cum de sola Christi carne loqueretur, quam sepultam de monumento putabat ablatam: ita et a parte totum carne nominata intellegitur homo, sicuti ea sunt quae supra commemoravimus. Cum igitur multis modis, quos perscrutari et colligere longum est, divina scriptura nuncupet carnem: quid sit secundum carnem vivere (quod profecto malum est, cum ipsa carnis natura non sit malum) ut indagare possimus, inspiciamus diligenter illum locum epistulae Pauli apostoli quam scripsit ad Galatas, ubi ait: Manifesta autem sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicationes, inmunditiae, luxuria, idolorum seruitus, veneficia, inimicitiae, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, dissensiones, haereses, inuidiae, ebrietates, comisationes et his similia; quae praedico vobis, sicut praedixi, quoniam qui talia agunt regnum Dei non possidebunt. Iste totus epistulae apostolicae locus, quantum ad rem praesentem satis esse videbitur, consideratus poterit hanc dissoluere quaestione ", quid sit secundum carnem vivere. In operibus namque camis, quae manifesta esse dixit eaque commemorata damnavit, non illa tantum invenimus, quae ad voluptatem peffinent carnis, sicuti sunt fornicationes, inmunditiae, luxuria, ebrietates, comisationes; verum etiam illa, quibus animi vitia demonstrantur a voluptate carnis aliena. Quis enim seruitutem, quae idolis exhibetur, veneficia, inimicitias, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, dissensiones, haereses, inuidias non potius intellegat animi vitia esse quam carnis? Quando quidem fieri potest, ut propter idololatriam vel haeresis alicuius errorem a voluptatibus corporis temperetur; et tamen etiam tunc homo, quamuis carnis libidines continere atque cohibere videatur, secundum carnem vivere hac apostolica auctoritate conuincitur, et in eo, quod abstinet a voluptatibus carnis, damnabilia opera carnis agere demonstratur. Quis inimicitias non in animo habeat? aut quis ita loquatur, ut inimico suo vel quem putat inimicum dicat: "Malam carnem," ac non potius: "Malum animum habes adversus me"? Postremo sicut carnalitates, ut ita dicam, si quis audisset, non dubitaret carni tribuere, ita nemo dubitat animositates ad animum pertinere. Cur ergo haec omnia et his similia doctor gentium in fide et veritate opera carnis appeuat, nisi quia eo locutionis modo, quo totum significatur a parte, ipsum hominem uult nomine carnis intellegi?	First, we must see what it is to live after the flesh, and what to live after the spirit. For any one who either does not recollect, or does not sufficiently weigh, the language of sacred Scripture, may, on first hearing what we have said, suppose that the Epicurean philosophers live after the flesh, because they place man's highest good in bodily pleasure; and that those others do so who have been of opinion that in some form or other bodily good is man's supreme good; and that the mass of men do so who, without dogmatizing or philosophizing on the subject, are so prone to lust that they cannot delight in any pleasure save such as they receive from bodily sensations: and he may suppose that the Stoics, who place the supreme good of men in the soul, live after the spirit; for what is man's soul, if not spirit? But in the sense of the divine Scripture both are proved to live after the flesh. For by flesh it means not only the body of a terrestrial and mortal animal, as when it says, "All flesh is not the same flesh, but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, another of birds," 1 Corinthians 15:39 but it uses this word in many other significations; and among these various usages, a frequent one is to use flesh for man himself, the nature of man taking the part for the whole, as in the words, "By the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified;" Romans 3:20 for what does he mean here by "no flesh" but "no man?" And this, indeed, he shortly after says more plainly: "No man shall be justified by the law;" Galatians 3:11 and in the Epistle to the Galatians, "Knowing that man is not justified by the works of the law." And so we understand the words, "And the Word was made flesh," John 1:14 -that is, man, which some not accepting in its right sense, have supposed that Christ had not a human soul. For as the whole is used for the part in the words of Mary Magdalene in the Gospel, "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him," John 20:13 by which she meant only the flesh of Christ, which she supposed had been taken from the tomb where it had been buried, so the part is used for the whole, flesh being named, while man is referred to, as in the quotations above cited.Since, then, Scripture uses the word flesh in many ways, which there is not time to collect and investigate, if we are to ascertain what it is to live after the flesh (which is certainly evil, though the nature of flesh is not itself evil), we must carefully examine that passage of the epistle which the Apostle Paul wrote to the Galatians, in which he says, "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like: of the which I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God." Galatians 5:19-21 This whole passage of the apostolic epistle being considered, so far as it bears on the matter in hand, will be sufficient to answer the question, what it is to live after the flesh. For among the works of the flesh which he said were manifest, and which he cited for condemnation, we find not only those which concern the pleasure of the flesh, as fornications, uncleanness, lasciviousness, drunkenness, revellings, but also those which, though they be remote from fleshly pleasure, reveal the vices of the soul. For who does not see that idolatries, witchcrafts, hatreds, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, heresies, envyings, are vices rather of the soul than of the flesh? For it is quite possible for a man to abstain from fleshly pleasures for the sake of idolatry or some heretical error; and yet, even when he does so, he is proved by this apostolic authority to be living after the flesh; and in abstaining from fleshly pleasure, he is proved to be practising damnable works of the flesh. Who that has enmity has it not in his soul? or who would say to his enemy, or to the man he thinks his enemy, You have a bad flesh towards me, and not rather, You have a bad spirit towards me? In fine, if any one heard of what I may call "carnalities," he would not fail to attribute them to the carnal part of man; so no one doubts that "animosities" belong to the soul of man. Why then does the doctor of the Gentiles in faith and verity call all these and similar things works of the flesh, unless because, by that mode of speech whereby the part is used for the whole, he means us to understand by the word flesh the man himself?
BOOK XIV [III] Quod si quisquam dicit carnem causam esse in malis moribus quorumcumque vitiorum, eo quod anima carne affecta sic vivit, profecto non universam hominis naturam diligenter advertit. Nam "corpus quidem corruptibile adgrauat animam." Vnde etiam idem apostolus agens de hoc corruptibili corpore, de quo paulo ante dixerat: Etsi exterior homo noster corrumpitur: Scimus, inquit, quia, si terrena nostra domus habitationis resolvatur, aedo ficationem habemus ex Deo, domum non manu factam aeternam in caelis. Etenim in hoc ingemescimus, habitaculum nostrum quod de caelo est superindui cupientes; si tamen et induti, non nudi inveniamur. Etenom quo sumus in hac habitatione, ingemescimus grauati, in quo nolumus exspoliari, sed superuestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a vita. Et adgrauamur ergo corruptibili corpore, et ipsius adgrauationis causam non naturam substantiamque corporis, sed eius corruptionem scientes nolumus corpore spoliari, sed eius inmortalitate uestiri. Et tunc enim erit, sed quia corruptibile non erit, non grauabit. Adgrauat ergo nunc anomam corpus corruptibile, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum muUa cogitantem. Verum tamen quia omnia mala animae ex corpore putant accidisse, in errore sunt. Quamuis enim Vergilius Platonicam videatur luculentis versibus explicare sententiam dicens: Igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant Terrenique hebetant artus moribundaque membra, omnesque illas notissimas quattuor animi perturbationes, cupiditatem timorem, laetitiam tristitiam, quasi origines omnium peccatorum atque vitiorum volens intellegi ex corpore accidere subiungat et dicat: Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, nec auras Suspiciunt, clausae tenebris et carcere caeco: tamen aliter se habet fides nostra. Nam corruptio corporis, quae adgrauat animam, non peccati primi est causa, sed poena; nec caro corruptibilis animam peccatricem, sed anima peccatrix fecit esse corruptibilem carnem. Ex qua corruptione carnis licet existant quaedam incitamenta vitiorum et ipsa desideria vitiosa, non tamen omnia vitae iniquae vitia tribuenda sunt carni, ne ab his omnibus purgemus diabolum, qui non habet carnem. Etsi enim diabolus fornicator vel ebriosus vel si quid huius modi mali est, quod ad carnis pertinet voluptates, non potest dici, cum sit etiam talium peccatorum suasor et instigator occultus: est tamen maxime superbus atque inuidus. Quae illum vitiositas sic obtinuit, ut propter hanc esset in carceribus caliginosi huius aeris aeterno supplicio destinatus. Haec autem vitia, quae tenent in diabolo principatum, carni tribuit apostolus, quam certum est diabolum non habere. Dicit enim inimicitias, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, inuidias opera esse carnis; quorum omnium malorum caput atque origo superbia est, quae sine carne regnat in diabolo. Quis autem illo est inimicior sanctis? Quis adversus eos contentiosior, animosior et magis aemulus atque inuidus invenitur? At haec omnia cum habeat sine carne, quo modo sunt ista opera carnis, nisi quia opera sunt hominis, quem, sicut dixi, nomine carnis appellat? Non enim habendo carnem, qUam non habet diabolus, sed vivendo secundum se ipsum, hoc est secundum hominem, factus est homo similis diabolo; quia et ille secundum se ipsum vivere voluit, quando in veritate non stetit, ut non de Dei, sed de suo mendacium loqueretur, qui non solum mendax, verum etiam mendacii pater est. Primus est quippe mentitus, et a quo peccatum, ab illo coepit esse mendacium.	But if any one says that the flesh is the cause of all vices and ill conduct, inasmuch as the soul lives wickedly only because it is moved by the flesh, it is certain he has not carefully considered the whole nature of man. For "the corruptible body, indeed, weighs down the soul." Wisdom 9:15 Whence, too, the apostle, speaking of this corruptible body, of which he had shortly before said, "though our outward man perish," 2 Corinthians 4:16 says, "We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up in life." 2 Corinthians 5:1-4 We are then burdened with this corruptible body; but knowing that the cause of this burdensomeness is not the nature and substance of the body, but its corruption, we do not desire to be deprived of the body, but to be clothed with its immortality. For then, also, there will be a body, but it shall no longer be a burden, being no longer corruptible. At present, then, "the corruptible body presses down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weighs down the mind that muses upon many things," nevertheless they are in error who suppose that all the evils of the soul proceed from the body.Virgil, indeed, seems to express the sentiments of Plato in the beautiful lines, where he says,-"A fiery strength inspires their lives, An essence that from heaven derives, Though clogged in part by limbs of clay And the dull 'vesture of decay;' "but though he goes on to mention the four most common mental emotions,-desire, fear, joy, sorrow,-with the intention of showing that the body is the origin of all sins and vices, saying,- "Hence wild desires and grovelling fears, And human laughter, human tears, Immured in dungeon-seeming nights They look abroad, yet see no light, "yet we believe quite otherwise. For the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, is not the cause but the punishment of the first sin; and it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible. And though from this corruption of the flesh there arise certain incitements to vice, and indeed vicious desires, yet we must not attribute to the flesh all the vices of a wicked life, in case we thereby clear the devil of all these, for he has no flesh. For though we cannot call the devil a fornicator or drunkard, or ascribe to him any sensual indulgence (though he is the secret instigator and prompter of those who sin in these ways), yet he is exceedingly proud and envious. And this viciousness has so possessed him, that on account of it he is reserved in chains of darkness to everlasting punishment. Now these vices, which have dominion over the devil, the apostle attributes to the flesh, which certainly the devil has not. For he says "hatred, variance, emulations, strife, envying" are the works of the flesh; and of all these evils pride is the origin and head, and it rules in the devil though he has no flesh. For who shows more hatred to the saints? who is more at variance with them? who more envious, bitter, and jealous? And since he exhibits all these works, though he has no flesh, how are they works of the flesh, unless because they are the works of man, who is, as I said, spoken of under the name of flesh? For it is not by having flesh, which the devil has not, but by living according to himself,-that is, according to man,-that man became like the devil. For the devil too, wished to live according to himself when he did not abide in the truth; so that when he lied, this was not of God, but of himself, who is not only a liar, but the father of lies, he being the first who lied, and the originator of lying as of sin.
BOOK XIV [IV] Cum ergo vivit homo secundum hominem, non secundum Deum, similis est diabolo; quia nec angelo secundum angelum, sed secundum Deum vivendum fuit, ut staret in veritate et veritatem de ivius, non de suo mendacium loqueretur. Nam et de homine alio loco idem apostolus ait: Si autem veritas Dei in meo mendacio abundavit. Nostrum ffixit mendacium, veritatem Dei. Cum itaque vivit homo secundum veritatem, non vivit secundum se ipsum, sed secundum Deum. Deus est enim qui dixit: Ego sum veritas. Cum vero vivit secundum se ipsum, hoc est secundum hominem, non secmdum Deum, profecto secundum mendacium vivit; non quia homo ipse mendacium est, cum sit eius auctor et creator Deus, qui non est utique auctor creatorque mendacii, sed quia homo ita factus est rectus, ut non secundum se ipsum, sed secundum eum, a quo factus est, viveret, id est illius potius quam suam faceret voluntatem: non ita vivere, quem ad modum est factus ut viveret, hoc est mendacium. Beatus quippe uult esse etiam non sic vivendo ut possit esse. Quid est ista voluntate mendacius? Vnde non frustra dici potest omne peccatum esse mendacium. Non enim fit peccatum nisi ea voluntate, qua volumus ut bene sit nobis vel nolumus ut male sit nobis. Ergo mendacium est, quod, cum fiat ut bene sit nobis, hinc potius male est nobis, vel cum fiat, ut melius sit nobis, hinc potius peius est nobis. Vnde hoc, nisi quia de Deo potest bene esse homini, quem delinquendo deserit, non de se ipso, secundum quem vivendo delinquit? Quod itaque diximus, hinc extitisse duas civitates diversas inter se atque contrarias, quod alii secundum carnem, alii secundum spiritum viverent: potest etiam isto modo dici quod alii secundum hominem, alii secundum Deum vivant. Apertissime quippe <Paulus> ad Corinthios dicit: Cum enim <sint> inter vos aemulatio et contentio, nonne carnales estis et secundum hominem ambulatis? Quod ergo est ambulare secundum hominem, hoc est esse carnalem, quod a carne, id est a parte hominis, intellegitur homo. Eosdem ipsos quippe dixit superius animales, quos postea carnales, ita loquens: Quis enim scit, inquit, hominum, quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Sic et quae Dei sunt, nemo scit nisi spiritus Dei. Nos autem, inquit, non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis; quae et loquimur, non in sapientiae humanae doctis verbis, sed doctis spiritu, spiritalibus spiritalia comparantes. Animalis autem homo non percipit quae sunt spiritus Dei; stultitia est enim illi. Talibus igitur, id est animalibus, paulo post dicit: Et ego, fratres, non potui loqui vobis quasi spiritalibus, sed quasi carnalibus; et illud et hoc eodem loquendi modo, id est a parte totum. Et ab anima namque et a carne, quae sunt partes hominis, potest totum significari, quod est homo; atque ita non est aliud animalis homo, aliud carnalis, sed idem ipsum est utrumque, id est secundum hominem vivens homo; sicut non aliud quam homines significantur, sive ubi legitur: Ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis caro, sive quod scriptum est: Septuaginta quinque animae descenderunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum. Et ibi enim per omnem carnem omnis homo, et ibi per septuaginta quinque animas septuaginta quinque homines intelleguntur. Et quod dictum est: Non in sapientiae humanae doctis verbis, potuit dici: "Non in sapientiae carnalis .; sicut quod dictum est: Secundum hominem ambulatis, potuit dici: "Secundum carnem". Magis autem hoc apparuit in his quae subiunxit: Cum enim quis dicat: Ego quidem sum Pauli, alius autem: Ego Apollo, nonne homines estis? Quod dicebat: Animales estis, et: Carnales estis, expressius dixit: Homines estis, quod est: "Secundum hominem vivitis, non secundum Deum, secundum quem si viveretis, dii essetis."	When, therefore, man lives according to man, not according to God, he is like the devil. Because not even an angel might live according to an angel, but only according to God, if he was to abide in the truth, and speak God's truth and not his own lie. And of man, too, the same apostle says in another place, "If the truth of God has more abounded through my lie;" Romans 3:7 -"my lie," he said, and "God's truth." When, then, a man lives according to the truth, he lives not according to himself, but according to God; for He was God who said, "I am the truth." John 14:6 When, therefore, man lives according to himself,-that is, according to man, not according to God,-assuredly he lives according to a lie; not that man himself is a lie, for God is his author and creator, who is certainly not the author and creator of a lie, but because man was made upright, that he might not live according to himself, but according to Him that made him,-in other words, that he might do His will and not his own; and not to live as he was made to live, that is a lie. For he certainly desires to be blessed even by not living so that he may be blessed. And what is a lie if this desire be not? Wherefore it is not without meaning said that all sin is a lie. For no sin is committed save by that desire or will by which we desire that it be well with us, and shrink from it being ill with us. That, therefore, is a lie which we do in order that it may be well with us, but which makes us more miserable than we were. And why is this, but because the source of man's happiness lies only in God, whom he abandons when he sins, and not in himself, by living according to whom he sins?In enunciating this proposition of ours, then, that because some live according to the flesh and others according to the spirit, there have arisen two diverse and conflicting cities, we might equally well have said, "because some live according to man, others according to God." For Paul says very plainly to the Corinthians, "For whereas there is among you envying and strife, are you not carnal, and walk according to man?" 1 Corinthians 3:3 So that to walk according to man and to be carnal are the same; for by flesh, that is, by a part of man, man is meant. For before he said that those same persons were animal whom afterwards he calls carnal, saying, "For what man knows the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knows no man, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things which are freely given to us of God. Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teaches, but which the Holy Ghost teaches; comparing spiritual things with spiritual. But the animal man perceives not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him." 1 Corinthians 2:11-14 It is to men of this kind, then, that is, to animal men, he shortly after says, "And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal." 1 Corinthians 3:1 And this is to be interpreted by the same usage, a part being taken for the whole. For both the soul and the flesh, the component parts of man, can be used to signify the whole man; and so the animal man and the carnal man are not two different things, but one and the same thing, viz., man living according to man. In the same way it is nothing else than men that are meant either in the words, "By the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified;" Romans 3:20 or in the words, "Seventy-five souls went down into Egypt with Jacob." Genesis 46:27 In the one passage, "no flesh" signifies "no man;" and in the other, by "seventy-five souls" seventy-five men are meant. And the expression, "not in words which man's wisdom teaches" might equally be "not in words which fleshly wisdom teaches;" and the expression, "ye walk according to man," might be "according to the flesh." And this is still more apparent in the words which followed: "For while one says, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos, are you not men?" The same thing which he had before expressed by "you are animal," "you are carnal, he now expresses by "you are men;" that is, you live according to man, not according to God, for if you lived according to Him, you should be gods.
