Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa-I-36-38
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Jump to navigationJump to searchSUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS XXXVI - XXXVIII
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| IЄ q. 36 pr. Post haec considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad personam spiritus sancti. Qui quidem non solum dicitur spiritus sanctus, sed etiam amor et donum Dei. Circa nomen ergo spiritus sancti quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum hoc nomen spiritus sanctus sit proprium alicuius divinae personae. Secundo, utrum illa persona divina quae spiritus sanctus dicitur, procedat a patre et filio. Tertio, utrum procedat a patre per filium. Quarto, utrum pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti. | |
IЄ q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen spiritus sanctus non sit proprium nomen alicuius divinae personae. Nullum enim nomen commune tribus personis, est proprium alicuius personae. Sed hoc nomen spiritus sanctus est commune tribus personis. Ostendit enim Hilarius, VIII de Trin., in spiritu Dei aliquando significari patrem, ut cum dicitur, spiritus domini super me; aliquando significari filium, ut cum dicit filius, in spiritu Dei eiicio Daemonia, naturae suae potestate eiicere se Daemonia demonstrans; aliquando spiritum sanctum, ut ibi, effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem. Ergo hoc nomen spiritus sanctus non est proprium alicuius divinae personae. |
Objection 1. It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of 'Holy Ghost' [It should be borne in mind that the word "ghost" is the old English equivalent for the Latin "spiritus," whether in the sense of "breath" or "blast," or in the sense of "spirit," as an immaterial substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7), "The Gost of Storms" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter "Trubled gost is sacrifice of God" (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and "Oure wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre" (More, "Comfort against Tribulation"); and in our modern expression of "giving up the ghost." As applied to God, and not specially to the third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder, "Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good." (See Oxford Dictionary).] is common to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin. viii) shows that the "Spirit of God" sometimes means the Father, as in the words of Is. 61:1: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" and sometimes the Son, as when the Son says: "In the Spirit of God I cast out devils" (Mt. 12:28), showing that He cast out devils by His own natural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of Joel 2:28: "I will pour out of My Spirit over all flesh." Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the proper name of a divine person. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, nomina divinarum personarum ad aliquid dicuntur, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin. Sed hoc nomen spiritus sanctus non dicitur ad aliquid. Ergo hoc nomen non est proprium divinae personae. | Objection 2. Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms, as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not a relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine Person. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, quia filius est nomen alicuius divinae personae, non potest dici filius huius vel illius. Dicitur autem spiritus huius vel illius hominis. Ut enim habetur Num. XI, dixit dominus ad Moysen, auferam de spiritu tuo, tradamque eis; et IV Reg. II, requievit spiritus Eliae super Elisaeum. Ergo spiritus sanctus non videtur esse proprium nomen alicuius divinae personae. | Objection 3. Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them" (Num. 11:17) and also "The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" (4 Kgs. 2:15). Therefore "Holy Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a divine Person. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. ult., tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo, pater, verbum et spiritus sanctus. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, VII de Trin., cum quaeritur, quid tres? Dicimus, tres personae. Ergo spiritus sanctus est nomen divinae personae. | On the contrary, It is said (1 Jn. 5:7): "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons." Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum sint duae processiones in divinis, altera earum, quae est per modum amoris, non habet proprium nomen, ut supra dictum est. Unde et relationes quae secundum huiusmodi processionem accipiuntur, innominatae sunt, ut etiam supra dictum est. Propter quod et nomen personae hoc modo procedentis, eadem ratione, non habet proprium nomen. Sed sicut sunt accommodata aliqua nomina, ex usu loquentium, ad significandum praedictas relationes, cum nominamus eas nomine processionis et spirationis, quae, secundum proprietatem significationis, magis videntur significare actus notionales quam relationes; ita ad significandum divinam personam quae procedit per modum amoris, accommodatum est, ex usu Scripturae, hoc nomen spiritus sanctus. Et huius quidem convenientiae ratio sumi potest ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex ipsa communitate eius quod dicitur spiritus sanctus. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin., quia spiritus sanctus communis est ambobus, id vocatur ipse proprie quod ambo communiter, nam et pater est spiritus, et filius est spiritus; et pater est sanctus, et filius est sanctus. Secundo vero, ex propria significatione. Nam nomen spiritus, in rebus corporeis, impulsionem quandam et motionem significare videtur, nam flatum et ventum spiritum nominamus. Est autem proprium amoris, quod moveat et impellat voluntatem amantis in amatum. Sanctitas vero illis rebus attribuitur, quae in Deum ordinantur. Quia igitur persona divina procedit per modum amoris quo Deus amatur, convenienter spiritus sanctus nominatur. | I answer that, While there are two processions in God, one of these, the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as stated above (27 , 4, ad 3). Hence the relations also which follow from this procession are without a name (28, 4): for which reason the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we use the names of procession and spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than the relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy Ghost" is by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the fact that the person who is called "Holy Ghost" has something in common with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17; v, 11), "Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which both are called in common. For the Father also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy." Secondly, from the proper signification of the name. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we call the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most properly named "The Holy Ghost." |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dico spiritus sanctus, prout sumitur in virtute duarum dictionum, commune est toti Trinitati. Quia nomine spiritus significatur immaterialitas divinae substantiae, spiritus enim corporeus invisibilis est, et parum habet de materia; unde omnibus substantiis immaterialibus et invisibilibus hoc nomen attribuimus. Per hoc vero quod dicitur sanctus, significatur puritas divinae bonitatis. Si autem accipiatur hoc quod dico spiritus sanctus, in vi unius dictionis, sic ex usu Ecclesiae est accommodatum ad significandam unam trium personarum, scilicet quae procedit per modum amoris, ratione iam dicta. | Reply to Objection 1. The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the immateriality of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word "holy" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above explained. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet hoc quod dico spiritus sanctus, relative non dicatur, tamen pro relativo ponitur, inquantum est accommodatum ad significandam personam sola relatione ab aliis distinctam. Potest tamen intelligi etiam in nomine aliqua relatio, si spiritus intelligatur quasi spiratus. | Reply to Objection 2. Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate a relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including a relation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus]. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in nomine filii intelligitur sola relatio eius qui est a principio, ad principium, sed in nomine patris intelligitur relatio principii; et similiter in nomine spiritus, prout importat quandam vim motivam. Nulli autem creaturae competit esse principium respectu alicuius divinae personae, sed e converso. Et ideo potest dici pater noster, et spiritus noster, non tamen potest dici filius noster. | Reply to Objection 3. In the name Son we understand that relation only which is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but in the name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power. But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say "our Father," and "our Spirit"; but we cannot say "our Son." |