BOOK XIV [V] Non igitur opus est in peccatis vitiisque nostris ad Creatoris iniuriam camis accusare naturam, quae in genere atque ordine suo bona est; sed deserto Creatore bono vivere secundum creatum bonum non est bonum, sive quisque secundum carnem sive secundum animam sive secundum totum hominem, qui ex anima constat et carne (unde et nomine solius animae et nomine solius carnis significari potest) eligat vivere. Nam qui velut summum bonum laudat animae naturam et tamquam malum naturam carnis accusat, profecto et animam carnaliter adpetit et carnem camaliter fugit, quoniam id uanitate sentit humana, non veritate divina. Non quidem Platonici sicut Manichaei desipiunt, ut tamquam mali naturam terrena corpora detestentur, cum omnia elementa, quibus iste mundus visibilis contrectabilisque compactus est, qualitatesque eorum Deo artifici tribuant; verum tamen ex terrenis artubus moribundisque membris sic affici animas opinantur, ut hinc eis sint morbi cupiditatum et timorum et laetitiae sive tristitiae; quibus quattuor vel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat, vel passionibus, ut plerique verbum e verbo Graeco exprimunt, omnis humanorum morum vitiositas continetur. Quod si ita est, quid est quod Aeneas apud Vergilium, cum audisset a patre apud inferos animas rursus ad corpora redituras, hanc opinionem miratur exclamans: O pater, anne aliquas ad caelum hinc ire putandum est Sublimes animas iterumque ad tarda reuerti Corpora? Quae lucis miseris tam dira cupido? Numquidnam haec tam dira cupido ex terrenis artubus moribundisque membris adhuc inest animarum illi praedicatissimae puritati? Nonne ab huius modi eorporeis, ut dicit, pestibus omnibus eas asserit esse purgatas, cum rursus incipiunt in corpora velle reuerti? Vnde colligitur, etiamsi ita se haberet, quod est omnino uanissimum, vicissim alternans incessabiliter euntium atque redeuntium animarum mundatio et inquinatio, non potuisse veraciter dici omnes culpabiles atque vitiosos motus animarum eis ex terrenis corpolibus inolescere, si quidem secundum ipsos illa, ut locutor nobilis ait, dira cupido usque adeo non est ex corpore, ut ab omni corporea peste purgatam et extra omne corpus animam constitutam ipsa esse compellat in corpore. Vnde etiam illis fatentibus non ex carne tantum afficitur anima, ut cupiat metuat, laetetur aegrescat, verum etiam ex se ipsa his potest motibus agitari.	There is no need, therefore, that in our sins and vices we accuse the nature of the flesh to the injury of the Creator, for in its own kind and degree the flesh is good; but to desert the Creator good, and live according to the created good, is not good, whether a man choose to live according to the flesh, or according to the soul, or according to the whole human nature, which is composed of flesh and soul, and which is therefore spoken of either by the name flesh alone, or by the name soul alone. For he who extols the nature of the soul as the chief good, and condemns the nature of the flesh as if it were evil, assuredly is fleshly both in his love of the soul and hatred of the flesh; for these his feelings arise from human fancy, not from divine truth. The Platonists, indeed, are not so foolish as, with the Manichжans, to detest our present bodies as an evil nature; for they attribute all the elements of which this visible and tangible world is compacted, with all their qualities, to God their Creator. Nevertheless, from the death-infected members and earthly construction of the body they believe the soul is so affected, that there are thus originated in it the diseases of desires, and fears, and joy, and sorrow, under which four perturbations, as Cicero calls them, or passions, as most prefer to name them with the Greeks, is included the whole viciousness of human life. But if this be so, how is it that Жneas in Virgil, when he had heard from his father in Hades that the souls should return to bodies, expresses surprise at this declaration, and exclaims:"O father! and can thought conceive That happy souls this realm would leave, And seek the upper sky, With sluggish clay to reunite? This direful longing for the light, Whence comes it, say, and why? "This direful longing, then, does it still exist even in that boasted purity of the disembodied spirits, and does it still proceed from the death-infected members and earthly limbs? Does he not assert that, when they begin to long to return to the body, they have already been delivered from all these so-called pestilences of the body? From which we gather that, were this endlessly alternating purification and defilement of departing and returning souls as true as it is most certainly false, yet it could not be averred that all culpable and vicious motions of the soul originate in the earthly body; for, on their own showing, "this direful longing," to use the words of their noble exponent, is so extraneous to the body, that it moves the soul that is purged of all bodily taint, and is existing apart from any body whatever, and moves it, moreover, to be embodied again. So that even they themselves acknowledge that the soul is not only moved to desire, fear, joy, sorrow, by the flesh, but that it can also be agitated with these emotions at its own instance.
BOOK XIV [VI] Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si pe: versa est, peruersos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt. Nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia nisi voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus? Et quid est metus atque tristitia nisi voluntas.in dissensione ab his quae nolumus? Sed cum consentimus appetendo ea quae volumus, cupiditas; cum autem consentimus fruendo his quae volumus, laetitia vocatur. Itemque cum dissentimus ab eo quod accidere nolumus, talis voluntas metus est; cum autem dissentimus ab eo quod nolentibus acciffit, talis voluntas tristitia est. Et omnino pro varietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur. Quaproper homo, qui secundum Deum, non secundum hominem vivit, oportet ut sit amator boni; unde fit consequens ut malum oderit. Et quoniam nemo natura, sed quisquis malus est, vitio malus est: perfectum odium debet malis, qui secundum Deum vivit, ut nec propter vitium oderit hominem nec amet vitium propter hominem, sed oderit vitium, amet hominem. Sanato enim vitio totum quod amare, nihil autem quod debeat; odisse remanebit.	But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain.
BOOK XIV [VII] Nam cuius propositum est amare Deum et non secundum hominem, sed secundum Deum amare proximum, sicut etiam se ipsum: procul dubio propter hunc amorem dicitur voluntatis bonae, quae usitatius in scripturis sanctis caritas appellatur; sed amor quoque secundum easdem sacras litteras dicitur. Nam et amatorem boni apostolus dicit esse debere, quem regendo populo praecipit eligendum, et ipse Dominus Petrum apostolum interrogans cum dixisset: Diligis me plus his? ille respondit: Domine, tu scis quia amo te; et iterum Dominus quaesivit, non utrum amaret, sed utrum diligeret eum Petrus; at ille respondit iterum: Domine, tu scis quia amo te; tertia vero interrogatione et ipse lesUs non ait: _ "Diligis me?" sed: Amas me? ubi secutus ait euangelista: Contristatus est Petrus, quia dixit ei tertio: Amas me? cum Dominus non tertio, sed semel dixerit: Amas me? bis autem dixerit: Diligis me? Vnde intellegimus, quod etiam cum dicebat Dominus: Diligis me? nihil aliud dicebat quam: Amas me? Petrus autem non mutavit huius unius rei verbum, sed etiam tertio: Domine, inquit, tu omnia scis, tu scis quia amo te. Hoc propterea commemorandum putavi, quia nonnulli arbitrantur aliud esse dilectionem sive caritatem, aliud amorem. Dicunt enim dilectionem accipiendam esse in bono, amorem in malo. Sic autem nec ipsos auctores saecularium litterarum locutos esse certissimum est. Sed viderint philosophi utrum vel qua ratione ista discernant; amorem tamen eos in bonis rebus et erga ipsum Deum magni pendere, libri eorum satis loquuntur. Sed scripturas religionis nostrae, quarum auctoritatem ceteris omnibus litteris anteponimus, non aliud dicere amorem, aliud dilectionem vel caritatem, insinuandum fuit. Nam et amorem in bono dici iam ostendimus. Sed ne quis existimet amorem quidem et in malo et in bono, dilectionem autem non nisi in bono esse dicendam, illud adtendat quod in psalmo scriptum est: Qui autem diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam, et illud apostoli lohannis: Si quis dilexerit mundum, non est dilectio Patris in illo. Ecce uno loco dilectio et in bono et in malo. Amorem autem in malo (quia in bono iam ostendimus) ne quisquam flagitet, legat quod scriptum est: Erunt enim homines se ipsos amantes, amatores pecuniae. Recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor et voluntas peruersa malus amor. Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est, id autem habens eoque fruens laetitia; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est, idque si acciderit sentiens tristitia est. Proinde mala sunt ista, si malus amor est; bona, si bonus. Quod dicimus, de scripturis probemus. Concupiscit apostolus dissolvi et esse cum Christo; et: Concupivit anima mea desiderare iudicia tua, vel si accommodatius dicitur: Desideravit anoma mea cuncupiscere iudicia tua; et: Concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum. Hoc tamen loquendi obtinuit consuetudo, ut, si cupiditas vel concupiscentia dicatur nec addatur cuius rei sit, non nisi in malo possit intellegi. Laetitia in bono est: Laetamini in Domino et exultate iusti; et: Dedisti laetitiam in cor meum; et: Adimplebis me laetitia cum uultu tuo. Timor in bono est apud apostolum, ubi ait: Cum timore et tremore uestram ipsorum salutem operamini; et: Noli altum sapere, sed time; et: Timeo autem, ne, sicut serpens Euam seduxit astutia sua, sic et uestrae mentes corrumpantur a castitate, quae est in Christo. De tristitia vero, quam Cicero magis aegritudinem appellat, dolorem autem Vergilius, ubi ait: "Dolent gaudentque", (sed ideo malui tristitiam dicere, quia aegritudo vel dolor usitatius in corporibus dicitur), scrupulosior quaestio est, utrum inveniri possit in bono.	He who resolves to love God, and to love his neighbor as himself, not according to man but according to God, is on account of this love said to be of a good will; and this is in Scripture more commonly called charity, but it is also, even in the same books, called love. For the apostle says that the man to be elected as a ruler of the people must be a lover of good. And when the Lord Himself had asked Peter, "Have you a regard for me (diligis) more than these?" Peter replied, "Lord, You know that I love (amo) You." And again a second time the Lord asked not whether Peter loved (amaret) Him, but whether he had a regard (diligeret)for Him, and, he again answered, "Lord, You know that I love (amo) You." But on the third interrogation the Lord Himself no longer says, "Have you a regard (diligis) for me,"but "Do you love (amas) me?" And then the evangelist adds, "Peter was grieved because He said unto him the third time, "Do you love (amas) me?" though the Lord had not said three times but only once, "Do you love (amas) me?" and twice "Diligis me ?" from which we gather that, even when the Lord said "diligis," He used an equivalent for "amas." Peter, too, throughout used one word for the one thing, and the third time also replied, "Lord, You know all things, You know that I love (amo) You."I have judged it right to mention this, because some are of opinion that charity or regard (dilectio) is one thing, love (amor) another. They say that dilectio is used of a good affection, amor of an evil love. But it is very certain that even secular literature knows no such distinction. However, it is for the philosophers to determine whether and how they differ, though their own writings sufficiently testify that they make great account of love (amor) placed on good objects, and even on God Himself. But we wished to show that the Scriptures of our religion, whose authority we prefer to all writings whatsoever, make no distinction between amor, dilectio, and caritas; and we have already shown that amor is used in a good connection. And if any one fancy that amor is no doubt used both of good and bad loves, but that dilectio is reserved for the good only, let him remember what the psalm says, "He that loves (diligit) iniquity hates his own soul;" and the words of the Apostle John, "If any man love (diligere) the world, the love (dilectio) of the Father is not in him." 1 John 2:15 Here you have in one passage dilectio used both in a good and a bad sense. And if any one demands an instance of amor being used in a bad sense (for we have already shown its use in a good sense), let him read the words, "For men shall be lovers (amantes) of their own selves, lovers (amatores) of money." 2 Timothy 3:2 The right will is, therefore, well-directed love, and the wrong will is ill-directed love. Love, then, yearning to have what is loved, is desire; and having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is opposed to it, it is fear; and feeling what is opposed to it, when it has befallen it, it is sadness. Now these motions are evil if the love is evil; good if the love is good. What we assert let us prove from Scripture. The apostle "desires to depart, and to be with Christ." Philippians 1:23 And, "My soul desired to long for Your judgments;" or if it is more appropriate to say, "My soul longed to desire Your judgments." And, "The desire of wisdom brings to a kingdom." Wisdom 6:20 Yet there has always obtained the usage of understanding desire and concupiscence in a bad sense if the object be not defined. But joy is used in a good sense: "Be glad in the Lord, and rejoice, you righteous." And, "You have put gladness in my heart." And, "You will fill me with joy with Your countenance." Fear is used in a good sense by the apostle when he says, "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling." Philippians 2:12 And, "Be not high-minded, but fear." Romans 11:20 And, "I fear, lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety, so your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ." 2 Corinthians 11:3 But with respect to sadness, which Cicero prefer to calls sickness (_S gritudo), and Virgil pain (dolor) (as he says, "Dolent gaudentque"), but which I prefer to call sorrow, because sickness and pain are more commonly used to express bodily suffering,-with respect to this emotion, I say, the question whether it can be used in a good sense is more difficult.