IЄ q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spiritus sanctus non procedat a filio. Quia secundum Dionysium, non est audendum dicere aliquid de substantiali divinitate, praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sacris eloquiis sunt expressa. Sed in Scriptura sacra non exprimitur quod spiritus sanctus a filio procedat, sed solum quod procedat a patre; ut patet Ioann. XV, spiritum veritatis, qui a patre procedit. Ergo spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio. |
Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles." But in the Sacred Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; but only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from Jn. 15:26: "The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, in symbolo Constantinopolitanae synodi sic legitur, credimus in spiritum sanctum, dominum et vivificantem, ex patre procedentem, cum patre et filio adorandum et glorificandum. Nullo igitur modo debuit addi in symbolo nostro quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio, sed videntur esse anathematis rei, qui hoc addiderunt. | Objection 2. Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can. vii) we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver, who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and glorified." Therefore it should not be added in our Creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, spiritum sanctum ex patre dicimus, et spiritum patris nominamus, ex filio autem spiritum sanctum non dicimus, spiritum vero filii nominamus. Ergo spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio. | Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him the Spirit of the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, nihil procedit ab eo in quo quiescit. Sed spiritus sanctus quiescit in filio. Dicitur enim in legenda beati Andreae, pax vobis, et universis qui credunt in unum Deum patrem, et in unum filium eius, unicum dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, et in unum spiritum sanctum, procedentem ex patre, et in filio permanentem. Ergo spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio. | Objection 4. Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St. Andrew: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, filius procedit ut verbum. Sed spiritus noster in nobis non videtur procedere a verbo nostro. Ergo nec spiritus sanctus procedit a filio. | Objection 5. Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath [spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 arg. 6 Praeterea, spiritus sanctus perfecte procedit a patre. Ergo superfluum est dicere quod procedit a filio. | Objection 6. Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 arg. 7 Praeterea, in perpetuis non differt esse et posse, ut dicitur in III Physic.; et multo minus in divinis. Sed spiritus sanctus potest distingui a filio, etiam si ab eo non procedat. Dicit enim Anselmus, in libro de processione spiritus sancti, habent utique a patre esse filius et spiritus sanctus, sed diverso modo, quia alter nascendo, et alter procedendo, ut alii sint per hoc ab invicem. Et postea subdit, nam si per aliud non essent plures filius et spiritus sanctus, per hoc solum essent diversi. Ergo spiritus sanctus distinguitur a filio, ab eo non existens. | Objection 7. Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in things perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir. Sancti, ii): "The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another." And further on he says: "For even if for no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice." Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Athanasius, spiritus sanctus a patre et filio, non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens. | On the contrary, Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding." |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere spiritum sanctum a filio esse. Si enim non esset ab eo, nullo modo posset ab eo personaliter distingui. Quod ex supra dictis patet. Non enim est possibile dicere quod secundum aliquid absolutum divinae personae ab invicem distinguantur, quia sequeretur quod non esset trium una essentia; quidquid enim in divinis absolute dicitur, ad unitatem essentiae pertinet. Relinquitur ergo quod solum relationibus divinae personae ab invicem distinguantur. Relationes autem personas distinguere non possunt, nisi secundum quod sunt oppositae. Quod ex hoc patet, quia pater habet duas relationes, quarum una refertur ad filium, et alia ad spiritum sanctum; quae tamen, quia non sunt oppositae, non constituunt duas personas, sed ad unam personam patris tantum pertinent. Si ergo in filio et in spiritu sancto non esset invenire nisi duas relationes quibus uterque refertur ad patrem, illae relationes non essent ad invicem oppositae; sicut neque duae relationes quibus pater refertur ad illos. Unde, sicut persona patris est una, ita sequeretur quod persona filii et spiritus sancti esset una, habens duas relationes oppositas duabus relationibus patris. Hoc autem est haereticum, cum tollat fidem Trinitatis. Oportet ergo quod filius et spiritus sanctus ad invicem referantur oppositis relationibus. Non autem possunt esse in divinis aliae relationes oppositae nisi relationes originis, ut supra probatum est. Oppositae autem relationes originis accipiuntur secundum principium, et secundum quod est a principio. Relinquitur ergo quod necesse est dicere vel filium esse a spiritu sancto, quod nullus dicit, vel spiritum sanctum esse a filio, quod nos confitemur. Et huic quidem consonat ratio processionis utriusque. Dictum enim est supra quod filius procedit per modum intellectus, ut verbum; spiritus sanctus autem per modum voluntatis, ut amor. Necesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat, non enim aliquid amamus, nisi secundum quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est quod spiritus sanctus procedit a filio. Ipse etiam ordo rerum hoc docet. Nusquam enim hoc invenimus, quod ab uno procedant plura absque ordine, nisi in illis solum quae materialiter differunt; sicut unus faber producit multos cultellos materialiter ab invicem distinctos, nullum ordinem habentes ad invicem. Sed in rebus in quibus non est sola materialis distinctio, semper invenitur in multitudine productorum aliquis ordo. Unde etiam in ordine creaturarum productarum, decor divinae sapientiae manifestatur. Si ergo ab una persona patris procedunt duae personae, scilicet filius et spiritus sanctus, oportet esse aliquem ordinem eorum ad invicem. Nec potest aliquis ordo alius assignari, nisi ordo naturae, quo alius est ex alio. Non est igitur possibile dicere quod filius et spiritus sanctus sic procedant a patre, quod neuter eorum procedat ab alio, nisi quis poneret in eis materialem distinctionem, quod est impossibile. Unde etiam ipsi Graeci processionem spiritus sancti aliquem ordinem habere ad filium intelligunt. Concedunt enim spiritum sanctum esse spiritum filii, et esse a patre per filium. Et quidam eorum dicuntur concedere quod sit a filio, vel profluat ab eo, non tamen quod procedat. Quod videtur vel ex ignorantia, vel ex protervia esse. Quia si quis recte consideret, inveniet processionis verbum inter omnia quae ad originem qualemcumque pertinent, communissimum esse. Utimur enim eo ad designandum qualemcumque originem; sicut quod linea procedit a puncto, radius a sole, rivus a fonte; et similiter in quibuscumque aliis. Unde ex quocumque alio ad originem pertinente, potest concludi quod spiritus sanctus procedit a filio. | I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (28, 3; 30, 2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved above (28, 44). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess. Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above (27, 2,4; 28, 4), that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction we always find that some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is impossible. Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father "through the Son." Some of them are said also to concede that "He is from the Son"; or that "He flows from the Son," but not that He proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de Deo dicere non debemus quod in sacra Scriptura non invenitur vel per verba, vel per sensum. Licet autem per verba non inveniatur in sacra Scriptura quod spiritus sanctus procedit a filio, invenitur tamen quantum ad sensum; et praecipue ubi dicit filius, Ioan. XVI, de spiritu sancto loquens, ille me clarificabit, quia de meo accipiet. Regulariter etiam in sacra Scriptura tenendum est, quod id quod de patre dicitur, oportet de filio intelligi, etiam si dictio exclusiva addatur, nisi solum in illis in quibus pater et filius secundum oppositas relationes distinguuntur. Cum enim dominus, Matth. XI, dicit, nemo novit filium nisi pater, non excluditur quin filius seipsum cognoscat. Sic igitur cum dicitur quod spiritus sanctus a patre procedit, etiam si adderetur quod a solo patre procedit, non excluderetur inde filius, quia quantum ad hoc quod est esse principium spiritus sancti, non opponuntur pater et filius; sed solum quantum ad hoc, quod hic est pater et ille filius. | Reply to Objection 1. We ought not to say about God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost, "He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine" (Jn. 16:14). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations, whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For when the Lord says, "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father," the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in quolibet Concilio institutum fuit symbolum aliquod, propter errorem aliquem qui in Concilio damnabatur. Unde sequens Concilium non faciebat aliud symbolum quam primum, sed id quod implicite continebatur in primo symbolo, per aliqua addita explanabatur contra haereses insurgentes. Unde in determinatione Chalcedonensis synodi dicitur, quod illi qui fuerunt congregati in Concilio Constantinopolitano, doctrinam de spiritu sancto tradiderunt, non quod minus esset in praecedentibus (qui apud Nicaeam congregati sunt), inferentes; sed intellectum eorum adversus haereticos declarantes. Quia igitur in tempore antiquorum Conciliorum nondum exortus fuerat error dicentium spiritum sanctum non procedere a filio; non fuit necessarium quod hoc explicite poneretur. Sed postea, insurgente errore quorundam, in quodam Concilio in Occidentalibus partibus congregato, expressum fuit auctoritate Romani pontificis; cuius auctoritate etiam antiqua Concilia congregabantur et confirmabantur. Continebatur tamen implicite in hoc ipso quod dicebatur spiritus sanctus a patre procedere. | Reply to Objection 2. In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated together in the council of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on, when certain errors rose up, another council [Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod spiritum sanctum non procedere a filio, primo fuit a Nestorianis introductum; ut patet in quodam symbolo Nestorianorum damnato in Ephesina synodo. Et hunc errorem secutus fuit Theodoretus Nestorianus, et plures post ipsum; inter quos fuit etiam Damascenus. Unde in hoc eius sententiae non est standum. Quamvis a quibusdam dicatur quod Damascenus, sicut non confitetur spiritum sanctum esse a filio, ita etiam non negat, ex vi illorum verborum. | Reply to Objection 3. The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him, among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that while Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither do those words of his express a denial thereof. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod per hoc quod spiritus sanctus dicitur quiescere vel manere in filio, non excluditur quin ab eo procedat, quia et filius in patre manere dicitur, cum tamen a patre procedat. Dicitur etiam spiritus sanctus in filio quiescere, vel sicut amor amantis quiescit in amato; vel quantum ad humanam naturam Christi, propter id quod scriptum est, Ioan. I, super quem videris spiritum descendentem, et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat. | Reply to Objection 4. When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature of Christ, by reason of what is written: "On whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes" (Jn. 1:33). |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod verbum in divinis non accipitur secundum similitudinem verbi vocalis, a quo non procedit spiritus, quia sic tantum metaphorice diceretur, sed secundum similitudinem verbi mentalis, a quo amor procedit. | Reply to Objection 5. The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word, whence proceeds love. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod per hoc quod spiritus sanctus perfecte procedit a patre, non solum non superfluum est dicere quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio; sed omnino necessarium. Quia una virtus est patris et filii; et quidquid est a patre, necesse est esse a filio, nisi proprietati filiationis repugnet. Non enim filius est a seipso, licet sit a patre. | Reply to Objection 6. For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from the Father. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 2 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum quod spiritus sanctus distinguitur personaliter a filio in hoc, quod origo unius distinguitur ab origine alterius. Sed ipsa differentia originis est per hoc, quod filius est solum a patre, spiritus sanctus vero a patre et filio. Non enim aliter processiones distinguerentur, sicut supra ostensum est. | Reply to Objection 7. The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other; but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other, as explained above, and in 27. |
IЄ q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod spiritus sanctus non procedat a patre per filium. Quod enim procedit ab aliquo per aliquem, non procedit ab eo immediate. Si igitur spiritus sanctus procedit a patre per filium, non procedit a patre immediate. Quod videtur inconveniens. |
Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed immediately; which seems to be unfitting. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, si spiritus sanctus procedit a patre per filium, non procedit a filio nisi propter patrem. Sed propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Ergo magis procedit a patre quam a filio. | Objection 2. Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the Father. But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, filius habet esse per generationem. Si igitur spiritus sanctus est a patre per filium, sequitur quod prius generetur filius, et postea procedat spiritus sanctus. Et sic processio spiritus sancti non est aeterna. Quod est haereticum. | Objection 3. Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, cum aliquis dicitur per aliquem operari, potest e converso dici, sicut enim dicimus quod rex operatur per ballivum, ita potest dici quod ballivus operatur per regem. Sed nullo modo dicimus quod filius spiret spiritum sanctum per patrem. Ergo nullo modo potest dici quod pater spiret spiritum sanctum per filium. | Objection 4. Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit, in libro de Trin., conserva hanc, oro, fidei meae religionem, ut semper obtineam patrem, scilicet te; et filium tuum una tecum adorem; et spiritum sanctum tuum, qui est per unigenitum tuum, promerear. | On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father--namely Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten." |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus locutionibus in quibus dicitur aliquis per aliquem operari, haec praepositio per designat in causali aliquam causam seu principium illius actus. Sed cum actio sit media inter faciens et factum, quandoque illud causale cui adiungitur haec praepositio per, est causa actionis secundum quod exit ab agente. Et tunc est causa agenti quod agat; sive sit causa finalis, sive formalis, sive effectiva vel motiva, finalis quidem, ut si dicamus quod artifex operatur per cupiditatem lucri; formalis vero, ut si dicamus quod operatur per artem suam; motiva vero, si dicamus quod operatur per imperium alterius. Quandoque vero dictio causalis cui adiungitur haec praepositio per, est causa actionis secundum quod terminatur ad factum; ut cum dicimus, artifex operatur per martellum. Non enim significatur quod martellus sit causa artifici quod agat, sed quod sit causa artificiato ut ab artifice procedat; et quod hoc ipsum habeat ab artifice. Et hoc est quod quidam dicunt, quod haec praepositio per quandoque notat auctoritatem in recto, ut cum dicitur, rex operatur per ballivum, quandoque autem in obliquo, ut cum dicitur, ballivus operatur per regem. Quia igitur filius habet a patre quod ab eo procedat spiritus sanctus, potest dici quod pater per filium spirat spiritum sanctum; vel quod spiritus sanctus procedat a patre per filium, quod idem est. | I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through another, this preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition "through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this preposition "through" is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition "through" sometimes denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king. Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, which has the same meaning. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in qualibet actione est duo considerare, scilicet suppositum agens, et virtutem qua agit; sicut ignis calefacit calore. Si igitur in patre et filio consideretur virtus qua spirant spiritum sanctum, non cadit ibi aliquod medium, quia haec virtus est una et eadem. Si autem considerentur ipsae personae spirantes, sic, cum spiritus sanctus communiter procedat a patre et filio, invenitur spiritus sanctus immediate a patre procedere, inquantum est ab eo; et mediate, inquantum est a filio. Et sic dicitur procedere a patre per filium. Sicut etiam Abel processit immediate ab Adam, inquantum Adam fuit pater eius; et mediate, inquantum Eva fuit mater eius, quae processit ab Adam; licet hoc exemplum materialis processionis ineptum videatur ad significandam immaterialem processionem divinarum personarum. | Reply to Objection 1. In every action two things are to be considered, the "suppositum" acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance, fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si filius acciperet a patre aliam virtutem numero ad spirandum spiritum sanctum, sequeretur quod esset sicut causa secunda et instrumentalis, et sic magis procederet a patre quam a filio. Sed una et eadem numero virtus spirativa est in patre et filio, et ideo aequaliter procedit ab utroque. Licet aliquando dicatur principaliter vel proprie procedere de patre, propter hoc quod filius habet hanc virtutem a patre. | Reply to Objection 2. If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut generatio filii est coaeterna generanti, unde non prius fuit pater quam gigneret filium; ita processio spiritus sancti est coaeterna suo principio. Unde non fuit prius filius genitus, quam spiritus sanctus procederet, sed utrumque aeternum est. | Reply to Objection 3. As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum aliquis dicitur per aliquid operari, non semper recipitur conversio, non enim dicimus quod martellus operetur per fabrum. Dicimus autem quod ballivus operatur per regem, quia ballivi est agere, cum sit dominus sui actus. Martelli autem non est agere, sed solum agi, unde non designatur nisi ut instrumentum. Dicitur autem ballivus operari per regem, quamvis haec praepositio per denotet medium, quia, quanto suppositum est prius in agendo, tanto virtus eius est immediatior effectui, quia virtus causae primae coniungit causam secundam suo effectui, unde et prima principia dicuntur immediata in demonstrativis scientiis. Sic igitur, inquantum ballivus est medius secundum ordinem suppositorum agentium, dicitur rex operari per ballivum, secundum ordinem vero virtutum, dicitur ballivus operari per regem, quia virtus regis facit quod actio ballivi consequatur effectum. Ordo autem non attenditur inter patrem et filium quantum ad virtutem; sed solum quantum ad supposita. Et ideo dicitur quod pater spirat per filium, et non e converso. | Reply to Objection 4. When anyone is said to work through anything, the converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the mallet works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to act, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act, but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only as an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the king, although this preposition "through" denotes a medium, for the more a "suppositum" is prior in action, so much the more is its power immediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect. Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of the subject's acting, the king is said to work through the bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of power between Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that the Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely. |
IЄ q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pater et filius non sint unum principium spiritus sancti. Quia spiritus sanctus non videtur a patre et filio procedere inquantum sunt unum, neque in natura, quia spiritus sanctus sic etiam procederet a seipso, qui est unum cum eis in natura; neque etiam inquantum sunt unum in aliqua proprietate, quia una proprietas non potest esse duorum suppositorum, ut videtur. Ergo spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio ut sunt plures. Non ergo pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. |
Objection 1. It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, cum dicitur, pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, non potest ibi designari unitas personalis, quia sic pater et filius essent una persona. Neque etiam unitas proprietatis, quia si propter unam proprietatem pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, pari ratione, propter duas proprietates pater videtur esse duo principia filii et spiritus sancti; quod est inconveniens. Non ergo pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. | Objection 2. Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity, because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, filius non magis convenit cum patre quam spiritus sanctus. Sed spiritus sanctus et pater non sunt unum principium respectu alicuius divinae personae. Ergo neque pater et filius. | Objection 3. Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, si pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti aut unum quod est pater; aut unum quod non est pater. Sed neutrum est dare, quia si unum quod est pater, sequitur quod filius sit pater; si unum quod non est pater, sequitur quod pater non est pater. Non ergo dicendum est quod pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti. | Objection 4. Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father. But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, si pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti videtur e converso dicendum quod unum principium spiritus sancti sit pater et filius. Sed haec videtur esse falsa, quia hoc quod dico principium, oportet quod supponat vel pro persona patris, vel pro persona filii; et utroque modo est falsa. Ergo etiam haec est falsa, pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. | Objection 5. Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for this word "principle" stands either for the person of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it is false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 arg. 6 Praeterea, unum in substantia facit idem. Si igitur pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, sequitur quod sint idem principium. Sed hoc a multis negatur. Ergo non est concedendum quod pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti. | Objection 6. Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 arg. 7 Praeterea, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, quia sunt unum principium creaturae, dicuntur esse unus creator. Sed pater et filius non sunt unus spirator, sed duo spiratores, ut a multis dicitur. Quod etiam consonat dictis Hilarii, qui dicit, in II de Trin., quod spiritus sanctus a patre et filio auctoribus confitendus est. Ergo pater et filius non sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. | Objection 7. Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "the Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors." Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in V de Trin., quod pater et filius non sunt duo principia, sed unum principium spiritus sancti. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod pater et filius in omnibus unum sunt, in quibus non distinguit inter eos relationis oppositio. Unde, cum in hoc quod est esse principium spiritus sancti, non opponantur relative, sequitur quod pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. Quidam tamen dicunt hanc esse impropriam, pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. Quia cum hoc nomen principium, singulariter acceptum, non significet personam, sed proprietatem, dicunt quod sumitur adiective, et quia adiectivum non determinatur per adiectivum, non potest convenienter dici quod pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti, nisi unum intelligatur quasi adverbialiter positum, ut sit sensus, sunt unum principium, idest uno modo. Sed simili ratione posset dici pater duo principia filii et spiritus sancti, idest duobus modis. Dicendum est ergo quod, licet hoc nomen principium significet proprietatem, tamen significat eam per modum substantivi, sicut hoc nomen pater vel filius etiam in rebus creatis. Unde numerum accipit a forma significata, sicut et alia substantiva. Sicut igitur pater et filius sunt unus Deus, propter unitatem formae significatae per hoc nomen Deus; ita sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, propter unitatem proprietatis significatae in hoc nomine principium. | I answer that, The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, they declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not signify "person," but "property," it must be taken as an adjective; and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the meaning should be: They are one principle--that is, in one and the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that the Father is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost--namely, in two ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word "principle" signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words "father" and "son" even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word "God"; so they are one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word "principle." |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si attendatur virtus spirativa, spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio inquantum sunt unum in virtute spirativa, quae quodammodo significat naturam cum proprietate, ut infra dicetur. Neque est inconveniens unam proprietatem esse in duobus suppositis, quorum est una natura. Si vero considerentur supposita spirationis, sic spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio ut sunt plures, procedit enim ab eis ut amor unitivus duorum. | Reply to Objection 1. If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one property being in two "supposita" that possess one common nature. But if we consider the "supposita" of the spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, designatur una proprietas, quae est forma significata per nomen. Non tamen sequitur quod propter plures proprietates possit dici pater plura principia, quia implicaretur pluralitas suppositorum. | Reply to Objection 2. In the proposition "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is the form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum relativas proprietates non attenditur in divinis similitudo vel dissimilitudo, sed secundum essentiam. Unde, sicut pater non est similior sibi quam filio, ita nec filius similior patri quam spiritus sanctus. | Reply to Objection 3. It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod haec duo, scilicet, pater et filius sunt unum principium quod est pater, aut, unum principium quod non est pater, non sunt contradictorie opposita. Unde non est necesse alterum eorum dare. Cum enim dicimus, pater et filius sunt unum principium, hoc quod dico principium, non habet determinatam suppositionem, imo confusam pro duabus personis simul. Unde in processu est fallacia figurae dictionis, a confusa suppositione ad determinatam. | Reply to Objection 4. These two propositions, "The Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not the Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father and the Son are one principle, this word "principle" has not determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of "figure of speech" as the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec etiam est vera, unum principium spiritus sancti est pater et filius. Quia hoc quod dico principium non supponit pro una persona tantum, sed indistincte pro duabus, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 5. This proposition is also true:--The one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word "principle" does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above explained. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod convenienter potest dici quod pater et filius sunt idem principium, secundum quod ly principium supponit confuse et indistincte pro duabus personis simul. | Reply to Objection 6. There is no reason against saying that the Father and the Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together. |
| IЄ q. 36 a. 4 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pater et filius, licet sint unum principium spiritus sancti, sunt tamen duo spiratores, propter distinctionem suppositorum, sicut etiam duo spirantes, quia actus referuntur ad supposita. Nec est eadem ratio de hoc nomine creator. Quia spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio ut sunt duae personae distinctae, ut dictum est, non autem creatura procedit a tribus personis ut sunt personae distinctae, sed ut sunt unum in essentia. Sed videtur melius dicendum quod, quia spirans adiectivum est, spirator vero substantivum, possumus dicere quod pater et filius sunt duo spirantes, propter pluralitatem suppositorum; non autem duo spiratores, propter unam spirationem. Nam adiectiva nomina habent numerum secundum supposita, substantiva vero a seipsis, secundum formam significatam. Quod vero Hilarius dicit, quod spiritus sanctus est a patre et filio auctoribus, exponendum est quod ponitur substantivum pro adiectivo. | Reply to Objection 7. Some say that although the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of the distinction of "supposita," as also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of the "supposita" but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the "supposita" but substantives from themselves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that "the Holy ghost is from the Father and the Son as His authors," this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective. |
| IЄ q. 37 pr. Deinde quaeritur de nomine amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Secundo, utrum pater et filius diligant se spiritu sancto. | |
IЄ q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Dicit enim Augustinus, XV de Trin., nescio cur, sicut sapientia dicitur et pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, et simul omnes non tres sed una sapientia, non ita et caritas dicatur pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, et simul omnes una caritas. Sed nullum nomen quod de singulis personis praedicatur et de omnibus in communi singulariter, est nomen proprium alicuius personae. Ergo hoc nomen amor non est proprium spiritus sancti. |
Objection 1. It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called Charity, and all together one Charity." But no name which is predicated in the singular of each person and of all together, is a proper name of a person. Therefore this name, "Love," is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, spiritus sanctus est persona subsistens. Sed amor non significatur ut persona subsistens, sed ut actio quaedam ab amante transiens in amatum. Ergo amor non est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. | Objection 2. Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, amor est nexus amantium, quia secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., est quaedam vis unitiva. Sed nexus est medium inter ea quae connectit, non autem aliquid ab eis procedens. Cum igitur spiritus sanctus procedat a patre et filio, sicut ostensum est, videtur quod non sit amor aut nexus patris et filii. | Objection 3. Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force." But a bond is a medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as was shown above (36, 2), it seems that He is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, cuiuslibet amantis est aliquis amor. Sed spiritus sanctus est amans. Ergo eius est aliquis amor. Si igitur spiritus sanctus est amor, erit amor amoris, et spiritus a spiritu. Quod est inconveniens. | Objection 4. Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, ipse spiritus sanctus est amor. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): "The Holy Ghost Himself is Love." |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen amoris in divinis sumi potest et essentialiter et personaliter. Et secundum quod personaliter sumitur, est proprium nomen spiritus sancti; sicut verbum est proprium nomen filii. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, cum in divinis, ut supra ostensum est, sint duae processiones, una per modum intellectus, quae est processio verbi; alia per modum voluntatis, quae est processio amoris, quia prima est nobis magis nota, ad singula significanda quae in ea considerari possunt, sunt magis propria nomina adinventa; non autem in processione voluntatis. Unde et quibusdam circumlocutionibus utimur ad significandam personam procedentem, et relationes etiam quae accipiuntur secundum hanc processionem, et processionis et spirationis nominibus nominantur, ut supra dictum est, quae tamen sunt magis nomina originis quam relationis, secundum proprietatem vocabuli. Et tamen similiter utramque processionem considerari oportet. Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente. Ita quod, cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante. Sed ex parte intellectus, sunt vocabula adinventa ad significandum respectum intelligentis ad rem intellectam, ut patet in hoc quod dico intelligere, et sunt etiam alia vocabula adinventa ad significandum processum intellectualis conceptionis, scilicet ipsum dicere, et verbum. Unde in divinis intelligere solum essentialiter dicitur, quia non importat habitudinem ad verbum procedens, sed verbum personaliter dicitur, quia significat id quod procedit, ipsum vero dicere dicitur notionaliter, quia importat habitudinem principii verbi ad verbum ipsum. Ex parte autem voluntatis, praeter diligere et amare, quae important habitudinem amantis ad rem amatam, non sunt aliqua vocabula imposita, quae importent habitudinem ipsius impressionis vel affectionis rei amatae, quae provenit in amante ex hoc quod amat, ad suum principium, aut e converso. Et ideo, propter vocabulorum inopiam, huiusmodi habitudines significamus vocabulis amoris et dilectionis; sicut si verbum nominaremus intelligentiam conceptam, vel sapientiam genitam. Sic igitur, inquantum in amore vel dilectione non importatur nisi habitudo amantis ad rem amatam, amor et diligere essentialiter dicuntur, sicut intelligentia et intelligere. Inquantum vero his vocabulis utimur ad exprimendam habitudinem eius rei quae procedit per modum amoris, ad suum principium, et e converso; ita quod per amorem intelligatur amor procedens, et per diligere intelligatur spirare amorem procedentem, sic amor est nomen personae, et diligere vel amare est verbum notionale, sicut dicere vel generare. | I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son. To see this we must know that since as shown above (27, 2,3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations following from this procession which are called "procession" and "spiration," as stated above (27, 4, ad 3), and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception--namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love," which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by fact that he loves--to the principle of that impression, or "vice versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom begotten." It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of the essence, as "understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is understood the "love proceeding," and by "to love" is understood "the spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name of the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to beget." To see this we must know that since as shown above (27, 2,3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations following from this procession which are called "procession" and "spiration," as stated above (27, 4, ad 3), and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception--namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love," which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by fact that he loves--to the principle of that impression, or "vice versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom begotten." It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of the essence, as "understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is understood the "love proceeding," and by "to love" is understood "the spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name of the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to beget." |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de caritate, secundum quod essentialiter sumitur in divinis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the divine essence, as was said above (here and 24, 2, ad 4). |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intelligere et velle et amare, licet significentur per modum actionum transeuntium in obiecta, sunt tamen actiones manentes in agentibus, ut supra dictum est; ita tamen quod in ipso agente important habitudinem quandam ad obiectum. Unde amor, etiam in nobis, est aliquid manens in amante, et verbum cordis manens in dicente; tamen cum habitudine ad rem verbo expressam, vel amatam. Sed in Deo, in quo nullum est accidens, plus habet, quia tam verbum quam amor est subsistens. Cum ergo dicitur quod spiritus sanctus est amor patris in filium, vel in quidquam aliud, non significatur aliquid transiens in alium; sed solum habitudo amoris ad rem amatam; sicut et in verbo importatur habitudo verbi ad rem verbo expressam. | Reply to Objection 2. Although to understand, and to will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents, as stated above (14, 4), yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there is more than this; because both Word and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for something else; we do not mean anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod spiritus sanctus dicitur esse nexus patris et filii, inquantum est amor, quia, cum pater amet unica dilectione se et filium, et e converso, importatur in spiritu sancto, prout est amor, habitudo patris ad filium, et e converso, ut amantis ad amatum. Sed ex hoc ipso quod pater et filius se mutuo amant, oportet quod mutuus amor, qui est spiritus sanctus, ab utroque procedat. Secundum igitur originem, spiritus sanctus non est medius, sed tertia in Trinitate persona. Secundum vero praedictam habitudinem, est medius nexus duorum, ab utroque procedens. | Reply to Objection 3. The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from both. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut filio, licet intelligat, non tamen sibi competit producere verbum, quia intelligere convenit ei ut verbo procedenti; ita, licet spiritus sanctus amet, essentialiter accipiendo, non tamen convenit ei quod spiret amorem, quod est diligere notionaliter sumptum; quia sic diligit essentialiter ut amor procedens, non ut a quo procedit amor. | Reply to Objection 4. As it does not belong to the Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as the word proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term; because He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one whence love proceeds. |
IЄ q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pater et filius non diligant se spiritu sancto. Augustinus enim, in VII de Trin., probat quod pater non est sapiens sapientia genita. Sed sicut filius est sapientia genita, ita spiritus sanctus est amor procedens, ut dictum est. Ergo pater et filius non diligunt se amore procedente, qui est spiritus sanctus. |