BOOK XIV [VIII] Quas enim Graeci appellant eu)paqei/as, Latine autem Cicero constantias nominavit, Stoici tres esse voluerunt pro tribus perturbationibus in animo sapientis, pro cupiditate voluntatem, pro laetitia gaudium, pro metu cautionem; pro aegritudine vero vel dolore, quam nos vitandae ambiguitatis gratia tristitiam maluimus dicere, negaverunt esse posse aliquid in animo sapientis. Voluntas quippe, inquiunt, appetit bonum, quod facit sapiens; gaudium de bono adepto est, quod ubique adipiscitur sapiens; cautio devitat malum, quod debet sapiens devitare; tristitia porro quia de malo est, quod iam accidit, nullum autem malum existimant posse accidere sapienti, nihil in eius animo pro illa esse posse dixerunt. Sic ergo illi loquuntur, ut velle gaudere cavere negent nisi sapientem; stultum autem non nisi cupere laetari, metuere contristari; et illas tres esse constantias, has autem quattuor perturbationes secundum Ciceronem, secundum autem plurimos passiones. Graece autem illae tres, sicut dixi, appellantur eu)pa/qeiai; istae autem quattuor *pa/qh. Haec locutio utrum scripturis sanctis congruat, cum quaererem quantum potui diligenter, illud inveni quod ait propheta: Non est gaudere impiis, dicit Dominus; tamquam impii laetari possint potius quam gaudere de malis, quia gaudium proprie bonorum et piorum est. Item illud in euangelio: Quaecumque uultis ut faciant vobis homines, haec et vos facite illis, ita dictum videtur, tamquam nemo possit aliquid male vel turpiter velle, sed cupere. Denique propter consuetudinem locutionis nonnulli interpretes addiderunt "bona" et ita interpretati sunt: "Quaecumque uultis ut faciant vobis homines bona." Cavendum enim putaverunt, ne quisquam inhonesta velit sibi fieri ab hominibus, ut de turpioribus taceam, certe luxuriosa conuivia, in quibus se, si et ipse illis faciat, hoc praecept existimet impleturum. Sed in Graeco euangelio, unde in Latinum translatum est, non legitur "bona", sed: Quaecumque uultis ut faciant vobis homines, haec et vos facite illis; credo propterea, quia in eo quod dixit uultis, iam voluit intellegi "bona". Non enim ait "cupitis". Non tamen semper his proprietatibus locutio nostra frenanda est, sed interdum his utendum est; et cum legimus eos, quorum auctoritati resultare fas non est, ibi sunt intellegendae, ubi rectus sensus alium exitum non potest invenire; sicut ista sunt, quae exempli gratia partim ex propheta, partim ex euangelio commemoravimus. Quis enim nescit impios exultare laetitia? et tamen: Non est gaudere impiis, dicit Dominus. Vnde, nisi quia gaudere aliud est, quando proprie signateque hoc verbum ponitur? Item quis negaverit non recte praecipi hominibus, ut quaecumque ab aliis sibi fieri cupiunt, haec eis et ipsi faciant; ne se inuicem turpitudine inlicitae voluptatis oblectent? et tamen saluberrimum verissimumque praeceptum est: Quaecumque uultis ut faciant vobis homines, eadem et vos facite illis. Et hoc unde, nisi quia hoc loco mUdo quodam proprio voluntas posita est, quae in malo accipi non potest? Locutione vero usitatiore, quam frequentat maxime consuetudo sermonis, non utique diceretur: Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium, nisi esset et voluntas mala, a cuius pravitate illa distinguitur, quam praedicaverunt angeli dicentes: Pax in terra hominibus bonae voluntatis. Nam ex abundanti additum est "bonae", si esse non potest nisi bona. Quid autem magnum in caritatis laudibus dixisset apostolus, quod non gaudeat super iniquitate, nisi Ovia ita malignitas gaudet? Et apud auctores saecularium litterarum talis istorum verborum indifferentia reperitur. Ait enim Cicero orator amplissimus: "Cupio, patres conscripti, me esse clementem." Quia id verbum in bono posuit, quis tam peruerse doctus existat, qui non eum "Cupio", sed "Volo" potius dicere debuisse contendat? Porro apud Terentium flagitiosus adulescens insana flagrans cupidine: Nihil volo aliud, inquit, nisi Philumenam. Quam voluntatem fuisse libidinem responsio, quae. ibi serui eius sanioris inducitur, satis indicat. Ait namque domino suo: Quanto satius est, Te id dare operam, qui istum amorem ex animo amoveas tuo, Quam id loqui, quo magis libido frustra accendatur tua? Gaudium vero eos et in malo posuisse ille ipse Vergilianus testis est versus, ubi has quattuor perturbationes summa brevitate complexus est: Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque. Dixit etiam idem auctor: Mala mentis gaudia. Proinde volunt cavent gaudent et boni et mali; atque ut eadem aliis verbis enuntiemus, cupiunt timent laetantur et boni et mali; sed illi bene, isti male, sicut hominibus seu recta seu peruersa voluntas est. Ipsa quoque tristitia, pro qua Stoici nihil in animo sapientis inveniri posse putaverunt, reperitur in bono et maxime apud nostros. Nam laudat apostolus Corinthios, quod contristati fuerint secundum Deum. Sed fortasse quis dixerit illis apostolum fuisse congratulatum, quod contristati fuerint paenitendo, qualis tristitia, nisi eorum qui peccaverint, esse non potest. Ita enim dicit: Video quod epistula illa, etsi ad horam, contristavit vos; nunc gaudeo, non quoa contristali estis, sed quia contristati eslis in paenitentiam. Contristati enim estis secundum Deum, ut in nullo detrimentum patiamini ex nobis. Quae enim secundum Deum est tristitia, paenitentiam in salutem inpaenitendam operatur; mundi autem tristitia mortem operatur. Ecce enim id ipsum secundum Deum contristari, quantam perfecit in vobis industriam. Ac per hoc possunt Stoici pro suis partibus respondere, ad hoc videri utilem esse tristitiam, ut peccasse paeniteat; in animo autem sapientis ideo esse non posse, quia nec peccatum in eum cadit, cuius paenitentia contristetur, nec ullum aliud malum, quod perpetiendo et sentiendo sit tristis. Nam et Alcibiadem ferunt (si me de nomine hominis memoria non fallit), cum sibi beatus videretur, Socrate disputante et ei quam miser esset, quoniam stultus esset, demonstrante flevisse. Huic ergo stultitia fuit causa etiam huius utilis optandaeque tristitiae, qua homo esse se dolet, quod esse non debet. Stoici autem non stultum, sed sapientem aiunt tristem esse non posse.	Those emotions which the Greeks call e?pa?e?a?, and which Cicero calls constanti_S , the Stoics would restrict to three; and, instead of three "perturbations" in the soul of the wise man, they substituted severally, in place of desire, will; in place of joy, contentment; and for fear, caution; and as to sickness or pain, which we, to avoid ambiguity, preferred to call sorrow, they denied that it could exist in the mind of a wise man. Will, they say, seeks the good, for this the wise man does. Contentment has its object in good that is possessed, and this the wise man continually possesses. Caution avoids evil, and this the wise man ought to avoid. But sorrow arises from evil that has already happened; and as they suppose that no evil can happen to the wise man, there can be no representative of sorrow in his mind. According to them, therefore, none but the wise man wills, is contented, uses caution; and that the fool can do no more than desire, rejoice, fear, be sad. The former three affections Cicero calls constanti_S , the last four perturbationes. Many, however, calls these last passions; and, as I have said, the Greeks call the former e?pa?e?a?, and the latter p??? . And when I made a careful examination of Scripture to find whether this terminology was sanctioned by it, I came upon this saying of the prophet: "There is no contentment to the wicked, says the Lord;" Isaiah 57:21 as if the wicked might more properly rejoice than be contented regarding evils, for contentment is the property of the good and godly. I found also that verse in the Gospel: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them?" Matthew 7:12 which seems to imply that evil or shameful things may be the object of desire, but not of will. Indeed, some interpreters have added "good things," to make the expression more in conformity with customary usage, and have given this meaning, "Whatsoever good deeds that you would that men should do unto you." For they thought that this would prevent any one from wishing other men to provide him with unseemly, not to say shameful gratifications,-luxurious banquets, for example,-on the supposition that if he returned the like to them he would be fulfilling this precept. In the Greek Gospel, however, from which the Latin is translated, "good" does not occur, but only, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them," and, as I believe, because "good" is already included in the word "would;" for He does not say "desire."Yet though we may sometimes avail ourselves of these precise proprieties of language, we are not to be always bridled by them; and when we read those writers against whose authority it is unlawful to reclaim, we must accept the meanings above mentioned in passages where a right sense can be educed by no other interpretation, as in those instances we adduced partly from the prophet, partly from the Gospel. For who does not know that the wicked exult with joy? Yet "there is no contentment for the wicked, says the Lord." And how so, unless because contentment, when the word is used in its proper and distinctive significance, means something different from joy? In like manner, who would deny that it were wrong to enjoin upon men that whatever they desire others to do to them they should themselves do to others, lest they should mutually please one another by shameful and illicit pleasure? And yet the precept, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them," is very wholesome and just. And how is this, unless because the will is in this place used strictly, and signifies that will which cannot have evil for its object? But ordinary phraseology would not have allowed the saying, "Be unwilling to make any manner of lie," Sirach 7:13 had there not been also an evil will, whose wickedness separates if from that which the angels celebrated, "Peace on earth, of good will to men." Luke 2:14 For "good" is superfluous if there is no other kind of will but good will. And why should the apostle have mentioned it among the praises of charity as a great thing, that "it rejoices not in iniquity," unless because wickedness does so rejoice? For even with secular writers these words are used indifferently. For Cicero, that most fertile of orators, says, "I desire, conscript fathers, to be merciful." And who would be so pedantic as to say that he should have said "I will" rather than "I desire," because the word is used in a good connection? Again, in Terence, the profligate youth, burning with wild lust, says, "I will nothing else than Philumena." That this "will" was lust is sufficiently indicated by the answer of his old servant which is there introduced: "How much better were it to try and banish that love from your heart, than to speak so as uselessly to inflame your passion still more!" And that contentment was used by secular writers in a bad sense that verse of Virgil testifies, in which he most succinctly comprehends these four perturbations,-Hence they fear and desire, grieve and are contentThe same author had also used the expression, "the evil contentments of the mind." So that good and bad men alike will, are cautious, and contented; or, to say the same thing in other words, good and bad men alike desire, fear, rejoice, but the former in a good, the latter in a bad fashion, according as the will is right or wrong. Sorrow itself, too, which the Stoics would not allow to be represented in the mind of the wise man, is used in a good sense, and especially in our writings. For the apostle praises the Corinthians because they had a godly sorrow. But possibly some one may say that the apostle congratulated them because they were penitently sorry, and that such sorrow can exist only in those who have sinned. For these are his words: "For I perceive that the same epistle has made you sorry, though it were but for a season. Now I rejoice, not that you were made sorry, but that you sorrowed to repentance; for you were made sorry after a godly manner, that you might receive damage by us in nothing. For godly sorrow works repentance to salvation not to be repented of, but the sorrow of the world works death. For, behold, this selfsame thing that you sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you!" 2 Corinthians 7:8-11 Consequently the Stoics may defend themselves by replying, that sorrow is indeed useful for repentance of sin, but that this can have no place in the mind of the wise man, inasmuch as no sin attaches to him of which he could sorrowfully repent, nor any other evil the endurance or experience of which could make him sorrowful. For they say that Alcibiades (if my memory does not deceive me), who believed himself happy, shed tears when Socrates argued with him, and demonstrated that he was miserable because he was foolish. In his case, therefore, folly was the cause of this useful and desirable sorrow, wherewith a man mourns that he is what he ought not to be. But the Stoics maintain not that the fool, but that the wise man, cannot be sorrowful.
BOOK XIV [IX] Verum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbationibus adtinet, iam respondimus in nono huius operis libro, ostendentes eos non tam de rebus, quam de verbis cupidiores esse contentionis quam veritatis. Apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas sanamque doctrinam cives sanctae civitatis Dei in huius vitae peregrinatione secundum Deum viventes metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent. Metuunt poenam aeternam, cupiunt vitam aeter nam; dolent in re, quia ipsi in semet ipsis adhuc ingemescunt adoptionem expectantes, redemptionem corporis sui; gaudent in spe, quia fiet sermo, qui scriptus est: Absorta est mors in victoriam. Item metuunt peccare, cupiunt perseuerare; dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis. Vt enim metuant peccare, audiunt: Quoniam abundabit iniquitas, refrigescet caritas multorum; ut cupiant perseuerare, audiunt quod scriptum est: Qui perseueraverit usque in finem, hic saluus erit; ut doleant in peccatis, audiunt: Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est; ut gaudeant in operibus bonis, audiunt: Hilarem datorem diligit Deus. Item sicuti se infirmitas eorum firmitasque habuerit, metuunt temptari, cupiunt temptari; dolent in temptationibus, gaudent in temptationibus. Vt enim metuant temptari, audiunt: Si quis praeoccupatus fuerit in aliquo delicto, vos, qui spiritales estis, instruite huius modi in spiritu mansuetudinis, intendens te ipsum, ne et tu tempteris. ut autem cupiant temptari, audiunt quendam virum fortem civitatis Dei dicentem: Proba me, Domine, et tempta me; ure renes meos et cor meum; ut doleant in temptationibus, vident Petrum flentem; ut gaudeant in temptationibus, audiunt Iacobum dicentem: Omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, cum in temptationes varias incideritis. Non solum autem propter se ipsos his moventur affectibus, verum etiam propter eos, quos liberari cupiunt et ne pereant metuunt, et dolent si pereunt et gaudent si liberantur. Illum quippe optimum et fortissimum virum, qui in suis infirmitatibus gloriatur, ut eum potissimum commemoremus, qui in ecclesiam Christi ex gentibus venimus, doctorem gentium in fide et veritate, qui et plus omnibus suis coapostolis laboravit et pluribus epistulis populos Dei, non eos tantum, qui praesentes ab illo videbantur; verum etiam illos, qui futuri praevidebantur, instruxit; illum, inquam, virum, athletam Christi, doctum ab illo, unctum de illo, crucifixum cum illo, gloriosum in illo, in theatro huius mundi, cui spectaculum factus est et angelis et hominibus, legitime magnum agonem certantem et palmam supernae vocationis in anteriora sectantem, oculis fidei libentissime spectant gaudere cum gaudentibus, flere cum flentibus, foris habentem pugnas, intus timores, cupientem dissolvi et esse cum Christo, desiderantem videre Romanos, ut aliquem fructum habeat et in illis, sicut et in ceteris gentibus, aemmantem Corinthios et ipsa aemulatione metuentem, ne seducantur eorum mentes a castitate, quae in Christo est, magnam tristitiam et continuum dolorem cordis de Israelitis habentem, quod ignorantes Dei iustitiam et suam volentes constituere iustitiae Dei non essent subiecti; nec solum dolorem, verum etiam luctum suum denuntiantem quibusdam, qui ante peccaverunt et non egerunt paenitentiam super inmunditia et fornicationibus suis. Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate venientes si vitia vocanda sunt, sinamus, ut ea, quae vere vitia sunt, virtutes vocentur. Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones, quando ubi oportet adbibentur, quis eas tunc morbos seu vitiosas passiones audeat dicere? Quam ob rem etiam ipse Dominus in forma serui agere vitam dignatus humanam, sed nullum habens omnino peccatum adhibuit eas, ubi adhibendas esse iudicavit. Neque enim, in quo verum erat hominis corpus et verus hominis animus, falsus erat humanus affectus. Cum ergo eius in euangelio ista referuntur, quod super duritia cordis ludaeorum cum ira contristatus sit, quod dixerit: Gaudeo propter vos, ut credatis, quod Lazarum suscitaturus etiam lacrimas fuderit, quod concupiverit cum discipulis suis manducare pascha, quod propinquante passione tristis fuerit anima eius: non falso utique referuntur. Verum ille hos motus certae dispensationis gratia ita cum voluit suscepit animo humano, ut cum voluit factus est homo. Proinde, quod fatendum est, etiam cum rectas et secundum Deum habemus has affectiones, huius vitae sunt, non illius, quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inuiti cedimus. Itaque aliquando, quamuis non culpabili cupiditate, sed laudabili caritate moveamur, etiam dum nolumus flemus. Habemus ergo eas ex humanae condicionis infinnitate; non autem ita Dominus Iesus, cuius et infirmitas fuit ex potestate. Sed dum vitae huius infinnitatem gerimus, si eas omnino nullas habeamus, tunc potius non recte vivimus. Vituperabat enim et detestabatur apostolus quosdam, quos etiam esse dixit sine affectione. Culpavit etiam illos sacer psalmus, de quibus ait: Sustinui qui simul contristaretur, et non fuit. Nam omnino non dolere, dum sumus in hoc loco miseriae, profecto, sicut quidam etiam apud saeculi huius litteratos sensit et dixit, 'non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore'. Quocirca illa, quae a)pa/qeia Graece dicitur (quae si Latine posset inpassibilitas diceretur), si ita intellegenda est (in animo quippe, non in corpore accipitur), ut sine his affectionibus vivatur, quae contra rationem accidunt mentemque perturbant, bona plane et maxime optanda est, sed nec ipsa huius est vitae. Non enim qualiumcumque hominum vox est, sed maxime piorum multumque iustorum atque sanctorum: Si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus et veritas in nobis non est. Tunc itaque a)pa/qeia ista erit, quando peccatum in homine nullum erit. Nunc vero satis bene vivitur, <si> sine crimine; sine peccato autem qui se vivere existimat, non id agit, ut peccatdm non habeat, sed ut veniam non accipiat. Porro si a)pa/qeia illa dicenda est, cum animum contingere omnino non potest ullus affectus, quis hunc stuporem non omnibus vitiis iudicet esse peiorem? Potest ergo non absurde dici perfectam beatitudinem sine stimulo timoris et sine ulla tristitia futuram; non ibi autem futurum amorem gaudiumque quis dixerit, nisi omni modo a veritate seclusus? Si autem a)pa/qeia illa est, ubi nec metus ullus exterret nec angit dolor, aversanda est in hac vita, si recte, hoc est secundum Deum, vivere volumus; in illa vero beata, quae sempiterna promittitur, plane speranda est. Timor namque ille, de quo dicit apostolus lohannes: Timor non est in caritate, sed perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem, quia timor poenam habet; qui autem timet, non est perfectus in caritate, non est eius generis timor, cuius ille, quo timebat apostolus Paulus, ne Corinthii serpentina seducerentur astutia; hunc enim timorem habet caritas, immo non habet nisi caritas; sed illius generis est timor qui non est in caritate, de quo ipse apostolus Paulus ait: Non enim accepistis spiritum seruitutis iterum in timore. Timor vero ille castus permanens in saeculum saeculi, si erit et in futuro saeculo, nam quo alio modo potest intellegi permanere in saeculum saeculi Pn non est timor exterrens a malo quod accidere potest, sed tenens in bono quod amitti non potest. Vbi enim boni adepti amor inmutabilis est, profecto, si dici potest, mali cavendi timor securus est. Timoris quippe casti nomine ea voluntas significata est, qua nos necesse erit nolle peccare, et non sollicitudine infirmitatis, ne forte peccemus, sed tranquillitate caritatis cavere peccatum. Aut si nullius omnino generis timor esse poterit in illa certissima securitate perpetuorum feliciumque gaudiorum, sic est dictum: Timor Domini castus permanens in saeculum saeculi, quem ad modum dictum est: Patientia pauperum non peribit in aeternum. Neque enim aeterna erit ipsa patientia, quae necessaria non est, nisi ubi toleranda sunt mala; sed aeternum erit, quo per patientiam pervenitur. Ita fortasse timor castus in saeculum sa eculi dictus est permanere, quia id permanebit, quo timor ipse perducit. Quae cum ita sint, quoniam recta vita ducenda est, qua perveniendum sit ad beatam, omnes affectus istos vita recta rectos habet, peruersa peruersos. Beata vero eademque aeterna amorem habebit et gaudium non solum rectum, verum etiam certum; timorem autem ac dolorem nullum. Vnde iam apparet utcumque, quales esse debeant in hac peregrinatione cives civitatis Dei, viventes secundum spiritum, non secundum carnem, hoc est secundum Deum, non secundum hominem, et quales in illa, quo tendunt, inmortalitate futuri sint. Civitas porro, id est societas, impiorum non secundum Deum, sed secundum hominem viventium et in ipso cultu falsae contemptuque verae divinitatis doctrinas hominum daemonumue sectantium his affectibus pravis tamquam morbis et perturbationibus quatitur. Et si quos cives habet, qui moderari talibus motibus et eos quasi temperare videantur, sic impietate superbi et elati sunt, ut hoc ipso sint in eis maiores tumores, quo minores dolores. Et si nonnmii tanto inmaniore, quanto rariore uanitate hoc in se ipsis adamaverint, ut nullo prorsus erigantur et excitentur, nullo flectantur atque inclinentur affectu: humanitatem totam potius amittunt, quam veram adsequuntur tranquillitatem. Non enim quia durum aliquid, ideo rectum, aut quia stupidum est, ideo sanum.	But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there "shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory." 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that "because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold." Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, "He that endures to the end shall be saved." Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that "the Lord loves a cheerful giver." 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, "If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted." Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, "Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart." They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, "My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations." James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow-apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in,-that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 -very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, "I am glad for your sakes, to the intent ye may believe," John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul.But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were "without natural affection." Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, "I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none." For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ?pa?e?a, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, "impassibilitas," if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this ap??e?a . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition.For that fear of which the Apostle John says, "There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love," 1 John 4:18 -that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear." Romans 8:15 But as for that "clean fear which endures for ever," if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of "clean fear" David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, "The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever," must be taken in the same sense as that other, "The patience of the poor shall not perish for ever." For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this "clean fear" is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure.And since this is so,-since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh,-that is to say, according to God, not according to man,-and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible.