Objection 1. It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained above (27, 3). Therefore the Father and the Son do not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, cum dicitur, pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto, hoc verbum diligere aut sumitur essentialiter, aut notionaliter. Sed non potest esse vera secundum quod sumitur essentialiter, quia pari ratione posset dici quod pater intelligit filio. Neque etiam secundum quod sumitur notionaliter, quia pari ratione posset dici quod pater et filius spirant spiritu sancto, vel quod pater generat filio. Ergo nullo modo haec est vera, pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto. | Objection 2. Further, the proposition, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost," this word "love" is to be taken either essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same way we might say that "the Father understands by the Son"; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like manner, it might be said that "the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Ghost," or that "the Father generates by the Son." Therefore in no way is this proposition true: "'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost." |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, eodem amore pater diligit filium, et se, et nos. Sed pater non diligit se spiritu sancto. Quia nullus actus notionalis reflectitur super principium actus, non enim potest dici quod pater generat se, vel spirat se. Ergo etiam non potest dici quod diligat se spiritu sancto, secundum quod diligere sumitur notionaliter. Item, amor quo diligit nos, non videtur esse spiritus sanctus, quia importatur respectus ad creaturam, et ita ad essentiam pertinet. Ergo et haec est falsa, pater diligit filium spiritu sancto. | Objection 3. Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the "Father begets Himself," or that "He spirates Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that "He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost," if "to love" is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false: "The Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost." |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod spiritus sanctus est quo genitus a generante diligitur, genitoremque suum diligit. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begetter." |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem difficultatem affert quod, cum dicitur, pater diligit filium spiritu sancto, cum ablativus construatur in habitudine alicuius causae, videtur quod spiritus sanctus sit principium diligendi patri et filio; quod est omnino impossibile. Et ideo quidam dixerunt hanc esse falsam, pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto. Et dicunt hanc esse retractatam ab Augustino in suo simili, cum scilicet retractavit istam, pater est sapiens sapientia genita. Quidam vero dicunt quod est propositio impropria; et est sic exponenda, pater diligit filium spiritu sancto, idest amore essentiali, qui appropriatur spiritui sancto. Quidam vero dixerunt quod ablativus iste construitur in habitudine signi, ut sit sensus, spiritus sanctus est signum quod pater diligat filium, inquantum scilicet procedit ab eis ut amor. Quidam vero dixerunt quod ablativus iste construitur in habitudine causae formalis, quia spiritus sanctus est amor, quo formaliter pater et filius se invicem diligunt. Quidam vero dixerunt quod construitur in habitudine effectus formalis. Et isti propinquius ad veritatem accesserunt. Unde ad huius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, cum res communiter denominentur a suis formis, sicut album ab albedine, et homo ab humanitate; omne illud a quo aliquid denominatur, quantum ad hoc habet habitudinem formae. Ut si dicam, iste est indutus vestimento, iste ablativus construitur in habitudine causae formalis, quamvis non sit forma. Contingit autem aliquid denominari per id quod ab ipso procedit, non solum sicut agens actione; sed etiam sicut ipso termino actionis, qui est effectus, quando ipse effectus in intellectu actionis includitur. Dicimus enim quod ignis est calefaciens calefactione, quamvis calefactio non sit calor, qui est forma ignis, sed actio ab igne procedens, et dicimus quod arbor est florens floribus, quamvis flores non sint forma arboris, sed quidam effectus ab ipsa procedentes. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum quod, cum diligere in divinis dupliciter sumatur, essentialiter scilicet et notionaliter; secundum quod essentialiter sumitur, sic pater et filius non diligunt se spiritu sancto, sed essentia sua. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quis audet dicere patrem nec se nec filium nec spiritum sanctum diligere nisi per spiritum sanctum? Et secundum hoc procedunt primae opiniones. Secundum vero quod notionaliter sumitur, sic diligere nihil est aliud quam spirare amorem; sicut dicere est producere verbum, et florere est producere flores. Sicut ergo dicitur arbor florens floribus, ita dicitur pater dicens verbo vel filio, se et creaturam, et pater et filius dicuntur diligentes spiritu sancto, vel amore procedente, et se et nos. | I answer that, A difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost," since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the Son; which cannot be admitted. In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost"; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that "the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten." Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost"--that is, "by His essential Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, "the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth. To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness, and "man" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action--that is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse sapientem vel intelligentem in divinis non sumitur nisi essentialiter, et ideo non potest dici quod pater sit sapiens vel intelligens filio. Sed diligere sumitur non solum essentialiter, sed etiam notionaliter. Et secundum hoc, possumus dicere quod pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, quando in intellectu alicuius actionis importatur determinatus effectus, potest denominari principium actionis et ab actione et ab effectu; sicut possumus dicere quod arbor est florens floritione, et floribus. Sed quando in actione non includitur determinatus effectus, tunc non potest principium actionis denominari ab effectu, sed solum ab actione, non enim dicimus quod arbor producit florem flore, sed productione floris. In hoc igitur quod dico spirat vel generat, importatur actus notionalis tantum. Unde non possumus dicere quod pater spiret spiritu sancto, vel generet filio. Possumus autem dicere quod pater dicit verbo, tanquam persona procedente, et dicit dictione, tanquam actu notionali, quia dicere importat determinatam personam procedentem, cum dicere sit producere verbum. Et similiter diligere, prout notionaliter sumitur, est producere amorem. Et ideo potest dici quod pater diligit filium spiritu sancto, tanquam persona procedente, et ipsa dilectione, tanquam actu notionali. | Reply to Objection 2. When the idea of an action includes a determined effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, "and speaks by the speaking," as by a notional act; forasmuch as "to speak" imports a determinate person proceeding; since "to speak" means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act. |
| IЄ q. 37 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod pater non solum filium, sed etiam se et nos diligit spiritu sancto. Quia, ut dictum est diligere, prout notionaliter sumitur, non solum importat productionem divinae personae, sed etiam personam productam per modum amoris, qui habet habitudinem ad rem dilectam. Unde, sicut pater dicit se et omnem creaturam verbo quod genuit, inquantum verbum genitum sufficienter repraesentat patrem et omnem creaturam; ita diligit se et omnem creaturam spiritu sancto, inquantum spiritus sanctus procedit ut amor bonitatis primae, secundum quam pater amat se et omnem creaturam. Et sic etiam patet quod respectus importatur ad creaturam et in verbo et in amore procedente, quasi secundario; inquantum scilicet veritas et bonitas divina est principium intelligendi et amandi omnem creaturam. | Reply to Objection 3. The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person, but also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word "begotten" adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures. |
| IЄ q. 38 pr. Consequenter quaeritur de dono. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum donum possit esse nomen personale. Secundo, utrum sit proprium spiritus sancti. | |
IЄ q. 38 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum non sit nomen personale. Omne enim nomen personale importat aliquam distinctionem in divinis. Sed nomen doni non importat aliquam distinctionem in divinis, dicit enim Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod spiritus sanctus ita datur sicut Dei donum, ut etiam seipsum det sicut Deus. Ergo donum non est nomen personale. |