BOOK XIV [X] Sed utrum primus homo vel primi homines (duorum erat quippe coniugium) habebant istos affectus in corpore animab ante peccatum, quales in corpore spiritali non habebimus omni purgato finitoque peccato, non inmerito quaeritur. Si enim habebant, quo modo erant beati in illo memorabili beatitudinis loco, id est paradiso? Quis tandem absolute dici beatus potest, qui timore afficitur vel dolore? Quid autem timere aut dolere poterant illi homines in tantorum tanta afluentia bonorum, ubi nec mors metuebatur nec ulla corporis mala valetudo, nec aberat quicquam, quod bona voluntas adipisceretur, nec inerat quod carnem animumue hominis feliciter viventis offenderet? Amor erat inperturbatus in Deum atque inter se coniugum fida et sincera societate viven. tium, et ex hoc amore grande gaudium, non desistente quod amabatur ad fruendum. Erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente nullum omnino alicunde malum, quod contristaret, inruebat. An forte cupiebant prohibitum lignum ad uescendum contingere, sed mori metuebant, ac per hoc et cupiditas et metus iam tunc illos homines etiam in illo perturbabat loco? Absit ut hoc existimemus fuisse, ubi nullum erat omnino peccatum. Neque enim nullum peccatum est ea quae lex Dei prohibet concupiscere atque ab his abstinere timore poenae, non amore iustitiae. Absit, inquam, ut ante omne peccatum iam ibi fuerit tale peccatum, ut hoc de ligno admitterent, quod de muliere Dominus ait: Si quis viderit mulieYem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est eam in corde suo. Quam igitur felices erant et nullis agitabantur perturbationibus animorum, nullis corporum laedebantur incommodis: tam felix universa societas esset humana, si nec illi malum, quod etiam in posteros traicerent, nec quisquam ex eorum stirpe iniquitate committeret, quod damnatione reciperet; atque ista permanente felicitate, donec per illam benedictionem, qua dictum est: Crescite et multiplicamini, praedestinatorum sanctorum numerus compleretur, alia maior daretur, quae beatissimis angelis data est, ubi iam esset Certa SeCuritaS peCCatUrUm neminem neminemqUe mOritUrum, et talis esset vita sanctorum post nullum laboris doloris mortis experimentum, qualis erit post haec omnia in incorruptione corporum reddita resurrectione mortuorum.	But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first parents (for there was a marriage of two), before they sinned, experienced in their animal body such emotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin has been purged and finally abolished. For if they did, then how were they blessed in that boasted place of bliss, Paradise? For who that is affected by fear or grief can be called absolutely blessed? And what could those persons fear or suffer in such affluence of blessings, where neither death nor ill-health was feared, and where nothing was wanting which a good will could desire, and nothing present which could interrupt man's mental or bodily enjoyment? Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow. Or did they perhaps desire to touch and eat the forbidden fruit, yet feared to die; and thus both fear and desire already, even in that blissful place, preyed upon those first of mankind? Away with the thought that such could be the case where there was no sin! And, indeed, this is already sin, to desire those things which the law of God forbids, and to abstain from them through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness. Away, I say, with the thought, that before there was any sin, there should already have been committed regarding that fruit the very sin which our Lord warns us against regarding a woman: "Whosoever looks on a woman to lust after her, has committed adultery with her already in his heart." Matthew 5:28 As happy, then, as were these our first parents, who were agitated by no mental perturbations, and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the whole human race have been, had they not introduced that evil which they have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of their descendants committed iniquity worthy of damnation; but this original blessedness continuing until, in virtue of that benediction which said, "Increase and multiply," Genesis 1:28 the number of the predestined saints should have been completed, there would then have been bestowed that higher felicity which is enjoyed by the most blessed angels,-a blessedness in which there should have been a secure assurance that no one would sin, and no one die; and so should the saints have lived, after no taste of labor, pain, or death, as now they shall live in the resurrection, after they have endured all these things.
BOOK XIV [XI] Sed quia Deus cuncta praescivit et ideo quoque hominem peccaturum ignorare non potuit: secundum id, quod praescivit atque disposuit, civitatem sanctam debemus adserere, non secundum illud, quod in nostram cognitionem pervenire non potuit, quia in Dei dispositione non fuit. Neque enim homo peccato suo divinum potuit perturbare consilium, quasi Deum quod statuerat mutare conpulerit; cum Deus praesciendo utrumque praeuenerit, id est, et homo, quem bonum ipse creavit, quam malus esset futurus, et quid boni etiam sic de illo esset ipse facturus. Deus enim etsi dicitur statuta mutare unde tropica locutione in scripturis etiam paenituisse legitur Deumn, iuxta id dicitur, quod homo speraverat vel naturalium causarum ordo gestabat, non iuxta id, quod se Omnipotens facturum esse praesciverat. Fecit itaque Deus, sicut scriptum est, hominem rectum ac per hoc voluntatis bonae. Non enim rectus esset bonam non habens voluntatem. Bona igitur voluntas opus est Dei; cum ea quippe ab illo factus est homo. Mala vero voluntas prima, quoniam omnia opera mala praecessit in homine, defectus potius fuit quidam ab opere Dei ad sua opera quam opus ullum, et ideo mala opera, quia secundum se, non secundum Deum; ut eorum operum tamquam fructuum malorum voluntas ipsa esset velut arbor mala aut ipse homo in quantum malae voluntatis. Porro mala voluntas quamuis non sit secundum naturam, sed contra naturam, quia vitium est, tamen eius naturae est, cuius est vitium, quod nisi in natura non potest esse: sed in ea, quam creavit ex nihilo, non quam genuit Creator de semet ipso, sicut genuit Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia; quia, etsi de terrae puluere Deus finxit hominem, eadem terra omnisque terrena materies omnino de nihilo est, animamque de nihilo factam dedit corpori, cum factus est homo. Vsque adeo autem mala vincuntur a bonis, ut, quamuis sinantur esse ad demonstrandum quam possit et ipsis bene uti iustitia providentissima Creatoris, bona tamen sine malis esse possint, sicut Deus ipse verus et summus, sicut omnis super istum caliginosum aerem caelestis inuisibilis visibilisque creatura; mala vero sine bonis esse non possint, quoniam naturae, in quibus sunt, in quantum naturae sunt, utique bonae sunt. Detrahitur porro malum non aliqua natura, quae accesserat, vel ulla eius parte sublata, sed ea, quae vitiata ac deprauata fuerat, sanata atque correcta. Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum vitiis peccatisque non seruit. Tale datum est a Deo; quod amissum proprio vitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Vnde Veritas dicit: Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis. Id ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: "Si vos Filius saluos fecerit, tunc vere salui eritis." Inde quippe liberator, unde saluator. Vivebat itaque homo secundum Deum in paradiso et corporali et spiritali. Neque enim erat paraffisus corporalis propter corporis bona et propter mentis non erat spiritalis; aut vero erat spiritalis quo per interiores et non erat corporalis quo per exteriores sensus homo frueretur. Erat plane utrumque propter utrumque. Postea vero quam superbus ille angelus ac per hoc inuidus per eandem superbiam a Deo ad semet ipsum conversus et quodam quasi tyrannico fastu gaudere subditis quam esse subditus eligens de spiritali paradiso cecidit (de cuius lapsu sociorumque eius, qui ex angelis Dei angeli eius effecti sunt, in libris undecimo et duodecimo huius operis satis, quantum potui, disputavi), malesuada versutia in hominis sensum serpere affectans, cui utique stanti, quoniam ipse ceciderat, inuidebat, colubrum in paradiso corporali, ubi cum duobus illis hominibus, masculo et femina, animalia etiam terrestria cetera subdita et innoxia versabantur, animal scilicet lubricum et tortuosis anfractibus mobile, operi suo congruum, per quem loqueretur, elegit; eoque per angelicam praesentiam praestantioremque naturam spiritali nequitia sibi subiecto et tamquam instrumento abutens fallacia sermocinatus est feminae, a parte scilicet inferiore illius humanae copulae incipiens, ut gradatim perveniret ad totum, non existimans virum facile credulum nec errando posse decipi, sed dum alieno cedit errori. Sicut enim Aaron erranti populo ad idolum fabricandum non consensit inductus, sed cessit obstrictus nec Salomonem credibile est errore putasse idolis esse seruiendum, sed blanditns femineis ad illa sacrilegia fuisse conpulsum: ita credendum est illum virum suae feminae, uni unum, hominem homini, coniugem coniugi, ad Dei legem transgrediendam non tamquam verum loquenti credidisse seductum, sed sociali necessitudine paruisse. Non enim frustra dixit apostolus: Et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta est, nisi quia illa quod ei serpens locutus est, tamquam verum esset, accepit, ille autem ab unico noluit consortio dirimi nec in communione peccati; nec ideo minus reus, si sciens prudensque peccavit. Vnde et apostolus non ait: "Non peccavit", sed: Non est seductus; nam utique ipsum ostendit, ubi dicit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et paulo post apertius: In similitudine, inquit, praeuaricationis Adae. Hos autem seductos intellegi voluit, qui id, quod faciunt, non putant esse peccatum; ille autem scivit. Afioquin quo modo verum erit: Adam non est seductus? Sed inexpertus divinae seueritatis in eo falli potuit, ut veniale crederet esse commissum. Ac per hoc in eo quidem, quo mulier seducta est, non est ille seductus, sed eum fefellit, quo modo fuerat iudicandum quod erat dicturus: Mulier, quam dedisti mecum, ipsa mihi dedit, et manducavi. Quid ergo pluribus? Etsi credendo non sunt ambo decepti, peccando tamen amho sunt capti et diaboli laqueis inplicati.	But because God foresaw all things, and was therefore not ignorant that man also would fall, we ought to consider this holy city in connection with what God foresaw and ordained, and not according to our own ideas, which do not embrace God's ordination. For man, by his sin, could not disturb the divine counsel, nor compel God to change what He had decreed; for God's foreknowledge had anticipated both,-that is to say, both how evil the man whom He had created good should become, and what good He Himself should even thus derive from him. For though God is said to change His determinations (so that in a tropical sense the Holy Scripture says even that God repented), this is said with reference to man's expectation, or the order of natural causes, and not with reference to that which the Almighty had foreknown that He would do. Accordingly God, as it is written, made man upright, Ecclesiastes 7:29 and consequently with a good will. For if he had not had a good will, he could not have been upright. The good will, then, is the work of God; for God created him with it. But the first evil will, which preceded all man's evil acts, was rather a kind of falling away from the work of God to its own works than any positive work. And therefore the acts resulting were evil, not having God, but the will itself for their end; so that the will or the man himself, so far as his will is bad, was as it were the evil tree bringing forth evil fruit. Moreover, the bad will, though it be not in harmony with, but opposed to nature, inasmuch as it is a vice or blemish, yet it is true of it as of all vice, that it cannot exist except in a nature, and only in a nature created out of nothing, and not in that which the Creator has begotten of Himself, as He begot the Word, by whom all things were made. For though God formed man of the dust of the earth, yet the earth itself, and every earthly material, is absolutely created out of nothing; and man's soul, too, God created out of nothing, and joined to the body, when He made man. But evils are so thoroughly overcome by good, that though they are permitted to exist, for the sake of demonstrating how the most righteous foresight of God can make a good use even of them, yet good can exist without evil, as in the true and supreme God Himself, and as in every invisible and visible celestial creature that exists above this murky atmosphere; but evil cannot exist without good, because the natures in which evil exists, in so far as they are natures, are good. And evil is removed, not by removing any nature, or part of a nature, which had been introduced by the evil, but by healing and correcting that which had been vitiated and depraved. The will, therefore, is then truly free, when it is not the slave of vices and sins. Such was it given us by God; and this being lost by its own fault, can only be restored by Him who was able at first to give it. And therefore the truth says, "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed;" 1 John 8:36 which is equivalent to saying, If the Son shall save you, you shall be saved indeed. For He is our Liberator, inasmuch as He is our Saviour.Man then lived with God for his rule in a paradise at once physical and spiritual. For neither was it a paradise only physical for the advantage of the body, and not also spiritual for the advantage of the mind; nor was it only spiritual to afford enjoyment to man by his internal sensations, and not also physical to afford him enjoyment through his external senses. But obviously it was both for both ends. But after that proud and therefore envious angel (of whose fall I have said as much as I was able in the eleventh and twelfth books of this work, as well as that of his fellows, who, from being God's angels, became his angels), preferring to rule with a kind of pomp of empire rather than to be another's subject, fell from the spiritual Paradise, and essaying to insinuate his persuasive guile into the mind of man, whose unfallen condition provoked him to envy now that himself was fallen, he chose the serpent as his mouthpiece in that bodily Paradise in which it and all the other earthly animals were living with those two human beings, the man and his wife, subject to them, and harmless; and he chose the serpent because, being slippery, and moving in tortuous windings, it was suitable for his purpose. And this animal being subdued to his wicked ends by the presence and superior force of his angelic nature, he abused as his instrument, and first tried his deceit upon the woman, making his assault upon the weaker part of that human alliance, that he might gradually gain the whole, and not supposing that the man would readily give ear to him, or be deceived, but that he might yield to the error of the woman. For as Aaron was not induced to agree with the people when they blindly wished him to make an idol, and yet yielded to constraint; and as it is not credible that Solomon was so blind as to suppose that idols should be worshipped, but was drawn over to such sacrilege by the blandishments of women; so we cannot believe that Adam was deceived, and supposed the devil's word to be truth, and therefore transgressed God's law, but that he by the drawings of kindred yielded to the woman, the husband to the wife, the one human being to the only other human being. For not without significance did the apostle say, "And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression;" 1 Timothy 2:14 but he speaks thus, because the woman accepted as true what the serpent told her, but the man could not bear to be severed from his only companion, even though this involved a partnership in sin. He was not on this account less culpable, but sinned with his eyes open. And so the apostle does not say, "He did not sin," but "He was not deceived." For he shows that he sinned when he says, "By one man sin entered into the world," Romans 5:12 and immediately after more distinctly, "In the likeness of Adam's transgression." But he meant that those are deceived who do not judge that which they do to be sin; but he knew. Otherwise how were it true "Adam was not deceived?" But having as yet no experience of the divine severity, he was possibly deceived in so far as he thought his sin venial. And consequently he was not deceived as the woman was deceived, but he was deceived as to the judgment which would be passed on his apology: "The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me, and I did eat." Genesis 3:12 What need of saying more? Although they were not both deceived by credulity, yet both were entangled in the snares of the devil, and taken by sin.
BOOK XIV [XII] Si quem vero movet, cur aliis peccatis sic natura non mutetur humana, quem ad modum illa duorum primorum hominum praeuaricatione mutata est, ut tantae corruptioni, quantam videmus atque sentimus, et per hanc subiaceret et morti ac tot et tantis tamque inter se contrariis perturbaretur et fluctuaret affectibus, qualis in paradiso ante peccatum, licet in corpore animali esset, utique non fuit _ - si quis hoc movetur, ut dixi, non ideo debet existimare leue ac paruum illud fuisse commissum, quia in esca factum est, non quidem mala nec noxia, nisi quia prohibita; neque enim quicquam mali Deus in illo tantae felicitatis loco crearet atque plantaret. Sed oboedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae virtus in creatura rationali mater quodam modo est omnium custosque virtutum; quando quidem ita facta est, ut ei subditam esse sit utile; perniciosum autem suam, non eius a quo creata est facere voluntatem. Hoc itaque de uno cibi genere non edendo, ubi aliorum tanta copia subiacebat, tam leue praeceptum ad observandum, tam breue ad memoria retinendum, ubi praesertim nondum voluntati cupiditas resistebat, quod de poena transgressionis postea subsecutum est, tanto maiore iniustitia violatum est, quanto faciliore posset observantia custodiri.	If any one finds a difficulty in understanding why other sins do not alter human nature as it was altered by the transgression of those first human beings, so that on account of it this nature is subject to the great corruption we feel and see, and to death, and is distracted and tossed with so many furious and contending emotions, and is certainly far different from what it was before sin, even though it were then lodged in an animal body,-if, I say, any one is moved by this, he ought not to think that that sin was a small and light one because it was committed about food, and that not bad nor noxious, except because it was forbidden; for in that spot of singular felicity God could not have created and planted any evil thing. But by the precept He gave, God commended obedience, which is, in a sort, the mother and guardian of all the virtues in the reasonable creature, which was so created that submission is advantageous to it, while the fulfillment of its own will in preference to the Creator's is destruction. And as this commandment enjoining abstinence from one kind of food in the midst of great abundance of other kinds was so easy to keep,-so light a burden to the memory,-and, above all, found no resistance to its observance in lust, which only afterwards sprung up as the penal consequence of sin, the iniquity of violating it was all the greater in proportion to the ease with which it might have been kept.
BOOK XIV [XIII] In occulto autem mali esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inoboeffientiam laberentur. Non enim ad malum opus perveniretur, nisi praecessisset voluntas mala. Porro malae voluntatis initium quae potuit esse nisi superbia? Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est. Quid est autem superbia nisi peruersae celsitudinis appetitus? Peruersa enim est celsitudo deserto eo, cui debet animus inhaerere, principio sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, cum sibi nimis placet. Sibi vero ita placet, cum ab illo bono inmutabili deficit, quod ei magis placere debuit quam ipse sibi. Spontaneus est autem iste defectus, quoniam, si voluntas in amore superioris inmutabilis boni, a quo inlustrabatur ut videret et accendebatOr ut amaret, stabilis permaneret, non inde ad sibi placendum averteretur et ex hoc tenebresceret et frigesceret, ut vel illa crederet verum dixisse serpentem, vel ille Dei mandato uxoris praeponeret voluntatem putaretque se venialiter transgressorem esse praecepti, si vitae suae sociam non desereret etiam in societate peccati. Non ergo malum opus factum est, id est illa transgressio, ut cibo prohibito uescerentur, nisi ab eis qui iam mali erant. Neque enim fieret ille fructus malus nisi ab arbore mala. Vt autem esset arbor mala, contra naturam factum est, quia nisi vitio voluntatis, quod contra naturam est, non utique fieret. Sed vitio deprauari nisi ex nihilo facta natura non posset. Ac per hoc ut natura sit, ex eo habet quod a Deo facta est; ut autem ab eo quod est deficiat, ex hoc quod de nihilo facta est. Nec sic defecit homo, ut omnino nihil esset, sed ut inclinatus ad se ipsum minus esset, quam erat, cum ei qui summe est inhaerebat. Relicto itaque Deo esse in semet ipso, hoc est sibi placere, non iam nihil esse est, sed nihilo propinquare. Vnde superbi secundum scripturas sanctas alio nomine appellantur sibi placentes. Bonum est enim sursum habere cor; non tamen ad se ipsum, quod est superbiae, sed ad Dominum, quod est oboedientiae, quae nisi humilium non potest esse. Est igitur aliquid humilitatis miro modo quod sursum faciat cor, et est aliquid elationis quod deorsum faciat cor. Hoc quidem quasi contrarium videtur, ut elatio sit deorsum et humilitas sursum. Sed pia humilitas facit subditum superiori; nihil est autem superius Deo; et ideo exaltat humilitas, quae facit subditum Deo. Elatio autem, quae in vitio est, eo ipso respuit subiectionem et cadit ab illo, quo non est quicquam superius, et ex hoc erit inferius et fit quod scriptum est: Deiecisti eos, cum extollerentur. Non enim ait: "Cum elati fuissent", ut prius extollerentur et postea deicerentur; sed cum extollerentur, tunc deiecti sunt. Ipsum quippe extolli iam deici est. Quapropter quod nunc in civitate Dei et civitati Dei in hoc peregrinantis aeculo maxime commendatur humilitas et in eius rege, qui est Christus, maxime praedicatur contrariumque huic virtuti elationis vitium in eius adversario, qui est diabolus, maxime dominari sacris litteris edocetur: profecto ista est magna differentia, qua civitas, unde loquimur, utraque dis cernitur, una scilicet societas piorum hominum, altera impiorum, singula quaeque cum angelis ad se pertinentibus, in quibus praecessit hac amor Dei, hac amor sui. Manifesto ergo apertoque peccato, ubi factum est quod Deus fieri prohibuerat, diabolus hominem non cepisset, nisi iam ille sibi ipsi placere coepisset. Hinc enim et delectavit quod dictum est: Eritis sicut dii. Quod melius esse possent summo veroque principio cohaerendo per oboedientiam, non suum sibi existendo principium per superbiam. Dii enim creati non sua veritate, sed Dei veri participatione sunt dii. Plus autem appetendo minus est, qui, dum sibi sufficere deligit, ab illo, qui ei vere sufficit, deficit. Illud itaque malum, quo, cum sibi homo placet, tamquam sit et ipse lumen, avertitur ab eo lumine, quod ei si placeat et ipse fit lumen _ - illud, inquam, malum praecessit in abdito, ut sequeretur hoc malum quod perpetratum est in aperto. Verum est enim quod scriptum est: Ante ruinam exaltatur cor ct ante gloriam humiliatur. Illa prorsus rmna, quae fit in occulto, praecedit ruinam, quae fit in manifesto, dum illa ruina esse non putatur. Quis enim exaltationem ruinam putat, cum iam ibi sit defectus, quo est relictus Excelsus? Quis autem ruinam esse non videat, quando fit mandati evidens atque indubitata transgressio? Propter hoc Deus illud prohibuit, quod cum eSet admissum, nulla defendi posset imaginatione iustitiae. Et audeo dicere superbis esse utile cadere in aliquod apertum manifestmmque peccatum, unde sibi displiceant, qui iam sibi placendo ceciderant. Salubrius enim Petrus sibi dispUcuit, quando flevit, quam sibi placuit, quando praesumpsit. Hoc dicit et sacer psalmus: Imple facies eorum ognomonia, et quaerent nomen tuum, Domine, id est, ut tu eis placeas quaerentibus nomen tuum, qui sibi placuerant quaerendo suum.	Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For "pride is the beginning of sin." Sirach 10:13 And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself. This happens when it becomes its own satisfaction. And it does so when it falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to satisfy it more than itself. This falling away is spontaneous; for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of that higher and changeless good by which it was illumined to intelligence and kindled into love, it would not have turned away to find satisfaction in itself, and so become frigid and benighted; the woman would not have believed the serpent spoke the truth, nor would the man have preferred the request of his wife to the command of God, nor have supposed that it was a venial trangression to cleave to the partner of his life even in a partnership of sin. The wicked deed, then,-that is to say, the trangression of eating the forbidden fruit,-was committed by persons who were already wicked. That "evil fruit" Matthew 7:18 could be brought forth only by "a corrupt tree." But that the tree was evil was not the result of nature; for certainly it could become so only by the vice of the will, and vice is contrary to nature. Now, nature could not have been depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from Him, this is because it is made out of nothing. But man did not so fall away as to become absolutely nothing; but being turned towards himself, his being became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him who supremely is. Accordingly, to exist in himself, that is, to be his own satisfaction after abandoning God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approximate to that. And therefore the holy Scriptures designate the proud by another name, "self-pleasers." For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to one's self, for this is proud, but to the Lord, for this is obedient, and can be the act only of the humble. There is, therefore, something in humility which, strangely enough, exalts the heart, and something in pride which debases it. This seems, indeed, to be contradictory, that loftiness should debase and lowliness exalt. But pious humility enables us to submit to what is above us; and nothing is more exalted above us than God; and therefore humility, by making us subject to God, exalts us. But pride, being a defect of nature, by the very act of refusing subjection and revolting from Him who is supreme, falls to a low condition; and then comes to pass what is written: "You cast them down when they lifted up themselves." For he does not say, "when they had been lifted up," as if first they were exalted, and then afterwards cast down; but "when they lifted up themselves" even then they were cast down,-that is to say, the very lifting up was already a fall. And therefore it is that humility is specially recommended to the city of God as it sojourns in this world, and is specially exhibited in the city of God, and in the person of Christ its King; while the contrary vice of pride, according to the testimony of the sacred writings, specially rules his adversary the devil. And certainly this is the great difference which distinguishes the two cities of which we speak, the one being the society of the godly men, the other of the ungodly, each associated with the angels that adhere to their party, and the one guided and fashioned by love of self, the other by love of God.The devil, then, would not have ensnared man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden, had man not already begun to live for himself. It was this that made him listen with pleasure to the words, "You shall be as gods," Genesis 3:5 which they would much more readily have accomplished by obediently adhering to their supreme and true end than by proudly living to themselves. For created gods are gods not by virtue of what is in themselves, but by a participation of the true God. By craving to be more, man becomes less; and by aspiring to be self-sufficing, he fell away from Him who truly suffices him. Accordingly, this wicked desire which prompts man to please himself as if he were himself light, and which thus turns him away from that light by which, had he followed it, he would himself have become light,-this wicked desire, I say, already secretly existed in him, and the open sin was but its consequence. For that is true which is written, "Pride goes before destruction, and before honor is humility;" Proverbs 18:12 that is to say, secret ruin precedes open ruin, while the former is not counted ruin. For who counts exaltation ruin, though no sooner is the Highest forsaken than a fall is begun? But who does not recognize it as ruin, when there occurs an evident and indubitable transgression of the commandment? And consequently, God's prohibition had reference to such an act as, when committed, could not be defended on any pretense of doing what was righteous. And I make bold to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into an open and indisputable transgression, and so displease themselves, as already, by pleasing themselves, they had fallen. For Peter was in a healthier condition when he wept and was dissatisfied with himself, than when he boldly presumed and satisfied himself. And this is averred by the sacred Psalmist when he says, "Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek Your name, O Lord;" that is, that they who have pleased themselves in seeking their own glory may be pleased and satisfied with You in seeking Your glory.
BOOK XIV [XIV] Sed est peior damnabiliorque superbia, qua etiam in peccatis manifestis suffugium excusationis inquiritur; sicut illi primi homines, quorum et illa dixit: Serpens seduxit me, et manducavi, et ille dixit: Mulier, quam dedo sti mecum, haec mihi dedit a ligno, et edi. Nusquam hic sonat petitio veniae, nusquam inploratio medicinae. Nam licet isti non sicut Cain quod commiserunt negent, adhuc tamen superbia in aliud quaerit referre quod perperam fecit: superbia mulieris in serpentem, superbia viri in mulierem. Sed accusatio potius quam excusatio vera est, ubi mandati divini est aperta transgressio. Neque enim hoc propterea non fecerunt, quia id mulier serpente suadente, vir muliere inpertiente commisit, quasi quicquam Deo, cui vel crederetur vel cederetur, anteponendum fuit.	But it is a worse and more damnable pride which casts about for the shelter of an excuse even in manifest sins, as these our first parents did, of whom the woman said, "The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat;" and the man said, "The woman whom You gave to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat." Genesis 3:12-13 Here there is no word of begging pardon, no word of entreaty for healing. For though they do not, like Cain, deny that they have perpetrated the deed, yet their pride seeks to refer its wickedness to another,-the woman's pride to the serpent, the man's to the woman. But where there is a plain trangression of a divine commandment, this is rather to accuse than to excuse oneself. For the fact that the woman sinned on the serpent's persuasion, and the man at the woman's offer, did not make the transgression less, as if there were any one whom we ought rather to believe or yield to than God.
BOOK XIV [XV] Quia ergo contemptus est Deus iubens, qui creaverat, qui ad suam imaginem fecerat, qui ceteris animalibus praeposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat, qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus oneraverat, sed uno brevissimo atque levissimo ad oboedientiae salubritatem adminiculaverat, quo eam creaturam, cui libera seruitus expediret, se esse Dominum commonebat: iusta damnatio subsecuta est, talisque damnatio, ut homo, qui custodiendo mandatum futurus fuerat etiam carne spiritalis, fieret etiam mente carnalis et qui sua superbia sibi placuerat, Dei iustitia sibi donaretur; nec sic, ut in sua esset omnimodis potestate, sed a se ipse quoque dissentiens sub illo, cui peccando consensit, pro libertate, quam concupivit, duram miseramque ageret seruitutem, mortuus spiritu volens et corpore moriturus inuitus, desertor aeternae vitae etiam aeterna, nisi gratia liberaret, morte damnatus. Quisquis huius modi damnationem vel nimiam vel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccanffi facilitas. Sicut enim Abrahae non inmerito magna oboedientia praedicatur, quia, ut occideret filium, res difficillima est imperata: ita in paradiso tanto maior inoboedientia fuit, quanto id, quod praeceptum est, nullius difficultatis fuit. Et sicut oboedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior, quo factus est oboediens usque ad mortem: ita inoboedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior, quo factus est inoboediens usque ad mortem. Vbi enim magna est inoboedientiae poena proposita et res a Creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit non oboedire in re facili et tantae potestatis imperio et tanto tenente supplicio? Denique, ut breviter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi inoboedientia retributa est? Nam quae hominis est alia miseria nisi adversus eum ipsum inoboedientia eius ipsius, ut, quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest velit? In paradiso enim etiamsi non omnia poterat ante peccatum, quidquid tamen non poterat, non volebat, et ideo poterat omnia quae volebat; nunc vero sicut in eius stirpe cognoscimus et divina scriptura testatur, homo uanitati simUis factus est. Quis enim enumerat, quam multa quae non potest velit, dum sibi ipse, id est voluntati eius ipse animus eius eoque inferior caro eius, non obtemperat? Ipso namque inuito et animus plerumque turbatur et caro dolet et ueterescit et moritur, et quidquid aliud patimur, quod non pateremur inuiti, si voluntati nostrae nostra natura omni modo atque ex omnibus partibus oboediret. At enim aliquid caro patitur, quo seruire non sinitur. Quid interest unde, dum tamen per iustitiam dominantis Dei, cui subditi seruire noluimus, caro nostra nobis, quae subdita fuerat, non seruiendo molesta sit, quamuis nos Deo non seruiendo molesti nobis potuerimus esse, non illi? Neque enim sic ille nostro, ut nos seruitio corporis indigemus, et ideo nostra est quod recipimus, non illius poena quod fecimus. Dolores porro, qui dicuntur carnis, animae sunt in carne et ex carne. Quid enim caro per se ipsam sine anima vel dolet vel concupiscit? Sed quod concupiscere caro dicitur vel dolere, aut ipse homo est, sicut disseruimus, aut aliquid animae, quod carnis afficit passio, vel aspera, ut faciat dolorem, vel lenis, ut voluptatem. Sed dolor carnis tantum modo offensio est animae ex carne et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio, sicut animi dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. Sed tristitiam plerumque praecedit metus, qui et ipse in anima est, non in carne. Dolorem autem carnis non praecedit ullus quasi metus carnis, qui ante dolorem in carne sentiatur. Voluptatem vero praecedit appetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas eius, sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale vocabulum omnis cupiditatis. Nam et ipsam iram nihil aliud esse quam ulciscendi libidinem ueteres definierunt; quamms nonnumquam homo, ubi vindictae nullus est sensus, etiam rebus inanimis irascatur, et male scribentem stilum conlidat vel calamum frangat iratus. Verum et ista licet inrationabilior, tamen quaedam ulciscendi libido est, et nescio qua, ut ita dixerim, quasi umbra retribfitionis, ut qui male faciunt, mala patiantur. Est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae auaritia; est libido quomodocumque vincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iactantia nuncupatur. Sunt multae variaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam vocabula propria, quaedam vero non habent. Quis enim facile dixerit, quid vocetur libido dominandi, quam tamen plurimum valere in tyrannorum animis etiam civilia bella testantur?	Therefore, because the sin was a despising of the authority of God,-who had created man; who had made him in His own image; who had set him above the other animals; who had placed him in Paradise; who had enriched him with abundance of every kind and of safety; who had laid upon him neither many, nor great, nor difficult commandments, but, in order to make a wholesome obedience easy to him, had given him a single very brief and very light precept by which He reminded that creature whose service was to be free that He was Lord,-it was just that condemnation followed, and condemnation such that man, who by keeping the commandments should have been spiritual even in his flesh, became fleshly even in his spirit; and as in his pride he had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in His justice abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute independence he affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to live dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself, doomed in spite of himself to die in body as he had willingly become dead in spirit, condemned even to eternal death (had not the grace of God delivered him) because he had forsaken eternal life. Whoever thinks such punishment either excessive or unjust shows his inability to measure the great iniquity of sinning where sin might so easily have been avoided. For as Abraham's obedience is with justice pronounced to be great, because the thing commanded, to kill his son, was very difficult, so in Paradise the disobedience was the greater, because the difficulty of that which was commanded was imperceptible. And as the obedience of the second Man was the more laudable because He became obedient even "unto death," Philippians 2:8 so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable because he became disobedient even unto death. For where the penalty annexed to disobedience is great, and the thing commanded by the Creator is easy, who can sufficiently estimate how great a wickedness it is, in a matter so easy, not to obey the authority of so great a power, even when that power deters with so terrible a penalty?In short, to say all in a word, what but disobedience was the punishment of disobedience in that sin? For what else is man's misery but his own disobedience to himself, so that in consequence of his not being willing to do what he could do, he now wills to do what he cannot? For though he could not do all things in Paradise before he sinned, yet he wished to do only what he could do, and therefore he could do all things he wished. But now, as we recognize in his offspring, and as divine Scripture testifies, "Man is like to vanity." For who can count how many things he wishes which he cannot do, so long as he is disobedient to himself, that is, so long as his mind and his flesh do not obey his will? For in spite of himself his mind is both frequently disturbed, and his flesh suffers, and grows old, and dies; and in spite of ourselves we suffer whatever else we suffer, and which we would not suffer if our nature absolutely and in all its parts obeyed our will. But is it not the infirmities of the flesh which hamper it in its service? Yet what does it matter how its service is hampered, so long as the fact remains, that by the just retribution of the sovereign God whom we refused to be subject to and serve, our flesh, which was subjected to us, now torments us by insubordination, although our disobedience brought trouble on ourselves, not upon God? For He is not in need of our service as we of our body's; and therefore what we did was no punishment to Him, but what we receive is so to us. And the pains which are called bodily are pains of the soul in and from the body. For what pain or desire can the flesh feel by itself and without the soul? But when the flesh is said to desire or to suffer, it is meant, as we have explained, that the man does so, or some part of the soul which is affected by the sensation of the flesh, whether a harsh sensation causing pain, or gentle, causing pleasure. But pain in the flesh is only a discomfort of the soul arising from the flesh, and a kind of shrinking from its suffering, as the pain of the soul which is called sadness is a shrinking from those things which have happened to us in spite of ourselves. But sadness is frequently preceded by fear, which is itself in the soul, not in the flesh; while bodily pain is not preceded by any kind of fear of the flesh, which can be felt in the flesh before the pain. But pleasure is preceded by a certain appetite which is felt in the flesh like a craving, as hunger and thirst and that generative appetite which is most commonly identified with the name" lust," though this is the generic word for all desires. For anger itself was defined by the ancients as nothing else than the lust of revenge; although sometimes a man is angry even at inanimate objects which cannot feel his vengeance, as when one breaks a pen, or crushes a quill that writes badly. Yet even this, though less reasonable, is in its way a lust of revenge, and is, so to speak, a mysterious kind of shadow of [the great law of] retribution, that they who do evil should suffer evil. There is therefore a lust for revenge, which is called anger; there is a lust of money, which goes by the name of avarice; there is a lust of conquering, no matter by what means, which is called opinionativeness; there is a lust of applause, which is named boasting. There are many and various lusts, of which some have names of their own, while others have not. For who could readily give a name to the lust of ruling, which yet has a powerful influence in the soul of tyrants, as civil wars bear witness?