Objection 1. It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of "Gift" does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that "the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He also gives Himself as God." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullum nomen personale convenit essentiae divinae. Sed essentia divina est donum quod pater dat filio, ut patet per Hilarium, IX de Trin. Ergo donum non est nomen personale. | Objection 2. Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum Damascenum, nihil est subiectum aut serviens in divinis personis. Sed donum importat quandam subiectionem et ad eum cui datur, et ad eum a quo datur. Ergo donum non est nomen personale. | Objection 3. Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, donum importat respectum ad creaturam, et ita videtur de Deo dici ex tempore. Sed nomina personalia dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, ut pater et filius. Ergo donum non est nomen personale. | Objection 4. Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin., sicut corpus carnis nihil aliud est quam caro, sic donum spiritus sancti nihil aliud est quam spiritus sanctus. Sed spiritus sanctus est nomen personale. Ergo et donum. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is "Gift." |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in nomine doni importatur aptitudo ad hoc quod donetur. Quod autem donatur, habet habitudinem et ad id a quo datur, et ad id cui datur, non enim daretur ab aliquo nisi esset eius; et ad hoc alicui datur, ut eius sit. Persona autem divina dicitur esse alicuius, vel secundum originem, sicut filius est patris; vel inquantum ab aliquo habetur. Habere autem dicimur id quo libere possumus uti vel frui, ut volumus. Et per hunc modum divina persona non potest haberi nisi a rationali creatura Deo coniuncta. Aliae autem creaturae moveri quidem possunt a divina persona; non tamen sic quod in potestate earum sit frui divina persona, et uti effectu eius. Ad quod quandoque pertingit rationalis creatura; ut puta cum sic fit particeps divini verbi et procedentis amoris, ut possit libere Deum vere cognoscere et recte amare. Unde sola creatura rationalis potest habere divinam personam. Sed ad hoc quod sic eam habeat, non potest propria virtute pervenire, unde oportet quod hoc ei desuper detur; hoc enim dari nobis dicitur, quod aliunde habemus. Et sic divinae personae competit dari, et esse donum. | I answer that, The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above; for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can "be given," and can be a "gift." |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nomen doni importat distinctionem personalem, secundum quod donum dicitur esse alicuius per originem. Et tamen spiritus sanctus dat seipsum, inquantum est sui ipsius, ut potens se uti, vel potius frui; sicut et homo liber dicitur esse sui ipsius. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quid tam tuum est quam tu? Vel dicendum, et melius, quod donum oportet esse aliquo modo dantis. Sed hoc esse huius dicitur multipliciter. Uno modo, per modum identitatis, sicut dicit Augustinus super Ioan., et sic donum non distinguitur a dante, sed ab eo cui datur. Et sic dicitur quod spiritus sanctus dat se. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse alicuius ut possessio vel servus, et sic oportet quod donum essentialiter distinguatur a dante. Et sic donum Dei est aliquid creatum. Tertio modo dicitur hoc esse huius per originem tantum, et sic filius est patris, et spiritus sanctus utriusque. Inquantum ergo donum hoc modo dicitur esse dantis, sic distinguitur a dante personaliter, et est nomen personale. | Reply to Objection 1. The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction , in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): "What is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, "this is this one's," can be understood in several senses. In one way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third sense "this is this one's" through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal name. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia dicitur esse donum patris primo modo, quia essentia est patris per modum identitatis. | Reply to Objection 2. The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first sense, as being the Father's by way of identity. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod donum, secundum quod est nomen personale in divinis, non importat subiectionem, sed originem tantum, in comparatione ad dantem. In comparatione vero ad eum cui datur, importat liberum usum vel fruitionem, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. Gift as a personal name in God does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod donum non dicitur ex eo quod actu datur, sed inquantum habet aptitudinem ut possit dari. Unde ab aeterno divina persona dicitur donum, licet ex tempore detur. Nec tamen per hoc quod importatur respectus ad creaturam, oportet quod sit essentiale, sed quod aliquid essentiale in suo intellectu includatur, sicut essentia includitur in intellectu personae, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 4. Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature; but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above (34, 3). |
IЄ q. 38 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum non sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Donum enim dicitur ex eo quod datur. Sed, sicut dicitur Isa. IX, filius datus est nobis. Ergo esse donum convenit filio, sicut spiritui sancto. |
Objection 1. It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Is. 9:16 says: "A Son is give to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne nomen proprium alicuius personae significat aliquam eius proprietatem. Sed hoc nomen donum non significat proprietatem aliquam spiritus sancti. Ergo donum non est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. | Objection 2. Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost. Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, spiritus sanctus potest dici spiritus alicuius hominis, ut supra dictum est. Sed non potest dici donum alicuius hominis, sed solum donum Dei. Ergo donum non est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. | Objection 3. Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "God's Gift" only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., sicut natum esse est filio a patre esse, ita spiritui sancto donum Dei esse est a patre et filio procedere. Sed spiritus sanctus sortitur proprium nomen inquantum procedit a patre et filio. Ergo et donum est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As 'to be born' is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be the Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod donum, secundum quod personaliter sumitur in divinis, est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod donum proprie est datio irreddibilis, secundum philosophum, idest quod non datur intentione retributionis, et sic importat gratuitam donationem. Ratio autem gratuitae donationis est amor, ideo enim damus gratis alicui aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo quod damus ei, est amor quo volumus ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod amor habet rationem primi doni, per quod omnia dona gratuita donantur. Unde, cum spiritus sanctus procedat ut amor, sicut iam dictum est, procedit in ratione doni primi. Unde dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod per donum quod est spiritus sanctus, multa propria dona dividuntur membris Christi. | I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost. In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)--i.e. a thing which is not given with the intention of a return--and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above (27, 4; 37, 1), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ." |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut filius, quia procedit per modum verbi, quod de ratione sua habet quod sit similitudo sui principii dicitur proprie imago, licet etiam spiritus sanctus sit similis patri; ita etiam spiritus sanctus, quia a patre procedit ut amor, dicitur proprie donum, licet etiam filius detur. Hoc enim ipsum quod filius datur, est ex patris amore, secundum illud Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut filium suum unigenitum daret. | Reply to Objection 1. As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, "God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" (Jn. 3:16). |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in nomine doni importatur quod sit dantis per originem. Et sic importatur proprietas originis spiritus sancti, quae est processio. | Reply to Objection 2. The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin of the Holy Ghost--that is, His procession. |
| IЄ q. 38 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod donum, antequam detur, est tantum dantis, sed postquam datur, est eius cui datur. Quia igitur donum non importat dationem in actu, non potest dici quod sit donum hominis; sed donum Dei dantis. Cum autem iam datum est, tunc hominis est vel spiritus vel datum. | Reply to Objection 3. Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
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