BOOK XIV [XVI] Cum igitur sint multarum libidines rerum, tamen, cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes corporis excitantur. Haec autem sibi non solum totum corpus nec solum extrinsecus, verum etiam intrinsecus vindicat totumque commovet hominem animi simul affectu cum carnis appetitu coniuncto atque permixto, ut ea voluptas sequatur, qua maior in corporis voluptatibus nulla est; ita ut momento ipso temporis, quo ad eius pervenitur extremum, paene omnis acies et quasi vigilia cogitationis obruatur. Quis autem amicus sapientiae sanctorumque gaudiorum coniugalem agens vitam, sed, sicut apostolus monuit, sciens suum uas possidere in sanctificatione et honore, non in morbo desiderii, sicut et gentes, quae ignorant Deum, non mallet, si posset, sine hac libidine filios procreare, ut etiam in hoc serendae prolis officio sic eius menti ea, quae ad hoc opus creata sunt, quem ad modum cetera suis quaeque operibus distributa membra seruirent, nutu voluntatis acta, non aestu libidinis incitata? Sed neque ipsi amatores huius voluptatis sive ad concubitus coniugales sive ad inmunditias flagitiorum cum voluerint commoventur; sed aliquando inportunus est ille motus poscente nullo, aliquando autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferueat, friget in corpore; atque ita mirum in modum non solum generandi voluntati, verum etiam lasciviendi libidini libido non seruit, et cum tota plerumque menti cohibenti adversetur, nonnumquam et adversus se ipsa dividitur commotoque animo in commovendo corpore se ipsa non sequitur.	Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, "how to possess his vessel in santification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God," would not prefer, if this were possi ble, to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other members serve him for their respective ends? But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the body unmoved.
BOOK XIV [XVII] Merito huius libidinis maxime pudet, merito et ipsa membra, quae suo quodam, ut ita dixerim, iure, non omni modo ad arbitrium nostrum movet aut non movet, pudenda dicuntur, quod ante peccatum hominis non fuerunt. Nam sicut scriptum est: Nudi erant, et non confundebantur, non quod eis sua nuditas esset incognita, sed turpis nuditas nondum erat, quia nondum libido membra illa praeter arbitrium commovebat, nondum ad hominis inoboedientiam redarguendam sua inoboedientia caro quodam modo testimonium perhibebat. Neque enim caeci creati erant, ut inperitum uulgus opinatur; quando quidem et ille vidit animalia, quibus nomina inposuit, et de illa legitur: Vidit mulier quia bonum lignum in escam et quia placet oculis ad videndum. Patebant ergo oculi eorum, sed ad hoc non erant aperti, hoc est non adtenti, ut cognoscerent quid eis indumento gratiae praestaretur, quando membra eorum voluntati repugnare nesciebant. Qua gratia remota, ut poena reciproca inoboedientia plecteretur, extitit in motu corporis quaedam inpudens novitas, unde esset indecens nuditas, et fecit adtentos reddiditque confusos. Hinc est quod, postea quam mandatum Dei aperta transgressione violarunt, scriptum est de illis: Et aperti sunt oculi amborum et agnoverunt quia nudi erant, et consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria. Aperti sunt, inquit, oculi amborum, non ad videndum, nam et antea videbant, sed ad discernendum inter bonum quod amiserant et malum quo ceciderant. Vnde et ipsum lignum, eo quod istam faceret dinoscentiam, si ad uescendum contra uetitum tangeretur, ex ea re nomen accepit, ut appellaretur lignum sciendi boni et mali. Experta enim morbi molestia evidentior fit etiam iucunditas sanitatis. Cognoverunt ergo quia nudi erant, nudati scilicet ea gratia, qua fiebat ut nuditas corporis nulla eos lege peccati menti eorum repugnante confunderet. Hoc itaque cognoverunt, quod felicius ignorarent, si Deo credentes et oboedientes non committerent, quod eos cogeret experiri infidelitas et inoboedientia quid nocet. Proinde confusi inoboedientia carnis suae, tamquam teste poena inoboedientiae suae, consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria, id est succinctoria genitalium. Nam quidam interpretes "succinctoria" posuerunt. Porro autem "campestria" Latinum quidem verbum est, sed ex eo dictum, quod ivuenes, qui nudi exercebantur in campo, pudenda operiebant; unde qui ita succincti sunt, campestratos uulgus appellat. Quod itaque adversus damnatam culpa inoboedientiae voluntatem libido inoboedienter movebat, verecundia pudenter tegebat. Ex hoc omnes gentes, quoniam ab illa stirpe procreatae sunt, usque adeo tenent insitum pudenda velare, ut quidam barbari illas corporis partes nec in balneis nudas habeant, sed cum earum tegimentis lavent. Per opacas quoque Indiae solitudines, cum quidam nudi philosophentur, unde gymnosophistae nominantur, adhibent tamen genitalibus tegmina, quibus per cetera membrorum carent.	Justly is shame very specially connected with this lust; justly, too, these members themselves, being moved and restrained not at our will, but by a certain independent autocracy, so to speak, are called "shameful." Their condition was different before sin. For as it is written, "They were naked and were not ashamed," Genesis 2:25 -not that their nakedness was unknown to them, but because nakedness was not yet shameful, because not yet did lust move those members without the will's consent; not yet did the flesh by its disobedience testify against the disobedience of man. For they were not created blind, as the unenlightened vulgar fancy; for Adam saw the animals to whom he gave names, and of Eve we read, "The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes." Genesis 3:6 Their eyes, therefore were open, but were not open to this, that is to say, were not observant so as to recognize what was conferred upon them by the garment of grace, for they had no consciousness of their members warring against their will. But when they were stripped of this grace, that their disobedience might be punished by fit retribution, there began in the movement of their bodily members a shameless novelty which made nakedness indecent: it at once made them observant and made them ashamed. And therefore, after they violated God's command by open transgression, it is written: "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." Genesis 3:7 "The eyes of them both were opened," not to see, for already they saw, but to discern between the good they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. And therefore also the tree itself which they were forbidden to touch was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil from this circumstance, that if they ate of it it would impart to them this knowledge. For the discomfort of sickness reveals the pleasure of health. "They knew," therefore, "that they were naked,"-naked of that grace which prevented them from being ashamed of bodily nakedness while the law of sin offered no resistance to their mind. And thus they obtained a knowledge which they would have lived in blissful ignorance of, had they, in trustful obedience to God, declined to commit that offence which involved them in the experience of the hurtful effects of unfaithfulness and disobedience. And therefore, being ashamed of the disobedience of their own flesh, which witnessed to their disobedience while it punished it, "they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons," that is, cinctures for their privy parts; for some interpreters have rendered the word by succinctoria. Campestria is, indeed, a Latin word, but it is used of the drawers or aprons used for a similar purpose by the young men who stripped for exercise in the campus; hence those who were so girt were commonly called campestrati. Shame modestly covered that which lust disobediently moved in opposition to the will, which was thus punished for its own disobedience. Consequently all nations, being propagated from that one stock, have so strong an instinct to cover the shameful parts, that some barbarians do not uncover them even in the bath, but wash with their drawers on. In the dark solitudes of India also, though some philosophers go naked, and are therefore called gymnosophists, yet they make an exception in the case of these members and cover them.
BOOK XIV [XVIII] Opus vero ipsum, quod libidine tali peragitur, non solum in quibusque stupris, ubi latebrae ad subterfugienda humana iudicia requiruntur, verum etiam in usu scortorum, quam terrena civitas licitam turpitudinem fecit, quamuis id agatur, quod eius civitatis nulla lex vindicat, devitat tamen publicum etiam permissa atque inpunita libido conspectum, et verecundia naturali habent provisum lupanaria ipsa secretum faciliusque potuit inpudicitia non habere vincla prohibitionis, quam inpudentia removere latibula illius foeditatis. Sed hanc etiam ipsi turpes turpitudinem vocant, cuius licet sint amatores, ostentatores esse non audent. Quid? concubitus coniugalis, qui secundum matrimonialium praescripta tabularum procreandorum fit causa liberorum, nonne et ipse quamquam sit licitus et honestus, remotum ab arbitris cubile conquirit? Nonne omnes famulos atque ipsos etiam paranymphos et quoscumque ingredi quaelibet necessitudo permiserat, ante mittit foras, quam vel blandiri coniux coniugi incipiat? Et quoniam, sicut ait etiam quidam "Romani maximus auctor eloquii", omnia recte facta in luce se conlocari volunt, id est appetunt sciri: hoc recte factum sic appetit sciri, ut tamen erubescat videri. Quis enim nescit, ut filii procreentur, quid inter se coniuges agant? quando quidem ut id agatur, tanta celebritate ducuntur uxores; et tamen cum agitur, unde filii nascantur, nec ipsi filii, si qui inde iam nati sunt, testes fieri permittuntur. Sic enim hoc recte factum ad sui notitiam lucem appetit animorum, ut tamen refugiat oculorum. Vnde hoc, nisi quia sic geritur quod deceat ex natura, ut etiam quod pudeat comitetur ex poena?	Lust requires for its consummation darkness and secrecy; and this not only when un lawful intercourse is desired, but even such fornication as the earthly city has legalized. Where there is no fear of punishment, these permitted pleasures still shrink from the public eye. Even where provision is made for this lust, secrecy also is provided; and while lust found it easy to remove the prohibitions of law, shamelessness found it impossible to lay aside the veil of retirement. For even shameless men call this shameful; and though they love the pleasure, dare not display it. What! does not even conjugal intercourse, sanctioned as it is by law for the propagation of children, legitimate and honorable though it be, does it not seek retirement from every eye? Before the bridegroom fondles his bride, does he not exclude the attendants, and even the paranymphs, and such friends as the closest ties have admitted to the bridal chamber? The greatest master of Roman eloquence says, that all right actions wish to be set in the light, i.e., desire to be known. This right action, however, has such a desire to be known, that yet it blushes to be seen. Who does not know what passes between husband and wife that children may be born? Is it not for this purpose that wives are married with such ceremony? And yet, when this well-understood act is gone about for the procreation of children, not even the children themselves, who may already have been born to them, are suffered to be witnesses. This right action seeks the light, in so far as it seeks to be known, but yet dreads being seen. And why so, if not because that which is by nature fitting and decent is so done as to be accompanied with a shame-begetting penalty of sin?
BOOK XIV [XIX] Hinc est quod et illi philosophi, qui veritati proprius accesserunt, iram atque libidinem vitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide atque inordinate moverentur ad ea etiam, quae sapientia perpetrari uetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque ratione. Quam partem animi tertiam velut in arce quadam ad istas regendas perhibent conlocatam, ut illa imperante, istis seruientibus possit in homine iustitia ex omni animi parte servari. Hae igitur partes, quas et in homine sapiente ac temperante fatentur esse vitiosas, ut eas ab his rebus, ad quas iniuste moventur, mens conpescendo et cohibendo refrenet ac reuocet atque ad ea permittat, quae sapientiae lege concessa sunt (sicut iram ad exerendam iustam cohercitionem, sicut libidinem ad propagandae prolis officium) _ - hae, inquam, partes in paradiso ante peccatum vitiosae non erant. Non enim contra rectam voluntatem ad aliquid movebantur, unde necesse esset eas rationis tamquam frenis regentibus abstinere. Nam quod nunc ita moventur et ab eis, qui temperanter et iuste et pie vivunt, alias facilius, alias difficibus, tamen cohibendo et repugnando modificantur, non est utique sanitas ex natura, sed languor ex culpa. Quod autem irae opera aliarumque affectionum in quibusque dictis atque factis non sic abscondit verecundia, ut opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in ceteris membra corporis non ipsae affectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, voluntas movet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur? Nam quisquis verbum emittit iratus vel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus iubente quodam modo voluntate moverentur; quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, moventur eadem voluntate. At vero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo iuri quodam modo mancipavit, ut moveri non valeant, si ipsa defuerit et nisi ipsa vel ultro vel excitata surrexerit. Hoc est quod pudet, hoc est quod intuentium oculos erubescendo devitat; magisque fert homo spectantium multitudinem, quando iniuste irascitur homini, quam vel unius aspectum, et quando iuste miscetur uxori.	Hence it is that even the philosophers who have approximated to the truth have avowed that anger and lust are vicious mental emotions, because, even when exercised towards objects which wisdom does not prohibit, they are moved in an ungoverned and inordinate manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason. And they assert that this third part of the mind is posted as it were in a kind of citadel, to give rule to these other parts, so that, while it rules and they serve, man's righteousness is preserved without a breach. These parts, then, which they acknowledge to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind, by its composing and restraining influence, must bridle and recall them from those objects towards which they are unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the law of wisdom sanctions,-that anger, e.g., may be allowed for the enforcement of a just authority, and lust for the duty of propagating offspring,-these parts, I say, were not vicious in Paradise before sin, for they were never moved in opposition to a holy will towards any object from which it was necessary that they should be withheld by the restraining bridle of reason. For though now they are moved in this way, and are regulated by a bridling and restraining power, which those who live temperately, justly, and godly exercise, sometimes with ease, and sometimes with greater difficulty, this is not the sound health of nature, but the weakness which results from sin. And how is it that shame does not hide the acts and words dictated by anger or other emotions, as it covers the motions of lust, unless because the members of the body which we employ for accomplishing them are moved, not by the emotions themselves, but by the authority of the consenting will? For he who in his anger rails at or even strikes some one, could not do so were not his tongue and hand moved by the authority of the will, as also they are moved when there is no anger. But the organs of generation are so subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but what it communicates. It is this we are ashamed of; it is this which blushingly hides from the eyes of onlookers. And rather will a man endure a crowd of witnesses when he is unjustly venting his anger on some one, than the eye of one man when he innocently copulates with his wife.
BOOK XIV [XX] Hoc illi canini philosophi, hoc est Cynici, non viderunt, proferentes contra humanam verecundiam quid aliud quam caninam, hoc est inmundam inpudentemque sententiam? ut scilicet, quoniam iustum est quod fit in uxore, palam ndn pudeat id agere nec in vico aut platea qualibet coniugalem concubitum devitare. Vicit tamen pudor naturalis opinionem huius erroris. Nam etsi perhibent, hoc aliquando gloriabundum fecisse Diogenem, ita putantem sectam suam nobiliorem futuram, si in hominum memoria insignior eius inpudentia figeretur, postea tamen a Cynicis fieri cessatum est, plusque valuit pudor, ut erubescerent homines hominibus, quam error, ut homines canibus esse similes affectarent. Vnde et illum vel illos, qui hoc fecisse referuntur, potius arbitror concumbentium motus dedisse oculis hominum nescientium quid sub pallio gereretur, quam humano premente conspectu potuisse illam peragi voluptatem. Ibi enim philosophi non erubescebant videri se velle concumbere, ubi libido ipsa erubesceret surgere. Et nunc videmus adhuc esse philosophos Cynicos; hi enim sunt, qui non solum amiciuntur pallio, vermm etiam clauam ferunt; nemo tamen eorum audet hoc facere, quod si aliqui ausi essent, ut non dicam ictibus lapidantium, certe conspuentium salivis obruerentur. Pudet igitur huius libidinis humanam sine ulla dubitatione naturam, et merito pudet. In eius quippe inoboedientia, quae genitalia corporis membra solis suis motibus subdidit et potestati voluntatis eripuit, satis ostenditur, quid sit hominis illi primae inoboedientiae retributum; quod in ea parte maxime oportuit apparere, qua generatur ipsa natura, quae illo primo et magno in deterius est mutata peccato; a cuius nexu nullus eruitur, nisi id, quod cum omnes in uno essent, in communem perniciem perpetratum est et Dei iustitia vindicatum, Dei gratia in singmis expietur.	It is this which those canine or cynic philosophers have overlooked, when they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs, viz., that as the matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, in the street or in any public place. Instinctive shame has overborne this wild fancy. For though it is related that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretence of copulation, and not the reality. Even at this day there are still Cynic philosophers to be seen; for these are Cynics who are not content with being clad in the pallium, but also carry a club; yet no one of them dares to do this that we speak of. If they did, they would be spat upon, not to say stoned, by the mob. Human nature, then, is without doubt ashamed of this lust; and justly so, for the insubordination of these members, and their defiance of the will, are the clear testimony of the punishment of man's first sin. And it was fitting that this should appear specially in those parts by which is generated that nature which has been altered for the worse by that first and great sin,-that sin from whose evil connection no one can escape, unless God's grace expiate in him individually that which was perpetrated to the destruction of all in common, when all were in one man, and which was avenged by God's justice.
BOOK XIV [XXI] Absit itaque, ut credamus illos coniuges in paradiso constitutos per hanc libidinem, de qua erubescendo eadem membra texerunt, impleturos fuisse quod in sua benedictione Deus dixit: Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram. Post peccatum quippe orta est haec libido; post peccatum ea " natma non inpudens amissa potestate, cui comus ex omni parte seruiebat, sensit adtendit, erubuit operuit. Illa vero benedictio nuptiarum, ut coniugati crescerent et multiplicarentur et implerent terram, quamuis et in delinquentibus manserit, tamen antequam delinquerent data est, ut cognosceretur procreationem filiorum ad gloriam conubii, non ad poenam pertinere peccati. Sed nunc homines, profecto illius quae in paradiso fuit felicitatis ignari, nisi per hoc, quod experti sunt, id est per libiffinem, de qua videmus etiam ipsam honestatem erubescere nuptiarum, non potuisse gigni filios opinantur, alii scripturas divinas, ubi legitur post peccatum puduisse nuditatis et pudenda esse contecta, prorsus non accipientes, sed infideliter inridentes; alii vero quamuis eas accipiant et honorent, illud tamen quod dictum est: Crescite et multiplicamini, non secundum carnalem fecunditatem volunt intellegi, quia et secundum animam legitur tale aliquid dictum: Multiplicabis me in anima mea in virtute, ut id, quod in genesi sequitur: Et implete terram et dominamini eius, terram intellegant carnem, quam praesentia sua implet anima eiusque maxime dominatur, cum in virtute multiplicatur; carnales autem fetus sine libidine, quae post peccatum exorta inspecta, confusa velata est, nec tunc nasci potuisse, sicut neque nunc possunt, nec in paradiso futuros fuisse, sed foris, sicut et factum est. Nam postea quam inde dimissi sunt, ad gignendos filios coierunt eosque genuerunt.	Far be it, then, from us to suppose that our first parents in Paradise felt that lust which caused them afterwards to blush and hide their nakedness, or that by its means they should have fulfilled the benediction of God, "Increase and multiply and replenish the earth;" Genesis 1:28 for it was after sin that lust began. It was after sin that our nature, having lost the power it had over the whole body, but not having lost all shame, perceived, noticed, blushed at, and covered it. But that blessing upon marriage, which encouraged them to increase and multiply and replenish the earth, though it continued even after they had sinned, was yet given before they sinned, in order that the procreation of children might be recognized as part of the glory of marriage, and not of the punishment of sin. But now, men being ignorant of the blessedness of Paradise, suppose that children could not have been begotten there in any other way than they know them to be begotten now, i.e., by lust, at which even honorable marriage blushes; some not simply rejecting, but sceptically deriding the divine Scriptures, in which we read that our first parents, after they sinned, were ashamed of their nakedness, and covered it; while others, though they accept and honor Scripture, yet conceive that this expression, "Increase and multiply," refers not to carnal fecundity, because a similar expression is used of the soul in the words, "You will multiply me with strength in my soul;" and so, too, in the words which follow in Genesis, "And replenish the earth, and subdue it," they understand by the earth the body which the soul fills with its presence, and which it rules over when it is multiplied in strength. And they hold that children could no more then than now be begotten without lust, which, after sin, was kindled, observed, blushed for, and covered; and even that children would not have been born in Paradise, but only outside of it, as in fact it turned out. For it was after they were expelled from it that they came together to beget children, and begot them.
BOOK XIV [XXII] Nos autem nullo modo dubitamus secundum benedictionem Dei crescere et multiplicari et implere terram donum esse nuptiarum, quas Deus ante peccatum hominis ab initio constituit, creando masculum et feminam, qui sexus evidens utique in carne est. Huic quippe operi Dei etiam benedictio ipsa subiuncta est. Nam cum scriptura dixisset: Masculum et feminam fecit eos, continuo subdidit: Et benedixit eos Deus dicens: Crescite et multiplicamini et implete terram et dominamini eius, et cetera. Quae omnia quamquam non inconvenienter possint etiam ad intellectum spiritalem referri, masculum tamen et feminam non sicut simile aliquid etiam in homine uno intellegi potest, quia videlicet in eo aliud est quod regit, aliud quod regitur; sed sicut evidentissime apparet in diversi sexus corporibus, masculum et feminam ita creatos, ut prolem generando crescerent et multiplicarentur et implerent terram, magnae absurditatis est reluctari. Neque enim de spiritu qui imperat et carne quae obtemperat, aut deanimo rationali qui regit et inrationali cupiditate quae regitur, aut de virtute contemplativa quae excellit et de activa quae subditur, aut de intellectu mentis et sensu corporis, sed aperte de vinculo coniugali, quo inuicem sibi uterque sexus obstringitur, Dominus interrogatus utrum liceret quacumque causa dimittere uxorem, quoniam propter duritiam cordis Israelitarum Moyses dari permisit libellum repudii, respondit atque ait: Non legistis, quia, qui fecit ab initio, masculum et feminam fecit eos et dixit: Propter hoc dimittet humo patrem et matrem et, adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una? Itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Quod ergo Deus coniunxit, homo non separet. Certum est igitur masculum et feminam ita primitus institutos, ut nunc homines duos diversi sexus videmus et novimus, unum autem dici vel propter coniunctionem vel propter originem feminae, quae de masculi latere creata est. Nam et apostolus per hoc primum, quod Deo instituente praecessit, exemplum singulos quusque admonet, ut viri uxores suas diligant.	But we, for our part, have no manner of doubt that to increase and multiply and replenish the earth in virtue of the blessing of God, is a gift of marriage as God instituted it from the beginning before man sinned, when He created them male and female,-in other words, two sexes manifestly distinct. And it was this work of God on which His blessing was pronounced. For no sooner had Scripture said, "Male and female created He them," Genesis 1:27-28 than it immediately continues, "And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Increase, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it," etc. And though all these things may not unsuitably be interpreted in a spiritual sense, yet "male and female" cannot be understood of two things in one man, as if there were in him one thing which rules, another which is ruled; but it is quite clear that they were created male and female, with bodies of different sexes, for the very purpose of begetting offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth; and it is great folly to oppose so plain a fact. It was not of the spirit which commands and the body which obeys, nor of the rational soul which rules and the irrational desire which is ruled, nor of the contemplative virtue which is supreme and the active which is subject, nor of the understanding of the mind and the sense of the body, but plainly of the matrimonial union by which the sexes are mutually bound together, that our Lord, when asked whether it were lawful for any cause to put away one's wife (for on account of the hardness of the hearts of the Israelites Moses permitted a bill of divorcement to be given), answered and said, "Have ye not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What, therefore, God has joined together, let not man put asunder." Matthew 19:4-5 It is certain, then, that from the first men were created, as we see and know them to be now, of two sexes, male and female, and that they are called one, either on account of the matrimonial union, or on account of the origin of the woman, who was created from the side of the man. And it is by this original example, which God Himself instituted, that the apostle admonishes all husbands to love their own wives in particular. Ephesians 5:25
BOOK XIV [XXIII] Quisquis autem dicit non fuisse coituros nec generaturos, nisi peccassent, quid dicit, nisi propter numerositatem sanctorum necessarium hominis fuisse peccatum? Si enim non peccando soli remanerent, quia, sicut putant, nisi peccassent, generare non possent: profecto ut non soli duo iusti homines possent esse, sed multi, necessarium peccatum fuit. Quod si credere absurdum est, illud potius est credendum, quod sanctorum numerus quantus conplendae illi sufficit beatissimae civitati, tantus existeret, etsi nemo peccasset, quantus nunc per Dei gratiam de multitudine colfigitur peccatorum, quo usque filii saeculi huius generant et generantur. Et ideo illae nuptiae dignae felicitate paradisi, si peccatum non fuisset, et diligendam prolem gignerent et pudendam libidinem non haberent. Sed quo modo id fieri posset, nunc non est quo demonstretur exemplo. Nec ideo tamen incredibile debet videri etiam illud unum sine ista libidine voluntati potuisse seruire, cui tot membra nunc seruiunt. An vero manus et pedes movemus, cum volumus, ad ea, quae his membris agenda sunt, sine ullo renisu, tanta facilitate, quanta et in nobis et in aliis videmus, maxime in artificibus quorumque operum corporalium, ubi ad exercendam infirmiorem tardioremque naturam agilior accessit industria; et non credimus ad opus generationis filiorum, si libido non fuisset, quae peccato inoboedientiae retributa est, oboedienter hominibus ad voluntatis nutum similiter ut cetera potuisse illa membra seruire? Nonne Cicero in libris de re publica, cum de imperiorum differentia disputaret et huius rei similitudinem ex natura hominis adsumeret, ut filiis dixit imperari corporis membris propter oboediendi facilitatem; vitiosas vero animi partes ut seruos asperiore imperio coherceri? Et utique ordine naturali animus anteponitur corpori, et tamen ipse animus imperat corpori facilius quam sibi. Verum tamen haec libido, de qua nunc disserimus, eo magis erubescenda extitit, quod animus in ea nec sibi efficaciter imperat, ut omnino non libeat, nec omni modo corpori, ut pudenda membra voluntas potius quam libido commoveat; quod si ita esset, pudenda non essent. Nunc vero pudet animum resisti sibi a corpore, quod ei natura inferiore subiectum est. In aliis quippe affectionibus cum sibi resistit, ideo minus pudet, quia, cum a se ipso vincitur, ipse se vincit; etsi inordinate atque vitiose, quia ex his partibus, quae rationi subici debent, tamen a partibus suis ac per hoc, ut dictum est, a se ipso vincitur. Nam cum ordinate se animus vincit, ut inrationabiles motus eius menti rationique subdantur, si tamen et illa Deo subdita est, laudis atque virtutis est. Minus tamen pudet, cum sibi animus ex vitiosis suis partibus non obtemperat, quam cum ei corpus, quod alterum ab illo est atque infra illum est et cuius sine illo natura non vivit, volenti iubentique non cedit. Sed cum alia membra retinentur voluntatis imperio, sine quibus illa, quae contra voluntatem libidine concitantur, id quod appetunt implere non possunt, pudicitia custoditur, non amissa, sed non permissa delectatione peccati. Hunc renisum, hanc repugnantiam, hanc voluntatis et libidinis rixam vel certe ad voluntatis sufficientiam libidinis indigentiam procul dubio, nisi culpabilis inoboedientia poenali inoboedientia plecteretur, in paradiso nuptiae non haberent, sed voluntati membra, ut cetera, ita cuncta seruirent. Ita genitale aruum uas in hoc opus creatum seminaret, ut nunc terram manus, et quod modo de hac re nobis volentibus diligentius disputare verecundia resistit et compellit veniam honore praefato a pudicis auribus poscere, cur id fieret nulla causa esset, sed in omnia, quae de huius modi membris sensum cogitandis adtingerent, sine ullo timore obscenitatis liber senno ferretur, nec ipsa verba essent, quae vocarentur obscena, sed quidquid inde diceretur, tam honestum esset, quam de aliis cum loquimur corporis partibus. Quisquis ergo ad has litteras inpudicus accedit, culpam refugiat, non naturam; facta denotet suae turpitudinis, non verba nostrae necessitatis; in quibus mihi facillime pudicus et religiosus lector vel auditor ignoscit, donec infidelitatem refellam, non de fide rerum inexpertarum, sed de sensu expertarum argumentantem. Legit enim haec sine offensione, qui non exhorret apostolum horrenda feminarum flagitia reprehendentem, quae inmutaverunt naturalem usum in eum usum, qui est contra naturam, praecipue quia nos non damnabilem obscenitatem nunc, sicut ille, commemoramus atque reprehendimus, sed in explicandis, quantum possumus, humanae generationis effectibus verba tamen, sicut ille, obscena vitamus.	But he who says that there should have been neither copulation nor generation but for sin, virtually says that man's sin was necessary to complete the number of the saints. For if these two by not sinning should have continued to live alone, because, as is supposed, they could not have begotten children had they not sinned, then certainly sin was necessary in order that there might be not only two but many righteous men. And if this cannot be maintained without absurdity, we must rather believe that the number of the saints fit to complete this most blessed city would have been as great though no one had sinned, as it is now that the grace of God gathers its citizens out of the multitude of sinners, so long as the children of this world generate and are generated. Luke 20:34 And therefore that marriage, worthy of the happiness of Paradise, should have had desirable fruit without the shame of lust, had there been no sin. But how that could be, there is now no example to teach us. Nevertheless, it ought not to seem incredible that one member might serve the will without lust then, since so many serve it now. Do we now move our feet and hands when we will to do the things we would by means of these members? do we meet with no resistance in them, but perceive that they are ready servants of the will, both in our own case and in that of others, and especially of artisans employed in mechanical operations, by which the weakness and clumsiness of nature become, through industrious exercise, wonderfully dexterous? and shall we not believe that, like as all those members obediently serve the will, so also should the members have discharged the function of generation, though lust, the award of disobedience, had been awanting? Did not Cicero, in discussing the difference of governments in his De Republica, adopt a simile from human nature, and say that we command our bodily members as children, they are so obedient; but that the vicious parts of the soul must be treated as slaves, and be coerced with a more stringent authority? And no doubt, in the order of nature, the soul is more excellent than the body; and yet the soul commands the body more easily than itself. Nevertheless this lust, of which we at present speak, is the more shameful on this account, because the soul is therein neither master of itself, so as not to lust at all, nor of the body, so as to keep the members under the control of the will; for if they were thus ruled, there should be no shame. But now the soul is ashamed that the body, which by nature is inferior and subject to it, should resist its authority. For in the resistance experienced by the soul in the other emotions there is less shame, because the resistance is from itself, and thus, when it is conquered by itself, itself is the conqueror, although the conquest is inordinate and vicious, because accomplished by those parts of the soul which ought to be subject to reason, yet, being accomplished by its own parts and energies, the conquest is, as I say, its own. For when the soul conquers itself to a due subordination, so that its unreasonable motions are controlled by reason, while it again is subject to God, this is a conquest virtuous and praiseworthy. Yet there is less shame when the soul is resisted by its own vicious parts than when its will and order are resisted by the body, which is distinct from and inferior to it, and dependent on it for life itself.But so long as the will retains under its authority the other members, without which the members excited by lust to resist the will cannot accomplish what they seek, chastity is preserved, and the delight of sin foregone. And certainly, had not culpable disobedience been visited with penal disobedience, the marriage of Paradise should have been ignorant of this struggle and rebellion, this quarrel between will and lust, that the will may be satisfied and lust restrained, but those members, like all the rest, should have obeyed the will. The field of generation should have been sown by the organ created for this purpose, as the earth is sown by the hand. And whereas now, as we essay to investigate this subject more exactly, modesty hinders us, and compels us to ask pardon of chaste ears, there would have been no cause to do so, but we could have discoursed freely, and without fear of seeming obscene, upon all those points which occur to one who meditates on the subject. There would not have been even words which could be called obscene, but all that might be said of these members would have been as pure as what is said of the other parts of the body. Whoever, then, comes to the perusal of these pages with unchaste mind, let him blame his disposition, not his nature; let him brand the actings of his own impurity, not the words which necessity forces us to use, and for which every pure and pious reader or hearer will very readily pardon me, while I expose the folly of that scepticism which argues solely on the ground of its own experience, and has no faith in anything beyond. He who is not scandalized at the apostle's censure of the horrible wickedness of the women who "changed the natural use into that which is against nature," Romans 1:26 will read all this without being shocked, especially as we are not, like Paul, citing and censuring a damnable uncleanness, but are explaining, so far as we can, human generation, while with Paul we avoid all obscenity of language.
BOOK XIV [XXIV] Seminaret igitur prolem vir, susciperet femina genitalibus membris, quando id opus esset et quantum opus esset, voluntate motis, non libidine concitatis. Neque enim ea sola membra movemus ad nutum, quae conpactis articulata sunt ossibus, sicut manus et pedes et digitos, verum etiam illa, quae mollibus remissa sunt neruis, cum volumus, movemus agitando et porrigendo producimug et torquendo flectimus et constringendo duramus, sicut ea sunt, quae in ore ac facie, quantum potest, voluntas movet. Pulmones denique ipsi omnium, nisi medullarum, mollissimi viscerum et ob hoc antro pectoris communiti, ad spiritum ducendum ac remittendum vocemque emittendam seu modificandam, sicut folles fabrorum vel organorum, flantis, respirantis, loquentis, clamantis, cantantis seruiunt voluntati. Omitto quod animalibus quibusdam naturaliter inditum est, ut tegmen, quo corpus omne uestitur, si quid in quocumque loco eius senserint abigendum, ibi tantum moveant, ubi sentiunt, nec solum insidentes muscas, verum etiam haerentes hastas cutis tremore discutiant. Numquid quia id non potest homo, ideo Creator quibus voluit animantibus donare non potuit? Sic ergo et ipse homo potuit oboedientiam etiam inferiorum habere membrorum, quam sua inoboedientia perdidit. Neque enim Deo difficile fuit sic illum condere, ut in eius carne etiam illud non nisi eius voluntate moveretur, quod nunc nisi libidine non movetur. Nam et hominum quorundam naturas novimus multum ceteris dispares et ipsa raritate mirabiles nonnulla ut volunt de corpore facientium, quae alii nullo modo possunt et audita vix credunt. Sunt enim, qui et aures moveant vel singulas vel ambas simul. Sunt qui totam caesariem capite inmoto, quantum capilli occupant, deponunt ad frontem reuocantque cum volunt. Sunt qui eorum quae voraverint incredibiliter plurima et varia paululum praecordiis contrectatis tamquam de sacculo quod placuerit integerrimum proferunt. Quidam voces avium pecorumque et aliorum quorumlibet hominum sic imitantur atque exprimunt, ut, nisi videantur, discerni omnino non possint. Nonnulli ab imo sine paedore ullo ita numerosos pro arbitrio sonitus edunt, ut ex illa etiam parte cantare videantur. Ipse sum expertus sudare hominem solere, cum vellet. Notum est quosdam flere, cum volunt, atque ubertim lacrimas fundere. Iam illud multo est incredibilius, quod plerique fratres memoria recentissima experti sunt. Presbyter fuit quidam Restitutus nomine in paroecia Calamensis ecclesiae. Quando ei placebat (rogabatur autem ut hoc faceret ab eis, qui rem mirabilem coram scire cupiebant), ad imitatas quasi lamentantis cuiuslibet hominis voces ita se auferebat a sensibus et iacebat simillimus mortuo, ut non solum vellicantes atque pungentes minime sentiret, sed aliquando etiam igne ureretur admotu sine ullo doloris sensu nisi postmodum ex uulnere; non autem obnitendo, sed non sentiendo non movere corpus eo probabatur, quod tamquam in defuncto nullus inveniebatur anhelitus; hominum tamen voces, si clarius loquerentur, tamquam de longinquo se audire postea referebat. Cum itaque corpus etiam nunc quibusdam, licet in came corruptibili hanc aerumnosam ducentibus vitam, ita in plerisque motionibus et affectionibus extra usitatum naturae modum mirabiliter seruiat: quid causae est, ut non credamus ante inoboedientiae peccatum corruptionisque supplicium ad propagandam prolem sine ulla libidine sermre voluntati humanae humana membra potuisse? Donatus est itaque homo sibi, quia deseruit Deum placendo sibi, et non oboediens Deo non potuit oboedire nec sibi. Hinc evidentior miseria, qua homo non vivit ut uult. Nam si ut vellet viveret, beatum se putaret; sed nec sic tamen esset, si turpiter viveret.	The man, then, would have sown the seed, and the woman received it, as need required, the generative organs being moved by the will, not excited by lust. For we move at will not only those members which are furnished with joints of solid bone, as the hands, feet, and fingers, but we move also at will those which are composed of slack and soft nerves: we can put them in motion, or stretch them out, or bend and twist them, or contract and stiffen them, as we do with the muscles of the mouth and face. The lungs, which are the very tenderest of the viscera except the brain, and are therefore carefully sheltered in the cavity of the chest, yet for all purposes of inhaling and exhaling the breath, and of uttering and modulating the voice, are obedient to the will when we breathe, exhale, speak, shout, or sing, just as the bellows obey the smith or the organist. I will not press the fact that some animals have a natural power to move a single spot of the skin with which their whole body is covered, if they have felt on it anything they wish to drive off,-a power so great, that by this shivering tremor of the skin they can not only shake off flies that have settled on them, but even spears that have fixed in their flesh. Man, it is true, has not this power; but is this any reason for supposing that God could not give it to such creatures as He wished to possess it? And therefore man himself also might very well have enjoyed absolute power over his members had he not forfeited it by his disobedience; for it was not difficult for God to form him so that what is now moved in his body only by lust should have been moved only at will.We know, too, that some men are differently constituted from others, and have some rare and remarkable faculty of doing with their body what other men can by no effort do, and, indeed, scarcely believe when they hear of others doing. There are persons who can move their ears, either one at a time, or both together. There are some who, without moving the head, can bring the hair down upon the forehead, and move the whole scalp backwards and forwards at pleasure. Some, by lightly pressing their stomach, bring up an incredible quantity and variety of things they have swallowed, and produce whatever they please, quite whole, as if out of a bag. Some so accurately mimic the voices of birds and beasts and other men, that, unless they are seen, the difference cannot be told. Some have such command of their bowels, that they can break wind continuously at pleasure, so as to produce the effect of singing. I myself have known a man who was accustomed to sweat whenever he wished. It is well known that some weep when they please, and shed a flood of tears. But far more incredible is that which some of our brethren saw quite recently. There was a presbyter called Restitutus, in the parish of the Calamensian Church, who, as often as he pleased (and he was asked to do this by those who desired to witness so remarkable a phenomenon), on some one imitating the wailings of mourners, became so insensible, and lay in a state so like death, that not only had he no feeling when they pinched and pricked him, but even when fire was applied to him, and he was burned by it, he had no sense of pain except afterwards from the wound. And that his body remained motionless, not by reason of his self-command, but because he was insensible, was proved by the fact that he breathed no more than a dead man; and yet he said that, when any one spoke with more than ordinary distinctness, he heard the voice, but as if it were a long way off. Seeing, then, that even in this mortal and miserable life the body serves some men by many remarkable movements and moods beyond the ordinary course of nature, what reason is there for doubting that, before man was involved by his sin in this weak and corruptible condition, his members might have served his will for the propagation of offspring without lust? Man has been given over to himself because he abandoned God, while he sought to be self-satisfying; and disobeying God, he could not obey even himself. Hence it is that he is involved in the obvious misery of being unable to live as he wishes. For if he lived as he wished, he would think himself blessed; but he could not be so if he lived wickedly.
BOOK XIV [XXV] Quamquam si diligentius adtendamus, nisi beatus non vivit ut uult, et nullus beatus nisi iustus. Sed etiam ipse iustus non vivet ut uult, nisi eo peruenerit, ubi mori falli offendi omnino non possit eique sit certum ita semper futurum. Hoc enim natura expetit, nec plene atque perfecte beata erit nisi adepta quod expetit. Nunc vero quis hominum potest ut uult vivere, quando ipsum vivere non est in potestate? Vivere enim uult, mori cogitur. Quo modo ergo vivit ut uult, qui non vivit quamdiu uult? Quod si mori voluerit, quo modo potest ut uult vivere, qui non uult vivere? Et si ideo mori velit, non quo nolit vivere, sed ut post mortem melius vivat: nondum ergo ut uult vivit, sed cum ad id quod uult moriendo peruenerit. Verum ecce vivat ut uult, quoniam sibi extorsit sibique imperavit non velle quod non potest, atque hoc velle quod potest (sicut ait Terentius: Quoniam non potest id fieri quod vis. Id velis quod possis): num ideo beatus est; quia patienter miser est? Beata quippe vita si non amatur, non habetur. Porro si amatur et habetur, ceteris omnibus rebus excellentius necesse est ametur, quoniam propter hanc amandum est quidquid aliud amatur. Porro si tantum amatur, quantum amari digna est (non enim beatus est, a quo ipsa beata vita fion amatur ut digna est): fieri non potest, ut eam, qui sic amat, non aeternam velit. Tunc igitur beata erit, quando aeterna erit.	However, if we look at this a little more closely, we see that no one lives as he wishes but the blessed, and that no one is blessed but the righteous. But even the righteous himself does not live as he wishes, until he has arrived where he cannot die, be deceived, or injured, and until he is assured that this shall be his eternal condition. For this nature demands; and nature is not fully and perfectly blessed till it attains what it seeks. But what man is at present able to live as he wishes, when it is not in his power so much as to live? He wishes to live, he is compelled to die. How, then, does he live as he wishes who does not live as long as he wishes? or if he wishes to die, how can he live as he wishes, since he does not wish even to live? Or if he wishes to die, not because he dislikes life, but that after death he may live better, still he is not yet living as he wishes, but only has the prospect of so living when, through death, he reaches that which he wishes. But admit that he lives as he wishes, because he has done violence to himself, and forced himself not to wish what he cannot obtain, and to wish only what he can (as Terence has it, "Since you cannot do what you will, will what you can"), is he therefore blessed because he is patiently wretched? For a blessed life is possessed only by the man who loves it. If it is loved and possessed, it must necessarily be more ardently loved than all besides; for whatever else is loved must be loved for the sake of the blessed life. And if it is loved as it deserves to be,-and the man is not blessed who does not love the blessed life as it deserves,-then he who so loves it cannot but wish it to be eternal. Therefore it shall then only be blessed when it is eternal.
BOOK XIV [XXVI] Vivebat itaque homo in paradiso sicut volebat, quamdiu hoc volebat quod Deus iusserat; vivebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus; vivebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper vivere habens in potestate. Cibus aderat ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, lignum vitae ne illum senecta dissolueret. Nihil corruptionis in corpore vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas. Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus aut frigus, sic in eius habitatore nulla ex cupiditate vel timore accidebat bonae voluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum. Gaudium verum perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, atque inter se coniugum fida ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque vigilia et mandati sine labore custodia. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat inuitum. In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo, sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur membra illa quo cetera, et sine ardoris inlecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione int egritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Neque enim quia experientia probari non potest, ideo credendum non est, quando illas corporis partes non ageret turbidus calor, sed spontanea potestas, sicut opus esset, adhiberet, ita tunc potuisse utero coniugis salua integritate feminei genitalis virile semen inmitti, sicut nunc potest eadem integritate salua ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Eadem quippe via posset illud inici, qua hoc potest eici. Vt enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis inpulsus feminea viscera relaxaret, sic ad fetandum et concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque coniungeret. De rebus loquimur nunc pudendis et ideo, quamuis, antequam earum puderet, quales esse potuissent coniciamus ut possumus, tamen necesse est, ut nostra disputatio magis frenetur ea, quae nos reuocat, verecundia, quam eloquentia, quae nobis parum suppetit, adivuetur. Nam cum id quod dico nec ipsi experti fuerint, qui experiri potuerunt quoniam praeoccupante peccato exilium de paradiso ante meruerunt, quam sibi in opere serendae propaginis tranquillo arbitrio convenirentn, quo modo nunc, cum ista commemorantur, sensibus occunit humanis nisi experientia libidinis turbidae, non coniectma placidae voluntatis? Hinc est quod inpedit loquentem pudor, etsi non deficiat ratio cogitantem. Verum tamen omnipotenti Deo, summo ac summe bono creatori omnium naturarum, voluntatum autem bonarum adiutori et remuneratori, malarum autem relictori et damnatori, utrarumque ordinatori, non defuit utique consilium, quo certum numerum civium in sua sapientia praedestinatum etiam ex damnato genere humano suae civitatis impleret, non eos iam meritis, quando quidem universa massa tamquam in vitiata raffice damnata est, sed gratia discernens et liberatis non solum de ipsis, verum etiam de non liberatis, quid eis largiatur, ostendens. Non enim debita, sed gratuita bonitate tunc se quisque agnoscit erutum malis, cum ab eorum hominum consortio fit inmunis, cum quibus illi iuste esset poena communis. Cur ergo non crearet Deus, quos peccaturos esse praescivit, quando quidem in eis et ex eis, et quid eorum culpa mereretur, et quid sua gratia donaretur, posset ostendere, nec sub illo creatore ac dispositore peruersa inordinatio delinquentium rectum peruerteret ordinem rermm?	In Paradise, then, man lived as he desired so long as he desired what God had commanded. He lived in the enjoyment of God, and was good by God's goodness; he lived without any want, and had it in his power so to live eternally. He had food that he might not hunger, drink that he might not thirst, the tree of life that old age might not waste him. There was in his body no corruption, nor seed of corruption, which could produce in him any unpleasant sensation. He feared no inward disease, no outward accident. Soundest health blessed his body, absolute tranquillity his soul. As in Paradise there was no excessive heat or cold, so its inhabitants were exempt from the vicissitudes of fear and desire. No sadness of any kind was there, nor any foolish joy; true gladness ceaselessly flowed from the presence of God, who was loved "out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned." 1 Timothy 1:5 The honest love of husband and wife made a sure harmony between them. Body and spirit worked harmoniously together, and the commandment was kept without labor. No languor made their leisure wearisome; no sleepiness interrupted their desire to labor. In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum, absit ut suspicemur, non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo: sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra qua cжtera, et sine ardoris illecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Neque enim quia experientia probari non potest, ideo credendum non est; quando illas corporis partes non ageret turbidus calor, sed spontanea potestas, sicut opus esset, adhiberet; ita tunc potuisse utero conjugis salva integritate feminei genitalis virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest eadem integritate salva ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Eadem quippe via posset illud injici, qua hoc potest ejici. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret: sic ad f_S tandum et concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque conjungeret. We speak of things which are now shameful, and although we try, as well as we are able, to conceive them as they were before they became shameful, yet necessity compels us rather to limit our discussion to the bounds set by modesty than to extend it as our moderate faculty of discourse might suggest. For since that which I have been speaking of was not experienced even by those who might have experienced it,-I mean our first parents (for sin and its merited banishment from Paradise anticipated this passionless generation on their part),-when sexual intercourse is spoken of now, it suggests to men's thoughts not such a placid obedience to the will as is conceivable in our first parents, but such violent acting of lust as they themselves have experienced. And therefore modesty shuts my mouth, although my mind conceives the matter clearly. But Almighty God, the supreme and supremely good Creator of all natures, who aids and rewards good wills, while He abandons and condemns the bad, and rules both, was not destitute of a plan by which He might people His city with the fixed number of citizens which His wisdom had foreordained even out of the condemned human race, discriminating them not now by merits, since the whole mass was condemned as if in a vitiated root, but by grace, and showing, not only in the case of the redeemed, but also in those who were not delivered, how much grace He has bestowed upon them. For every one acknowledges that he has been rescued from evil, not by deserved, but by gratuitous goodness, when he is singled out from the company of those with whom he might justly have borne a common punishment, and is allowed to go scathless. Why, then, should God not have created those whom He foresaw would sin, since He was able to show in and by them both what their guilt merited, and what His grace bestowed, and since, under His creating and disposing hand, even the perverse disorder of the wicked could not pervert the right order of things?
BOOK XIV [XXVII] Proinde peccatores, et angeli et homines, nihil agunt, quo inpediantur magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius, quoniam qui providenter atque omnipotenter sua cuique distribuit, non solum bonis, verum etiam malis bene uti novit. Ac per hoc propter meritum primae malae voluntatis ita damnato atque obdurato angelo malo, ut iam bonam voluntatem ulterius non haberet, bene utens Deus cur non permitteret, ut ab illo primus homo, qui rectus, hoc est bonae voluntatis, creatus fuerat, temptaretur? Quando quidem sic erat institutus, ut, si de adiutorio Dei fideret bonus homo, malum angelum vinceret; si autem creatorem atque adiutorem Deum superbe sibi placendo desereret, vinceretur; meritum bonum habens in adiuta divinitus voluntate recta, malum vero in deserente Deum voluntate peruersa. Quia et ipsum fidere de adiutorio Dei non quidem posset sine adiutorio Dei, nec tamen ideo ab his divinae gratiae beneficiis sibi placendo recedere non habebat in potestate. Nam sicut in hac carne vivere sine adiumentis alimentorum in potestate non est, non autem in ea vivere in potestate est, quod faciunt qui se ipsos necant: ita bene vivere sine adiutorio Dei etiam in paradiso non erat in potestate; erat autem in potestate male vivere, sed beatitudine non permansura et poena iustissima secutura. Cum igitur huius futuri casus humani Deus non esset ignarus, cur eum non sineret inuidi angeli malignitate temptari? nullo modo quidem quod vinceretur incertus, sed nihilo minus praescius quod ab eius semine adiuto sua gratia idem ipse diabolus fuerat sanctorum gloria maiore vincendus. Ita factum est, ut nec Deum aliquid futurorum lateret, nec praesciendo quemqua "peccare conpelleret et, quid interesset inter propriam cuiusque praesumptionem et suam tuitionem, angelicae et humanae rationali creaturae consequenti experientia demonstraret. Quis enim audeat credere aut dicere, ut neque angelus neque homo caderet, in Dei potestate non fuisse? Sed hoc eorum potestati maluit non auferre atque ita, et quantum mali eorum superbia et quantum boni sua gratia valeret, ostendere.	The sins of men and angels do nothing to impede the "great works of the Lord which accomplish His will." For He who by His providence and omnipotence distributes to every one his own portion, is able to make good use not only of the good, but also of the wicked. And thus making a good use of the wicked angel, who, in punishment of his first wicked volition, was doomed to an obduracy that prevents him now from willing any good, why should not God have permitted him to tempt the first man, who had been created upright, that is to say, with a good will? For he had been so constituted, that if he looked to God for help, man's goodness should defeat the angel's wickedness; but if by proud self-pleasing he abandoned God, his Creator and Sustainer, he should be conquered. If his will remained upright, through leaning on God's help, he should be rewarded; if it became wicked, by forsaking God, he should be punished. But even this trusting in God's help could not itself be accomplished without God's help, although man had it in his own power to relinquish the benefits of divine grace by pleasing himself. For as it is not in our power to live in this world without sustaining ourselves by food, while it is in our power to refuse this nourishment and cease to live, as those do who kill themselves, so it was not in man's power, even in Paradise, to live as he ought without God's help; but it was in his power to live wickedly, though thus he should cut short his happiness, and incur very just punishment. Since, then, God was not ignorant that man would fall, why should He not have suffered him to be tempted by an angel who hated and envied him? It was not, indeed, that He was unaware that he should be conquered. but because He foresaw that by the man's seed, aided by divine grace, this same devil himself should be conquered, to the greater glory of the saints. All was brought about in such a manner, that neither did any future event escape God's foreknowledge, nor did His foreknowledge compel any one to sin, and so as to demonstrate in the experience of the intelligent creation, human and angelic, how great a difference there is between the private presumption of the creature and the Creator's protection. For who will dare to believe or say that it was not in God's power to prevent both angels and men from sinning? But God preferred to leave this in their power, and thus to show both what evil could be wrought by their pride, and what good by His grace.
BOOK XIV [XXVIII] Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Denique illa in se ipsa, haec in Domino gloriatur. Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam; huic autem Deus conscientiae testis maxima est gloria. Illa in gloria sua exaltat caput suum; haec dicit Deo suo: Gloria mea et exaltans caput meum. Illi in principibus eius vel in eis quas subiugat nationibus dominandi libido dominatur; in hac seruiunt inuicem in caritate et praepositi consulendo et subditi obtemperando. Illa in suis potentibug diligit virtutem suam; haec dicit Deo suo: Diligam te, Domine, virtus mea. Ideoque in illa sapientes eius secundum hominem viventes aut corporis aut animi sui bona aut utriusque sectati sunt, aut qui potuerunt cognoscere Deum, non ut Deum honoraverunt aut gratias egerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogilationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum; dicentes se esse sapientes (id est dominante sibi.superbia in sua sapientia sese extollentes) stulti facti sunt et inmutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium (ad huiusce modi enim simulacra adoranda vel duces populorum vel sectatores fuerunt), et coluerunt atque seruierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictovs in saecula; in hac autem nulla est hominis sapientia nisi pietas, qua recte colitur verus Deus, id expectans praemium in societate sanctorum non solum hominum, verum etiam angelorum, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus.	Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, "You are my glory, and the lifter up of mine head." In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all. The one delights in its own strength, represented in the persons of its rulers; the other says to its God, "I will love You, O Lord, my strength." And therefore the wise men of the one city, living according to man, have sought for profit to their own bodies or souls, or both, and those who have known God "glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened; professing themselves to be wise,"-that is, glorying in their own wisdom, and being possessed by pride,-"they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." For they were either leaders or followers of the people in adoring images, "and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever." Romans 1:21-25 But in the other city there is no human wisdom, but only godliness, which offers due worship to the true God, and looks for its reward in the society of the saints, of holy angels as well as holy men, "that God may be all in all." 1 Corinthians 15:28

Directory:Logic Museum/Augustine City of God Book XIV

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